Stephens v. Mound City Liverymen & Undertakers Association of St. Louis
Decision Date | 06 December 1922 |
Citation | 246 S.W. 40,295 Mo. 596 |
Parties | NORA C. STEPHENS and THOMAS C. STEPHENS, Appellants, v. MOUND CITY LIVERYMEN & UNDERTAKERS ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Moses Hartmann Judge.
Affirmed.
George Eigel and James T. Roberts for appellants.
(1) The public policy of this State will not permit the control of an important and necessary line of business to be placed in the hands of any body or association of persons members of that body acting in unison or under agreements. State ex rel v. Harvester Co., 237 Mo. 369; State ex rel. v Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356. (2) It is not necessary that the result of this combination should be a complete monopoly. It is sufficient for the purposes of this action that it tends to that end and tends to deprive the public from the advantages which flow from free competition. State ex rel. v. Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356; United States v. Knight, 156 U.S. 16. (3) The public policy of this State, as evidenced by its common and statutory law and the decisions of its appellate courts construing that law, was violated when the Mound City Liverymen & Undertakers' Association of St. Louis and the individual and corporate defendants bound themselves together under the agreement to restrict the hiring of hearses, horses and carriages or other equipment necessary for the conduct of a funeral, with the intent to create a monopoly and thereby control prices. State ex rel. v. Stock Exchange, 211 Mo. 181. (4) The occupation or calling of these plaintiffs as undertakers, by the means of which they earned their livelihood, is property within the meaning of the law, and as such is entitled to protection. This is aside from and entirely independent of the unlawful character of the association. The conduct of this association and the other defendants, as set forth in the petition, discloses a state of facts which makes the defendants guilty of a boycott in an effort to establish a monopoly and entitles plaintiffs to the relief sought. Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 422; Clarkson v. Laiblan, 178 Mo.App. 708. (5) In an action against the members and officers of an association of liverymen and undertakers for damages for conspiracy in an effort to establish a monopoly, where no theory of the case developed in the trial court, a general demurrer was improperly sustained if the petition stated a cause either under the statute or at common law. Harelson v. Tyler, 219 S.W. 908.
Jourdan, Rassieur & Pierce for respondents.
(1) A general demurrer admits only the facts which are well pleaded. It does not admit the pleader's conclusions either of law or fact. Harelson v. Tyler, 219 S.W. 912. (2) Appellants cannot sue upon one cause of action and recover upon another: If the petition is brought under a statute to recover a penalty given by statute, appellants must recover the penalty or not at all. In such case, if the petition fails to state a cause of action under the statute, a demurrer should be sustained, and it is immaterial whether or not there are averments in the petition which would have enabled appellants to recover at common law. Cole v. Armour, 154 Mo. 333, 350; Roaring Fork Potato Growers v. Clemons Produce Co., 193 Mo.App. 657. (3) Any number of persons, commissionmen, agents, undertakers, liverymen or persons engaged in the business of supplying any sort of service may form an association for the better conduct of their business, and may agree among themselves that they will not transact business with others who are not members of said association or with those who trade with non-members, and such an agreement is not in violation of the anti-trust laws of this State, nor of any rule of the common law. Co-Operative Live Stock Commission Co. v. Browning, 260 Mo. 324; Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 43 L.Ed. 300; Harelson v. Tyler, 219 S.W. 908; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Assn., 169 F. 259. (4) The petition fails to state a cause of action under the Statutes. R. S. 1919, secs. 9655, 9656, 9657, 9658; Co-Operative Live Stock Commission Co. v. Browning, 260 Mo. 324; Harelson v. Tyler, 219 S.W. 908; State ex rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 456; Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604. (5) The petition fails to state a cause of action at common law. National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Assn., 169 F. 259; 5 R. C. L. 1095-1098.
OPINION
In Banc.
Plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court for the city of St. Louis the following petition:
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