Stephens v. Naps
| Citation | 70 Mass. App. Ct. 676,876 N.E.2d 452 |
| Decision Date | 08 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-P-0435.,No. 06-P-0836.,06-P-0435.,06-P-0836. |
| Parties | Sandy STEPHENS v. GLOBAL NAPS (and a companion case<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>). |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Emilie F. Athanasoulis (Christine Cooney, with her), Boston, for Sandy Stephens.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
Martin J. Newhouse & Ben Robbins for New England Legal Foundation & another.
Nina Joan Kimball & Jonathan J. Margolis, Boston, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association.
Present: PERRETTA, SMITH, & VUONO, JJ.
The plaintiff, Sandy Stephens, was employed by defendant Global NAPs (Global) as a housekeeper for Global's president, Frank Tiberius Gangi.2 In late 1999 Stephens informed Gangi and her supervisor, Janet Lima, that she was pregnant and that her last day of work before maternity leave would be July 14, 2000. Stephens claimed that Lima told her that she could extend her maternity leave from September 18, 2000, to October 2, 2000, if her baby was delivered by Cesarean section. Stephens's baby was born on August 2, 2000, by Cesarean section, and she so informed Lima. Anticipating her return to work on October 2, 2000, Stephens called Lima on September 27, 2000, and learned that she had been fired for failing to return to work on time. Thereupon, Stephens brought an action in the Superior Court alleging that Global and Gangi had violated the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act (MMLA), G.L. c. 149, § 105D. A jury returned a verdict against Global for compensatory damages in the amount of $1,366,165 and punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000, and against Gangi,3 for aiding and abetting Global, in the amount of $136,000.
The threshold question before us is the scope of Global's appeal. In the circumstances presented here, we conclude that Global's appeal from the judgment on the jury verdict and from the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur, is not properly before us. However, Global's appeals from (1) the denial of its motion for partial reconsideration of the court's order regarding its motion for a new trial or remittitur (treated as a motion pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 60[b], 365 Mass. 828 [1974] ); (2) the denial of its motion to extend time to file an appeal pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 4(c), as amended, 378 Mass. 928 (1979); and (3) the corrected judgment entered on October 25, 2005, were timely. In addition, Global's appeal from the denial by a single justice of this court of its motion for an extension of time pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 14(b), as amended, 378 Mass. 939 (1979), which was consolidated with this appeal, is also before us.
1. Relevant facts and procedural history. The postjudgment procedural history of the case is extensive, and we relate only so much as necessary to frame the issues. After judgments on the jury verdict entered on July 27, 2004,4 Global and Gangi filed a timely motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur. In a detailed memorandum of decision and order dated February 11, 2005, and docketed on February 17, 2005, the trial judge (1) allowed the motion for judgment n.o.v. with respect to the aiding and abetting count against Gangi; (2) denied the motion for judgment n.o.v. with respect to Global; (3) denied the motion for a new trial as to liability; and (4) allowed the motion for a new trial on the issue of damages unless Stephens accepted a remittitur of the compensatory damages in the amount of $1,012,305.12 and of the punitive damages in the amount of $0 within thirty days. Stephens elected to accept the remittitur, and her acceptance was entered on the docket on March 11, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Global filed a motion5 for partial reconsideration of the court's order on the motion for a new trial or remittitur (hereinafter referred to as the "motion for partial reconsideration"). That motion, which makes no reference to any rule of civil procedure, sought reconsideration "with respect to the determination of [p]laintiff's damages for front pay and emotional distress." Specifically, Global claimed (1) that the judge erred in failing to discount the front pay award for present value; and (2) that the emotional distress award, even as remitted, lacked adequate support in the record. The trial judge denied the motion on April 6, 2005.
On April 19, 2005, Global filed its first notice of appeal, from (1) the judgment on the jury verdict against Global; (2) the order denying its motion for judgment n.o.v.; (3) the order denying its motion for a new trial; and (4) the order denying its motion for partial reconsideration of the court's order on the motion for new trial or remittitur. Apparently concerned that its notice of appeal might be viewed as untimely, Global also moved to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 4(c) "to the extent such motion is deemed necessary."
Stephens promptly moved to strike Global's notice of appeal for untimeliness, asserting that more than thirty days had passed between the date of the order denying the motion for a new trial (March 11, 2005, when Stephens accepted the remittitur) and Global's filing of its notice of appeal (April 19, 2005). Global opposed the motion, denying untimeliness on the basis that its motion for partial reconsideration tolled the time period for filing its appeal; in addition, for safety's sake, assuming untimeliness, Global claimed excusable neglect. The motions were heard on July 20, 2005. In a written memorandum of decision issued on July 28, 2005, the trial judge allowed Stephens's motion to strike Global's appeal and denied Global's motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
Global then filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's July 28 order prohibiting it from filing a late notice of appeal. Numerous postjudgment motions ensued, a majority of which concerned Global's attempt to reinstate its chief appeal. A judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 58(a) was entered on the docket on October 4, 2005, and following a motion to amend that judgment, a corrected judgment entered on October 25, 2005. Global filed a notice of appeal from that judgment on November 17, 2005. Eventually, on January 13, 2006, the trial judge issued an order (entered January 20, 2006) on the motions regarding the notices of appeal, in which he ruled that "there are only two viable appeals available to Defendant: (1) an appeal of the court's denial of Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time Pursuant to [Mass.R.A.P.] 4(c) (and the Reconsideration); and (2) Defendant's appeal of the Corrected Judgment [entered on October 25, 2005]" (emphasis original).
2. Viability of Global's appeal from (1) the judgment on the jury verdict and (2) the denial of its motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial or remittitur. Under Mass.R.A.P. 4(a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1603 (1999), Global was required to file its notice of appeal "within thirty days of the date of the entry of the judgment appealed from." See Muir v. Hall, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 38, 40, 636 N.E.2d 312 (1994). Global's timely filing of a motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial tolled the running of the thirty-day appeal period until such time as the motion was denied.6 Ibid. Here, Global's motion for judgment n.o.v. was denied on February 11, 2005, and its motion for a new trial was denied on March 11, 2005, when Stephens accepted the remittitur. See Okongwu v. Stephens, 396 Mass. 724, 727, 488 N.E.2d 765 (1986). See also Hastings Assocs. v. Local 369 Bldg. Fund, Inc., 42 Mass.App.Ct. 162, 163 n. 3, 675 N.E.2d 403 (1997).
Therefore, it was on March 11, 2005, that the new appeal period began to run, and it is from that date that the timeliness of Global's appeal from the judgment on the jury verdict and the orders denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. and the motion for a new trial must be computed. Since Global filed its notice of appeal on April 19, 2005, thirty-nine days after the appeal period had commenced, it was untimely.
Global contends that the rule set forth in the Okongwu case "creates unique circumstances and confusion" and urges us to ignore it. Global further argues that the Okongwu decision does not apply here because it concerned an earlier version of Mass.R.A.P. 4(a). While Global is correct that rule 4(a) has been amended, the changes cited by Global have no bearing on the circumstances of this case. The earlier version of rule 4(a) provided that "the full time for appeal fixed by this rule shall commence to run and shall be computed from the making of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules ..." (emphasis original). Okongwu v. Stephens, 396 Mass. at 727 n. 5, 488 N.E.2d 765, quoting from Mass. R.A.P. 4(a), as amended, 378 Mass. 924 (1979). The rule now states that the appeal period shall "run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion" (emphasis supplied). Mass.R.A.P. 4(a), as amended, 430 Mass. 1603 (1999). Here, the denial of Global's motion for a new trial was effectively entered on March 11, 2005, the day on which the remittitur was accepted and docketed. Thus, in accordance with the holding in Okongwu, the critical date on which the new appeal period began to run was March 11, 2005.
Global argues that the "corrected judgment" entered on October 25, 2005, is the "`final judgment' that adjudicated all the rights and liabilities of the parties" and that, therefore, its appeal from the corrected judgment served to preserve its appeal from the underlying jury verdict and all adverse postjudgment orders. However, the case law interpreting rule 4(a) does not support this interpretation. See Okongwu, supra at 727-729, 488 N.E.2d 765.7
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