Stephens v. State
| Decision Date | 08 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A2113,A92A2113 |
| Parties | STEPHENS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Summer & Summer, Daniel A. Summer, Gainesville, for appellant.
C. Andrew Fuller, Dist. Atty., John G. Wilbanks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Freddie L. Stephens appeals his judgment of conviction of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (possession of cocaine) and obstruction of an officer, and his sentence. He enumerates two errors. Held:
1. Appellant asserts the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination of the State's crime lab witness when it refused to allow appellant to examine the witness regarding another crime lab scientist who testified at a hearing in another county in an unrelated case that a substance was cocaine when in fact it was soap. Appellant made a proffer of expected testimony outside the presence of the jury and argued that the incident "goes to the integrity ... of the State Crime Lab," and that it was thus "fair game." The crime lab witness testified, during proffer, that he had "no personal knowledge" of the incident and all the information he possessed about it was "secondary information" which was told to him at a crime lab meeting conducted by his supervisor.
Appellant has a statutory right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the witnesses against him (OCGA § 24-9-64); however, this right is not without legitimate limitations (Hayes v. State, 193 Ga.App. 33, 34(2), 387 S.E.2d 139). The right of cross-examination is not abridged where examination is limited by the trial judge to relevant matters by proper questioning. Timberlake v. State, 200 Ga.App. 64, 66(2), 406 S.E.2d 537; Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580(2), 398 S.E.2d 734. Controlling the scope or extent of cross-examination is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court (Robinson v. State, 258 Ga. 279, 281(3), 368 S.E.2d 513) and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion in controlling the scope or extent thereof, an appellate court will not interfere (Walker v. State, 198 Ga.App. 422, 423(1), 401 S.E.2d 613). The record does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter.
2. Appellant asserts the trial court erred by requiring him to waive his Fourth Amendment right as a condition of parole. The trial court sentenced appellant to 30 years as to the cocaine possession charge and five years (to run concurrently) as to the felony obstruction charge; appellant was not sentenced to probation. Over an objection that defendant could not, under these circumstances, be sentenced to forfeit Fourth Amendment rights, the trial court sentenced appellant, as a condition of any parole, to waive his Fourth Amendment rights to search and seizure. The trial court explained the effect of this condition as subjecting appellant to "be searched at any place [he] may be or have control of, possession or control ... without a warrant and without probable cause." (Emphasis supplied.) (Thus, under these broad and unrestricted terms, law enforcement authorities could claim an unfettered right to search appellant's bedroom in the middle of the night for absolutely no reason at all, as a result of the parole condition imposed ostensibly as a legitimate part of appellant's sentence.)
Our search of statutory and case law reveals no express legal authority for the imposition of this type of parole condition by the trial judge as a part of an offender's sentence. Conversely, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III of the Ga. Const. of 1983 mandates that the legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the state shall forever remain separate and distinct; "and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided." Additionally, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution establishes a State Board of Pardons and Paroles; and Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II(a) thereof vests the board with the "power of executive clemency" including the power to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles. In OCGA § 42-9-1, the General Assembly promulgated and declared its legislative policy regarding the executive character of the functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, as follows: "In recognition of the doctrine contained in the Constitution of this state requiring the three branches of government to be separate, it is declared to be the...
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Sultenfuss v. Snow
...and suggesting that substantive legislative limits on the Board's discretion would be unconstitutional) and Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1993) (holding that a sentencing court's attempt to impose conditions on a criminal defendant's parole unconstitutionally infr......
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Wolcott v. State, No. S04A1590, S04A1591.
...which is a department in the executive branch of this state's government. See OCGA §§ 42-2-1 et seq. See also Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 647(2), 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993) (State Board of Pardons and Paroles). The purpose of that department is "the supervision of felony probationers." O......
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Metheny v. Hammonds, No. 99-10646
...the Board's power, did not construe this statute. And, thus, did not decide the pertinent question. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 428 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1993) (determining that Board has executive power concerning terms and condition of paroles, thus judicial attempt to condi......
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Peterson v. State
...to a thorough and sifting cross-examination is not abridged when the trial judge limits it to relevant matters. Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 646(1), 428 S.E.2d 661 (1993). Whether the victim used drugs in the past or was battered by her boyfriend is not relevant to whether Peterson k......
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Irrelevant or Immaterial Questions
...just because that examination is limited 6-141 Irrelevant or Immaterial Questions §6.800 to relevant matters. Stephens v. State , 428 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. App. 1993). On the other hand, Georgia’s Rules of Evidence favor the admissibility of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probati......
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Irrelevant or immaterial questions
...defendant’s right of cross-examination is not abridged just because that examination is limited to relevant matters. Stephens v. State , 428 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. App. 1993). On the other hand, Georgia’s Rules of Evidence favor the admissibility of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its ......
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Irrelevant or Immaterial Questions
...defendant’s right of cross-examination is not abridged just because that examination is limited to relevant matters. Stephens v. State , 428 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. App. 1993). On the other hand, Georgia’s Rules of Evidence favor the admissibility of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its ......
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Irrelevant or Immaterial Questions
...defendant’s right of cross-examination is not abridged just because that examination is limited to relevant matters. Stephens v. State , 428 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. App. 1993). On the other hand, Georgia’s Rules of Evidence favor the admissibility of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its ......