Bunting v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 153,153
• Citation: 312 Md. 472,540 A.2d 805
• Parties: Gerald T. BUNTING v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 472

312 Md. 472

540 A.2d 805

Gerald T. BUNTING v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 153, Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 5, 1988.

William A. Lee Clarke, III, Salisbury, for appellant.

Ann E. Singleton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH ^*, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Under Article III(d) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 616D(d), if a detainer is lodged in Maryland against a defendant who is imprisoned in another jurisdiction that is party to the Agreement and if the defendant makes a "request for final disposition" of the charges against him, he has a right to stand trial in Maryland on those charges before being "returned to the original place of imprisonment." Article III(d) further provides that a court should dismiss with prejudice the charges against the defendant if he is "returned to the original place of imprisonment" without first standing trial. This provision is commonly called the "single transfer rule" of Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The question in this case is whether a circuit court's pretrial ruling that this single transfer rule was not violated and the court's consequent refusal to dismiss the charges against a defendant constitute an appealable judgment.

I.

In early 1986, while imprisoned in the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, the defendant Gerald T. Bunting was charged, in Somerset County, Maryland, with numerous counts of felony theft. ¹ On account of these charges, the State of Maryland lodged detainers with the federal authorities at Lewisburg, who are subject to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 18 U.S.C.App. § 2 (1982). Pursuant to the Agreement, the defendant requested final disposition of the state charges. Shortly thereafter, on August 4, 1986, the defendant was transported to Somerset County for the purpose of attending a hearing on several preliminary motions filed by the defense. ² On the next day, August 5, the Sheriff of Somerset County brought the defendant back to Lewisburg. The defendant's trial did not take place before Maryland officials surrendered custody of him to federal authorities.

On August 11, 1986, the defendant moved to dismiss the Maryland charges, claiming that the State had violated the single transfer rule of Article III(d). ³ The circuit court denied the motion, ⁴ and the defendant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In that court, the State moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not from a final judgment. The defendant countered that the collateral order doctrine authorized the appeal. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the defense contention and granted the State's motion to dismiss.

Thereafter, we granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.

II.

Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, grants a right of appeal only from "final judgments." See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 314, 529 A.2d 356, 358 (1987); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 212, 406 A.2d 922, 924 (1979); Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86, 90, 394 A.2d 801, 803-804 (1978). Ordinarily, a circuit court judgment is final only if it terminates the action in that court. See, e.g., Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent Co., 305 Md. 407, 412, 504 A.2d 1145 (1986); Sigma Repro. Health Cen. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665-666, 467 A.2d 483 (1983); Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 6, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981). In this case, the challenged order is obviously not "final" in the normal sense. The criminal prosecution against the defendant is still pending in the circuit court.

Nevertheless, we have in recent years adopted the so-called "collateral order doctrine." See, e.g., State v. Hogg, 311 Md. 446, 535 A.2d 923 (1988); Harris v. Harris, supra, 310 Md. at 315-316, 529 A.2d at 358-359; Public Service Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. 200, 206, 477 A.2d 759, 762 (1984); Clark v. Elza, supra, 286 Md. at 212, 406 A.2d at 925; Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, supra, 284 Md. at 91-92, 394 A.2d at 804. As stated in Public Service Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley, supra, 300 Md. at 206, 477 A.2d at 762, the collateral order doctrine "treats as final and appealable a limited class of orders which do not terminate the litigation in the trial court." See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-547, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-1226, 93 L.Ed. 1528, 1536 (1949). In order to fit within this narrow class, however, the challenged order generally must meet four requirements ( Clark v. Elza, supra, 286 Md. at 213, 406 A.2d at 925) " '[T]he order must [ (1) ] conclusively determine the disputed question, [ (2) ] resolve an important issue[, (3) be] completely separate from the merits of the action, and [ (4) ] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.' "

See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351, 357-358 (1978).

We need not consider whether the challenged order in this case satisfies the first three requirements, as we are of the opinion that it fails to satisfy the fourth requirement. If the defendant is convicted, his contentions will be effectively reviewed on appeal from the final judgment of conviction.

In attempting to show that the challenged order in this case is not effectively reviewable on appeal, the defendant relies primarily on Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine encompassed the denial of a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground of double jeopardy. Relying on the language of the federal Constitution and on prior decisions, the Court reasoned that the guarantee against double jeopardy is more than a prohibition against double punishment; by its very nature, the Double Jeopardy Clause grants a defendant the right not to stand trial under certain circumstances. 431 U.S. at 659-662, 97 S.Ct. at 2040-2042, 52 L.Ed. at 660-662. That right would be irretrievably lost if a defendant had to await termination of the criminal trial before appealing an order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the order was not effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment of conviction. See also Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) (involving the speech and debate clause of the federal Constitution, Art. I, § 6).

This Court has also recognized that, under the collateral order doctrine, a defendant may take an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 424-425, 483 A.2d 68, 75 (1984). See Russell v. State, 310 Md. 96, 98 n. 1, 527 A.2d 34, 34 n. 1 (1987); Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 741 n. 2, 517 A.2d 94, 96 n. 2 (1986); Huffington v. State, 302 Md. 184, 187 n. 2, 486 A.2d 200, 202 n. 2 (1985); Evans v. State, 301 Md. 45, 49 n. 2, 481 A.2d 1135, 1137 n. 2 (1984); Bowling v. State, 298 Md. 396, 401 n. 4, 470 A.2d 797, 799 n. 4 (1984); In re Mark R., 294 Md. 244, 246 n. 2, 449 A.2d 393, 395 n. 2 (1982).

By analogy to the double jeopardy cases, the defendant argues that, because Article III(d) prescribes the remedy of dismissal for violations of the single transfer rule, he too has a right not to stand trial. He thus concludes that the alleged denial of his rights under the single transfer rule are effectively unreviewable on appeal. We disagree.

As the Supreme Court has stated, in the context of the collateral order doctrine, "Double jeopardy and speech or debate rights are sui generis." Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 267, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 79 L.Ed.2d 288, 295 (1984). Likewise, this Court has recognized that, under the collateral order doctrine, an exception to the general rule of finality may well be limited to its own unique factual circumstances. See, e.g., Public Service Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley, supra, 300 Md. at 207, 210, 477 A.2d at 763, 764.

This Court's decision in Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 386 A.2d 1206 (1978), clearly illustrates that only a very few rights are analogous to the Double Jeopardy Clause's entitlement not to stand trial. In that case, we held that the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss on the ground of an alleged violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights did not fall within the collateral order doctrine. In reaching that decision, we largely relied on United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978), in which the Supreme Court distinguished Abney v. United States, supra, by pointing out (435 U.S. at 861, 98 S.Ct. at 1553, 56 L.Ed.2d at 27): "It is the delay before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial." See also Flanagan v. United States, supra, 465 U.S. at 267, 104 S.Ct. at 1055-1056, 79 L.Ed.2d at 296. Similarly, in this case, the defendant has a right not to be "returned to his original place of imprisonment" before standing trial, within the meaning of Article III(d); he does not have a right to avoid the trial itself.

The defendant's position emphasizes the statutory sanction of dismissal. But merely because a defendant may have the charges against him dismissed if the trial court accepts his contentions, it does not follow that his statutory right is to avoid trial altogether. As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. MacDonald, supra, 435 U.S. at 860 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 1552-1553 n. 7, 56 L.Ed.2d at 27 n. 7):

"Certainly, the fact that this court has held dismissal of the indictment to be the proper remedy when the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated ... does not mean that a defendant enjoys a 'right...