Stephens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. RDB–11–1603.
• Citation: 80 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1094,807 F.Supp.2d 375
• Parties: James S. STEPHENS, Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID–ATLANTIC STATES, INC., et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

80 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1094

807 F.Supp.2d 375

James S. STEPHENS, Plaintiff,

v.KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE MID–ATLANTIC STATES, INC., et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. RDB–11–1603.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Aug. 18, 2011.

Thomas Carey Summers, Gregory Kenneth Kirby, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Diane V. Daiutolo, Tydings and Rosenberg LLP, Derek McIntosh Stikeleather, Richard M. Barnes, Goodell Devries Leech and Dann LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.

Pending before this Court are Plaintiff James S. Stephens' Motion to Remand (ECF No. 21), and a Motion to Stay (ECF No. 10) filed by Defendants DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. Stephens filed suit against Defendants Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid–Atlantic States, Inc. (“Kaiser”), Mid–Atlantic Permanente Medical Group, P.C. (“Mid–Atlantic”), Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (“Johnson & Johnson”), DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (“DePuy”), and Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd. (“Chesapeake”) in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to recover damages for injuries he sustained after undergoing a total hip replacement. Essentially, Stephens argues that his injuries were the result of medical negligence on the part of Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic, and due to a defective product manufactured and distributed by DePuy, Johnson & Johnson, and Chesapeake. DePuy and Johnson & Johnson removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, despite the fact that complete diversity does not exist insofar as Stephens, Kaiser, Mid–Atlantic, and Chesapeake are Maryland citizens. DePuy and Johnson & Johnson (the “Removing Defendants”) argue that diversity jurisdiction nevertheless exists because Stephens' allegations against Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic were fraudulently misjoined in that the medical negligence and product liability claims do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence, and do not share common questions of law or fact. Moreover, the Removing Defendants assert that Stephens has no possibility of recovering against Defendant Chesapeake, and therefore, under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, Chesapeake's citizenship should be disregarded for the purposes of determining this Court's diversity jurisdiction. This Court has reviewed the record, as well as the pleadings and exhibits, and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2011). For the reasons stated below, the Removing Defendants have not met their heavy burden of showing that Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic were fraudulently misjoined. As complete diversity does not exist, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and it need not determine whether Defendant Chesapeake was fraudulently joined. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED, and Defendants' Motion to Stay (ECF No. 10) is DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2005, Plaintiff Stephens underwent a right total hip replacement surgery performed by Michael Jaworski, M.D., at Greater Baltimore Medical Center (“GBMC”) in Baltimore, Maryland. Compl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 2. During this surgery, Stephens was implanted with the Pinnacle Cup System, an artificial hip prosthesis manufactured by Defendant DePuy.¹ Id. at ¶ 37. After approximately two and a half years, Stephens' hip replacement was examined and it was determined that the device had failed. Id. at 39. On June 10, 2008, Stephens underwent a revision surgery where the failed hip replacement was replaced with another Pinnacle Cup System device. Id. at ¶¶ 40–43. Only two days after leaving GBMC, Stephens reported to the emergency room at Saint Agnes Hospital in Baltimore complaining of indigestion, hip pain, and chest pains. Id. at ¶¶ 44. An examination of the new hip replacement revealed that it had also failed. Id. at ¶¶ 45–48. Stephens thereafter suffered severe complications relating to the failed hip replacement, and alleges numerous injuries and permanent disability sustained as a result of being implanted with the Pinnacle Cup System. Id. at ¶¶ 49–58.

On March 22, 2010, Stephens filed a medical negligence action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against non-diverse Defendants Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic. See Original Compl., ECF No. 21–6. Although the original state court action was solely a medical negligence action, through discovery Stephens learned that Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic would likely argue that Stephens' injuries were not the result of medical negligence, but rather, were the result of a defective Pinnacle Cup System. Stephens subsequently added diverse Removing Defendants Johnson & Johnson, DePuy, and non-diverse Defendant Chesapeake in anticipation of Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic's potential utilization of the “empty chair” defense. See Pl.'s Mot. Remand 3, ECF No. 21. The instant complaint was filed on May 4, 2011 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

In his Complaint, Stephens asserts two causes of action against the non-diverse Defendants Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic: medical negligence and informed consent. Compl. Counts I and II. Stephens alleges that Kaiser and Mid–Atlantic were negligent by and through their agent or employee Dr. Jaworski for placing an undersized and too vertical component for the total hip replacement, and that he “failed to use additional or sufficient screws to fixate the cup properly.” Id. at ¶¶ 62–63. Stephens asserts four product liability related causes of action against Johnson & Johnson, DePuy, and Chesapeake: negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13–301.

On June 10, 2011, Removing Defendants Johnson & Johnson and DePuy removed the case to this Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Removing Defendants sought to consolidate this action with multidistrict litigation pending in the Northern District of Texas. See In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2244. On June 13, 2011, Removing Defendants provided notice to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that they believed this case should be transferred to MDL No. 2244. The MDL Panel conditionally transferred this case to MDL No. 2244, but Mr. Stephens moved to vacate the transfer. See Defs.' Opp'n 2, ECF No. 36. In light of the potential consolidation of this action with the ongoing multidistrict litigation, on June 14, 2011, Johnson & Johnson and DePuy moved to stay all proceedings in this matter pending a transfer to MDL No. 2244. See Mot. Stay, ECF No. 10. Subsequently, Stephens timely moved to remand this case back to state on June 22, 2011.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Except as otherwise provided by law, a defendant may remove a state civil action to a federal court where the action is one “of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2009). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal, and because of the “significant federalism concerns” implicated by divesting a state court of jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction is strictly construed. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)). On a motion to remand, a court must “strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court.” Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700, 701–02 (D.Md.1997) (citation omitted). “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151; see also Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815–16 (4th Cir.2004)

A defendant in a state civil action may remove the case to federal court only if the federal court can exercise original jurisdiction over at least one of the asserted claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(c) (2006). Federal courts have original jurisdiction over two kinds of civil actions—those which are founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and those where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a) (2006). If a civil action is not based on a question of federal law, then a federal court may only exercise original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The purpose of the diversity requirement “is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over any of the claims in the action.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005). As the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]ncomplete diversity destroys original jurisdiction with respect to all claims.” Id. at 554, 125 S.Ct. 2611.

Federal courts are obliged to carefully scrutinize challenges to jurisdictional authority, and must “do more than simply point jurisdictional traffic in the direction of state courts.” 17th Street Associates, LLP v. Markel Int'l Ins. Co. Ltd., 373 F.Supp.2d 584, 592 (E.D.Va.2005). The federal remand statute provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise ...” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In other words, “a district court should be cautious in denying defendants access to a federal forum because remand orders are generally unreviewable.” Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 988 F.Supp. 913, 914–15 (D.Md.1997); see also In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731, 736 (4th Cir.1996) (“[A] federal court loses jurisdiction over a case as soon as its order to remand the case is entered.”).

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