Stephenson v. State

• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BASCHAB.
• Citation: 801 So.2d 34
• Parties: Marcel STEPHENSON v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 01 December 2000

801 So.2d 34

Marcel STEPHENSON
v.
STATE

CR-99-2357.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 1, 2000.

Marcel Stephenson, appellant, pro se.

Andrew W. Redd, general counsel, and Albert Sim Butler, asst. general counsel, Department of Corrections.

BASCHAB, Judge.

In December 1999, the appellant, Marcel Stephenson, an inmate incarcerated at Holman Prison, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he is being denied the opportunity to earn a reduction in his custody status and to participate

801 So.2d 35

in work release and educational programs because two outstanding sentencing detainers from the State of Florida are pending against him. He requested that the circuit court order the Alabama Department of Corrections to remove the two sentencing detainers from his institutional file because there has not been a final disposition of the detainers as required by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act ("UMDDA"),¹ which is codified at §§ 15-9-80 through -88, Ala. Code 1975. After the State responded, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. This appeal followed

The appellant alleges that, after he had been convicted of grand theft auto in Bay County, Florida, he was released from the county jail on the condition that he return for sentencing on November 6, 1985. However, he asserts that he was not able to appear for the sentencing hearing because he was arrested in Alabama on November 4, 1985. Subsequently, he was convicted in Montgomery County, Alabama, of first-degree arson and sentenced to serve a term of 21 years in prison.² On June 12, 1986, Bay County, Florida, authorities issued a detainer against the appellant because he did not appear at the November 6, 1985, sentencing hearing. On February 12, 1990, Bay County, Florida, authorities issued a second detainer against the appellant based on his failure to appear at the November 6, 1985, sentencing hearing. On February 14, 1991, the appellant gave written notice of his place of imprisonment and requested a final disposition of the sentencing detainers pursuant to the UMDDA. The record indicates that, on March 20, 2000, the 1986 detainer was removed from the appellant's institutional file. However, the 1990 detainer is still pending against the appellant.

I.

The appellant argues that his due process rights have been violated because the State of Florida did not effect a final disposition of the sentencing detainers within 180 days after he filed his request for final disposition as required by the UMDDA. "[A] writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle with which to attack interstate detainers." Speights v. State, 546 So.2d 1009, 1009 (Ala.Crim.App.1988).

"The Alabama Legislature enacted the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act in 1978, adopting the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement). 1978 Ala.Acts 693, No. 590 (April 27, 1978); Ala.Code 1975, § 15-9-81. Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act in 1970, joining the United States and the District of Columbia as parties to the Agreement. 18 U.S.C.A.App., §§ 1-2, page 585 (1985). The United States is a `state' for purposes of the Agreement. Agreement, Article II(a). At least forty-six states, including Alabama, are signatories. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978); McCallum v. State, 407 So.2d 865 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). The Agreement attempts to remedy the disadvantages and hardships imposed upon prisoners attendant to the use of detainers and to eliminate potential abuses of the detainer system. Article I. The agreement provides the prisoner with a method of clearing detainers lodged against

801 So.2d 36

him. It further provides cooperative proceedings for temporary transfers of prisoners for purposes of trial on outstanding charges among participating jurisdictions to aid such disposition. United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2179, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979); Morning v. State, 416 So.2d 780 (Ala. Crim.App.1982). In either case, the provisions of the Agreement are applicable only when a participating jurisdiction, having untried charges pending against a prisoner, first lodges a detainer with the participating jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated. United States v. Mauro, supra; United States v. Dixon, supra."

Gillard v. State, 486 So.2d 1323, 1325 (Ala. Crim.App.1986). Article I of the UMDDA, which is codified at § 15-9-81, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures."

(Emphasis added.) Article III of the UMDDA, which is also codified at § 15-9-81, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided, that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of the commitment under which the

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