Stephens v. State

• Decision Date: 12 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 114,Sept. Term,2010.,114
• Citation: 24 A.3d 105,420 Md. 495
• Parties: Lee E. STEPHENSv.STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

420 Md. 495

24 A.3d 105

Lee E. STEPHENS

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 114

Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 12, 2011.

A. Stephen Hut, Jr. (Ryan Huschka, Maureen P. Smith, Brenda E. Lee of WilmerHale, Washington, D.C.; Gary E. Proctor of Law Offices of Gary E. Proctor, Baltimore, MD; Michael E. Lawlor of Lawlor & Englert, LLC, Greenbelt, MD), on brief, for Appellant.James E. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.BARBERA, J.

Maryland Code (2002, 2010 Supp.), § 2–202(a)(3) of the Criminal Law Article (“CrL”) forbids the imposition of the death penalty without the State having first presented to the jury or court, inter alia, biological or DNA evidence linking the defendant to the murder. We are asked in this appeal whether CrL § 2–202(a)(3) requires such a determination be made by a judge at a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, upon the request of the defendant. The resolution of that issue is of interest to Petitioner Lee E. Stephens, who has been indicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, but not yet tried, on charges of first degree murder of Maryland House of Correction Officer David McGuinn and conspiracy to commit that crime. The State notified Petitioner of its intention to seek the death penalty and, in accordance with Maryland Code (1977, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 10–915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CP”), further informed Petitioner of the State's intention to introduce “DNA evidence that links the Defendant to the act of murder of David McGuinn.” Petitioner sought a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the State can produce at trial DNA evidence connecting him to the murder.

Upon the court's denial of that request, Petitioner noted an immediate appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal is an impermissible interlocutory appeal. The Court of Special Appeals denied the motion without prejudice, and docketed argument for April 2011.

Before briefing and argument in that court, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our initiative, to consider the case. We also issued a stay of further proceedings in the Circuit Court pending the outcome of the appeal. We heard argument in the case on April 8, 2011, and, on April 12, 2011, issued a per curiam order dismissing the appeal and vacating the stay. This opinion sets forth our reasons for dismissing the appeal.

I.

On May 7, 2009, the General Assembly enacted Maryland Senate Bill 279, which altered Maryland's death penalty scheme. Of importance for our purposes, SB 279 added to CrL § 2–202(a), entitled “ Requirement for imposition,” the following provision:

A defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree may be sentenced to death only if: ... (3) the State presents the court or jury with:

(i) biological evidence or DNA evidence that links the defendant to the act of murder;

(ii) a video taped, voluntary interrogation and confession of the defendant to the murder; or

(iii) a video recording that conclusively links the defendant to the murder [.] ¹

[24 A.3d 108 , 420 Md. 500]

As mentioned, the State notified Petitioner that it intends to satisfy this provision by producing, at trial and/or sentencing, DNA evidence linking him to the murder.

On August 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion to Preclude the Death Penalty on the ground that the death penalty statute as amended is unconstitutional. Petitioner later filed a Supplemental Memorandum on October 15, 2009, requesting a pre-trial “full evidentiary hearing” to determine whether, as a matter of law, there was DNA evidence linking him to the murder, thereby rendering him death penalty eligible under CrL § 2–202(a)(3)(i). ² That motion and other unrelated issues came on for a hearing on October 19, 2009.

At that hearing, Petitioner argued that CrL § 2–202(a)(3) entitled him to a pre-trial hearing to determine whether “a jury could [ ] find in the light most favorable to the state that the DNA links [him] to the act of murder.” Petitioner maintained that a pre-trial hearing to make that determination as a matter of law is consistent with the purpose behind CrL § 2–202(a)(3); moreover, a pre-trial hearing is, in Petitioner's words, “efficient, practical and would save time, money and effort later if the death penalty could not be applied.” The State countered that CrL § 2–202(a)(3) does not contemplate a pre-trial evidentiary hearing.

The Circuit Court agreed with the State and orally denied Petitioner's request for a hearing. The court noted that “[t]here is no suggestion” in CrL § 2–202(a)(3) or “in logic” directing the court to decide “ahead of time” whether the State can present DNA evidence linking Petitioner to the crime; rather, “the sentencing authority ... has to make that decision.”

This pre-trial ruling of the Circuit Court forms the basis of this appeal.

II.

We do not reach the merits of the Circuit Court's pre-trial ruling denying Petitioner his requested hearing because that ruling is not one that permits an immediate appeal.

“In Maryland, appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally created, is statutorily granted.” Schuele v. Case Handyman, LLC, 412 Md. 555, 565, 989 A.2d 210, 215 (2010). The general rule is that an appeal will lie only from a final judgment. See Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12–301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CP”) (authorizing appeals from “a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case”). In a criminal case, “no final judgment exists until after conviction and sentence has been determined, or, in other words, when only the execution of the judgment remains.” Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 22 A.3d 886 (2011) (quoting Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983)).

Petitioner does not contend that the present appeal is from a final judgment and indeed it is not, as the case remains active in the Circuit Court. Neither does he contend that there is any other statutory right of appeal from this obviously interlocutory ruling. Petitioner argues, instead, that the ruling of the Circuit Court comes within what is known as the “collateral order doctrine.”

Maryland's collateral order doctrine has its roots in the important policy underlying the final judgment rule, which is to “prevent piecemeal appeals and ... the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings.” Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr., 297 Md. at 665, 467 A.2d at 485. The doctrine “is very limited,” Walker v. State, 392 Md. 1, 15, 895 A.2d 1024, 1033 (2006), and permits the immediate appeal of only a “narrow class of orders” that are “offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued” and are considered “final judgments without regard to the posture of the case,” Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 266–67, 747 A.2d 1199, 1203 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To come within the collateral order doctrine, the order sought to be reviewed must be one that:

“(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.”

In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633, 820 A.2d 587, 591 (2003) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660–61, 728 A.2d 210, 211–12 (1999)). The four requirements “are conjunctive in nature” and each must be satisfied in order for a prejudgment order to constitute a collateral order. In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327, 783 A.2d 673, 686 (2001); see also Jackson, 358 Md. at 267, 747 A.2d at 1203. All four requirements “are very strictly applied, and appeals under the doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances.” Foley, 373 Md. at 634, 820 A.2d at 591 (collecting cases in which this Court has dismissed appeals for failing to satisfy all four requirements of the collateral order doctrine).

III.

The State contends that the pre-trial ruling at issue here does not satisfy any, much less all, of the four requirements of the collateral order doctrine. It is unnecessary, though, to consider whether the court's denial of the requested pre-trial evidentiary hearing would conclusively determine a disputed question or resolve an important issue (the first two requirements of the collateral order doctrine), because the ruling at issue does not satisfy the third and fourth requirements. See Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 477, 540 A.2d 805, 807 (1988) (per curiam) (declining to consider whether the challenged order satisfied the first three requirements of the collateral order doctrine because the order failed the fourth requirement).

We begin with the third requirement of the collateral order doctrine—that the order appealed from is completely collateral to and separate from the merits of the underlying case. Petitioner sought a pre-trial determination, upon a full evidentiary hearing, of whether the State possesses DNA evidence sufficient to link him to the murder of Correctional Officer McGuinn. Far from being “completely separate from” the case that is yet to be tried, the evidence sought at the requested pre-trial hearing not only is intimately tied to whether Petitioner is guilty of the charged murder, but is particularly pertinent, if he is found guilty of the crime, to whether he is subject to imposition of the death sentence.³ Cf. Falik v. Hornage, 413 Md. 163, 177, 991 A.2d 1234, 1243 (2010) (Discovery orders “do not comply with the third requirement of the collateral order doctrine, as they generally are not completely separate from the merits of the lawsuit. Instead, a typical discovery order is aimed at ascertaining critical facts upon which the outcome of the ... controversy might depend.” (Quoting St....