Stephenson v. Benson Consulting & Benson Med.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 CV 5761 (DG)(LB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
| Parties | CAPRICE STEPHENSON, Plaintiff, v. BENSON CONSULTING & BENSON MEDICAL, MAIMONIDES MEDICAL CENTER Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Caprice Stephenson brings this pro se action alleging defendants violated a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) granted in the Northern District of New York and her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ECF Nos. 25, 26. The Honorable Diane Gujarati referred defendants' motions to me for a Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that defendants' motions should be granted, and plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.
The following facts are drawn from allegations in plaintiff's complaint. ECF No. 1. Prior to September 26, 2021, plaintiff was employed as a nurse practitioner at Benson Consulting & Benson Medical (“Benson”) in Brooklyn, New York. Id. at 3. By email on August 19, 2021, Benson informed its staff that, “due to the [COVID-19] numbers rising,” it would be mandatory for all employees to be fully vaccinated, and that unvaccinated employees would be terminated starting August 30th, 2021. ECF No. 1-2 at 2. On the same day, plaintiff replied to the email stating that she was seeking a religious exemption from the requirement to be vaccinated. Id. at 3. Dr. Orrin Lippoff informed plaintiff that she would be exempt as long as she continued to wear a mask and test weekly. Id. at 4.
On August 26, 2021, the New York State Department of Health (“DOH”) issued a regulation mandating that health care workers receive the [COVID-19] vaccination.[1] ECF No. 11 at 1. The regulation does not include any religious exemption and requires that all personnel at general hospitals receive the first dose of the vaccine by September 27, 2021. Id. at 2. On September 13, 2021, seventeen medical professionals filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against New York state defendants in the Northern District of New York (“Northern District”), alleging that the regulation mandating vaccination violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs in that action also moved for a TRO to prevent the state defendants from enforcing the mandate to the extent that it requires healthcare employers to deny religious exemptions.[2] Id. The Court granted the plaintiffs' TRO on September 14, 2021, and later extended the TRO through October 12, 2021. Id. at 2, 4.
On September 14, 2022, Benson informed employees that “due to the expanding crisis of [COVID-19] infections,” Benson had decided to “follow the NYS guidelines” for all health care workers to receive the first dose of the vaccination by September 27, 2021. ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Moreover, Benson reported that two unvaccinated employees had tested positive for the virus during their weekly testing and therefore the risk to patients and staff posed by such an infected employee was unacceptable. Id. Benson informed employees that there would be no religious exemption from the vaccination requirement and terminations for unvaccinated employees would be effective September 27, 2022. Id. On September 26, 2021, plaintiff emailed Benson staff, stating that she would not be vaccinated due to her religious beliefs. Id. at 6. Benson terminated plaintiff the same day. Id.
The Court takes judicial notice that on October 12, 2021, the Northern District converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction, and the state appealed.[3] On October 29, 2021, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Northern District's injunction.[4]
Plaintiff commenced this pro se action in the Southern District of New York on September 27, 2021. ECF No. 1. The case was transferred to the Eastern District on October 15 2021. ECF No. 9. Defendants moved to dismiss, ECF Nos. 25, 26; plaintiff opposed defendants' motions, ECF No. 33; and defendants have replied, ECF Nos. 34, 35. The motions have been referred to me for Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff's complaint asserts two claims against defendants. First plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Northern District's TRO by requiring its employees to be vaccinated. Second, plaintiff brings a claim under § 1983 against defendants, alleging that they violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motions should be granted and plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.
A complaint “must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), plaintiff must do more than allege facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability,” or “speculative,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); she must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). If a plaintiff does not “nudge[] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court has an obligation to “liberally construe” the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 55 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id.
A court reviewing a motion to dismiss must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555- 56; In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007); Chambers v. Time Warner Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d. Cir. 2002). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is confined to material contained in the complaint, attached to it, or incorporated by reference. See Sierra Club v. Con-Strux, LLC, 911 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011)). However, a court may take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts. See Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 166 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012) ().
As a preliminary matter, the claims against Maimonides Medical Center (“Maimonides”) should be dismissed. Plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)). However, plaintiff fails to plead any facts alleging conduct specific to Maimonides. Plaintiff herself admits that she “is not alleging any claims against the defendant Maimonides,” except to the extent Benson is “affiliated with the defendant” and is following Maimonides guidelines.[5] ECF No. 33 at 1.
To withstand the motion to dismiss, plaintiff must allege defendant's “personal involvement in the deprivation of [her] rights.” Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2021); see Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2009) (); Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Having failed to allege, as they must, that these defendants were directly and personally responsible for the purported unlawful conduct, their complaint is ‘fatally defective' on its face”). As plaintiff fails to allege Maimonides' personal involvement in any of her claims, defendant's motion should be granted and plaintiff's complaint against Maimonides should be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges defendants violated the TRO issued by the Honorable David N. Hurd in Dr. A. v. Hochul, No. 21-cv-01009, ECF Nos. 7, 15 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2021), when Benson terminated her for failing to receive the first dose of the vaccine by September 27, 2021. ECF No. 1 at 4. She asserts that the TRO prevented Benson from mandating her vaccination without considering her religious exemption. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff is mistaken about the effect of the TRO issued by Judge Hurd.
Benson was not bound by the issuance of the Northern District's TRO. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceedure, which governs Injunctions and Restraining Orders, provides that such an order “binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with [the parties].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2). Benson was not a party to the Northern District case in which the TRO was issued. Although, “a nonparty that acts ‘in active concert or participation' with a party subject to an injunction is prohibited from ‘assisting in a violation of the...
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