Stephenson v. Bankers' Life Ass'n of Des Moines

• Citation: 79 N.W. 459,108 Iowa 637
• Parties: STEPHENSON v. BANKERS' LIFE ASS'N OF DES MOINES.
• Decision Date: 25 May 1899
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

108 Iowa 637

79 N.W. 459

STEPHENSON

v.BANKERS' LIFE ASS'N OF DES MOINES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 25, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Kossuth county; Lot Thomas, Judge.

Action at law upon a certificate of membership in the defendant association. Defendant pleaded that the assured, Louis E. Stephenson, committed suicide, and further claimed that no sufficient proofs of death were furnished within the time required by law and the terms of the certificate. There was a trial to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Ayres, Woodin & Ayres, and Geo. E. Clark, for appellant.

E. V. Swetting and A. E. Morling, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

December 26, 1895, the defendant issued a certificate of membership to Louis E. Stephenson, by the terms of which it agreed to pay plaintiff, his beneficiary, $2,000, in the event of the death of the assured during the life of the certificate. One of the conditions on which it issued was that the certificate should be null and void if death occurred from self-destruction within two years from its date, whether the member was sane or insane at the time he took his own life. On the 22d day of September, 1896, the deceased was found dead in a barn upon his own premises. The evidence tends to show that he had been in an insane asylum for some time just prior to his death. His brother-in-law went after him, and, with the consent of the physician in charge, brought him home from that institution. When he returned, he seemed to be better than when he was taken to the asylum. Shortly after his arrival at home he procured a revolver which had been left at the house of his brother-in-law, with the avowed purpose of preventing the sheriff from returning him to the asylum; declaring that he would shoot that officer if he should undertake to return him to the hospital. When he reached home he seemed very glad to meet his family, and displayed considerable interest in his home and surroundings. He picked up his little babe, kissed it, and seemed to have the usual parental affection for his offspring. After procuring the revolver he started for home, accompanied by his brother-in-law, who attempted, without avail, to secure the revolver; and, having reached home, both parties started to go into the house. The brother-in-law went around to the front door to tell the wife of the assured that he had a revolver, supposing that the assured was following him. Just as the brother-in-law arrived at the door and had communicated the fact of the assured's having a revolver, a pistol shot was heard in the direction of the barn, which was but a short distance from the house. Shortly thereafter various parties went to the barn, and there found the assured. He was lying on his back, his body extended. His right hand, which grasped the revolver, was “kind of drawn up over his breast,” and his left hand and arm were extended along his left side. A bullet wound was found near the center of the forehead, the ball ranging upward. There were very slight powder marks, if any, about the wound, and there was no laceration. It was a clear cut. If the body had been raised to its feet from the recumbent position in which it was found, it would face the left-hand side of the barn, about 18 inches or 2 feet from the door by which it had entered. The bullet wound was fatal. The doctor who examined the deceased shortly after his death testified that there were no powder marks, and that the discoloration of the wound looked as if it might have been made by the smoke or dirt off of the bullet, rather than by the smoke from the gun; and he further testified that the revolver was not held close against the head. This was practically all the evidence relating to the manner and cause of death.

On the one hand it is contended that this evidence clearly shows self-destruction, while on the other it is said that the evidence points to the theory of accident. The trial court instructed to the effect that the presumption was that the killing was accidental, and that the burden was on the defendant to show that the assured committed suicide. While some complaints are lodged against the instructions, they are largely hypercritical and without substantial merit. They announce the law as established by almost the entire current of authority, and are clear, comprehensive, and easily understood. See Inghram v. National Union (Iowa) 72 N. W. 559;Hale v. Investment Co., 61 Minn. 516, 63 N. W. 1108;Insurance Co. v. Nitterhouse (Ind. App.) 38 N. E. 1110;Beckett v. Association (Minn.) 69 N. W. 923;Jones v. Association, 92 Iowa, 652, 61 N. W. 485;Follis v. Association, 94 Iowa, 439, 62 N. W. 807;Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360, 127 U. S. 661. Again, it is contended that the evidence shows without dispute that the deceased committed suicide. As we have already observed, there is a presumption in favor of the theory of accident. This presumption has the effect of affirmative evidence, and, unless so negatived by the surrounding facts and circumstances as to leave room for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide, such presumption will be allowed to prevail, and a verdict founded thereon will not be set aside for want of evidence. Some facts are disclosed by the record in aid of this presumption. It is evident that the revolver was not held against the head, as is usual in cases of suicide. The position of the body and the direction of the wound also give color to the claim of accident. Again, there is no evidence tending to show a desire or purpose on the part of the deceased to take his own life. Indeed, he seemed to be so in love with his home and family as to threaten the life of the one who he feared might remove him from them. He seemed to be on affectionate terms with all the members of his family, and at no time threatened to take his own life. While some of the circumstances point towards self-destruction, yet we cannot say that the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of accident. The most that can be said is that they point as strongly in one direction as the other; but this, as we have seen, is not sufficient, for the reason that plaintiff's case is aided by a presumption based upon the love of life found in every individual, which is ordinarily sufficient to induce its preservation.

2. Plaintiff alleged in her petition that she made proof of death, and served the same upon defendant, “a copy of which proof is hereto attached, and made a part hereof, marked ‘Exhibit B.’ ” She also pleaded a waiver of proofs of death, based upon certain correspondence, which will be hereafter referred to. Defendant admitted the receipt of Exhibit B, but denied all other allegations relating to proofs of loss. As the question to be decided involves a consideration of all the correspondence between the parties, it is perhaps better to refer to the waiver pleaded by plaintiff. It is alleged in the petition that defendant refused, and still refuses, to pay the amount of the certificate, on the ground that the assured took his own life. In an amendment to the petition, plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 1896, she, through her attorney, notified the defendant, in writing, of the death of the assured, inquired of defendant whether it had received proofs of death. and, if not, whether it desired such proofs, and requested defendant to send blanks, that proofs might be made; that in reply thereto defendant informed plaintiff that it had written one E. G. Bowyer in regard to the death of the assured, and inclosed a copy of the letter written him, in which it denied all liability and refused to furnish blanks; that thereafter plaintiff, through her attorney, again wrote defendant, asking whether it refused to pay the certificate, which defendant never answered; that thereafter, and on October 26, 1896, plaintiff sent the proofs of loss referred to in her petition, and stated that, if further proofs were required, they would be furnished on application; that this letter was never answered; and that defendant received, and still retains, the proofs of death, and has never made any objection thereto, but refused, and has ever since refused, to pay the loss. It is true that this amendment does not state that these facts were pleaded to show a waiver or estoppel; but such is undoubtedly their legal effect, and plaintiff was not required to name her plea. If the facts stated amounted to a waiver, they are sufficient, although not christened. To sustain these allegations with reference to proofs of death, plaintiff introduced the following correspondence:

“Algona, Iowa, Sept. 22, 1896. Bankers' Life Association, Des Moines, Iowa: I am requested to inform you of the death of Louis E. Stephenson by gunshot wound, which happened this a. m., as he holds policy No. 49,417 in your company. Yours, truly, E. G. Bowyer.”

“Algona, Iowa, Sept. 29, '97. Bankers' Life: I wrote you a few days ago of the death of L. E. Stephenson, policy No. 49,417, which, as yet,...