Stephenson v. State

• Decision Date: 10 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. CR 07-1080.,CR 07-1080.
• Citation: 373 Ark. 134,282 S.W.3d 772
• Parties: Deandra Laron STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

282 S.W.3d 772

373 Ark. 134

Deandra Laron STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 07-1080.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 10, 2008.

James Law Firm, by: William O. "Bill" James, Jr., Fayetteville, AR, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Deandra Laron Stephenson appeals the judgment and commitment order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of two counts of capital murder and one count of a terroristic act, for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and forty-five years, respectively. On appeal, Appellant raises one argument for reversal: the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict when the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Appellant committed two capital murders and a terroristic act. As Appellant received a life sentence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm.

On July 1, 2006, Lademon Taylor, Christopher Taylor, and Leslie Harper went shopping at McCain Mall in North Little Rock, Arkansas. While Lademon and Christopher were in a store, Harper went to get a drink when he bumped into Rashon McKinney who was playing with and looking at his cell phone. After a brief conversation about what Harper was doing and who he was with, the two parted ways and Harper met back up with the others. They then exited the mall and got in their car to leave. Immediately after sitting down in their vehicle, multiple shots were fired into the car hitting all three occupants. The shooter then jumped into the passenger seat of another car and drove off. Harper managed to get out of the car and was taken to the hospital by a mall patron whom he stopped in the parking lot. When the North Little Rock police arrived on the scene, Lademon and Christopher were dead inside the car.

Following an investigation into the shooting, on September 29, 2006, Appellant was charged with two counts of capital murder, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (Repl.2006), and one count of a terroristic act, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-310 (Repl.2006).¹ The felony information also stated that the sentences received for committing these crimes should be increased for each offense in accordance with Ark.Code Ann. § 16-90-120 (Repl. 2006). On March 5, 2007, Appellant filed a motion for recusal, which the circuit court addressed and denied prior to trial.

Appellant's trial began on March 12, 2007, during which the State called multiple witnesses, including Appellant's accomplices Norman Dednam and McKinney. During Dednam's testimony, he identified Appellant as the shooter.² Specifically, he explained that he was driving through the mall parking lot when Appellant told him to stop the car. Upon stopping, Appellant exited the vehicle and began shooting into the victims' car. Furthermore, McKinney testified that, after running into Harper, he called Appellant and told him that Lademon, Christopher, and Harper were at the mall.³ McKinney explained that he called Appellant because he had heard about Lademon and Harper robbing Appellant earlier that week.

At the close of the State's evidence, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on all charges based upon the State's failure to provide substantial evidence to support the crimes. Specifically, he argued that the testimony of the accomplices had not been corroborated by independent evidence tying Appellant to the crimes. The circuit court denied Appellant's motions. After the defense rested, Appellant renewed his motions for directed verdict based upon his previous arguments. The circuit court again denied his motions. Following deliberations, the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of capital murder and one count of a terroristic act. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because his conviction was based upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Id.

As stated earlier, Appellant was convicted of two capital murders and a terroristic act. Under Arkansas law, a person commits capital murder if "[w]ith the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of any person." Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(4). Premeditation and deliberation may be formed in an instant. Winston v. State, 372 Ark. 19, 269 S.W.3d 809 (2007). Intent can rarely be proven by direct evidence; however, a jury can infer premeditation and deliberation from circumstantial evidence, such as the type and character of the weapon used; the nature, extent, and location of wounds inflicted; and the conduct of the accused. Id.

Additionally, a person commits a terroristic act if, while not in the commission of a lawful act, and with the purpose of causing injury to persons or property, he shoots at a vehicle that is being operated or that is occupied by another person. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-310(a)(1). Moreover, a person who commits a terroristic act is guilty of a Class Y felony "if the person with the purpose of causing physical injury to another person causes serious physical injury or death to any person." Ark.Code Ann. § 5-13-310(b)(2).

When accomplice testimony is considered in reaching a verdict, Arkansas law provides that a person cannot be convicted based upon the testimony of an accomplice "unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant ... with the commission of the offense." Ark.Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (Repl. 2006). Furthermore, "corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof." Ark.Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1)(B). It must be evidence of a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with a crime and not toward corroborating the accomplice testimony. Green, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638. The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient standing alone to sustain the conviction, but it must, independent from that of the accomplice, tend to connect to a substantial degree the accused with the commission of the crime. Id. The test is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were completely eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Id. The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial so long as it is substantial; evidence that merely raises a suspicion of guilt is insufficient to corroborate an accomplice's testimony. Id.

In the present case, Appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence that he caused the death of another person as well as that he projected an object at a conveyance. Appellant does not dispute that shots were fired into a vehicle occupied by three individuals, which killed the driver and the back-seat passenger as well as wounded the front-seat passenger. Rather, he argues that there was no evidence that he was present at the scene of the crime or that he was the shooter. In support of this argument, Appellant asserts that the only evidence presented that he fired the shots, which constituted the criminal act, was the unreliable testimony of an accomplice to the crime who was testifying in hopes of a lenient offer from the State. Specifically, he asserts that Dednam, an accomplice, was the only person in the case to identify Appellant as the shooter and that Dednam was the only person who placed Appellant at the scene of the crime. He further argues that the only evidence tending to corroborate Dednam's testimony was that of McKinney, another accomplice. We disagree and hold that, after eliminating both accomplices' testimony, there is sufficient evidence that tends to connect Appellant to the commission of the crimes.

First, other testimony and evidence presented by the State established that Appellant was present at the scene of the crime and that he was the shooter. Samuel White, an eyewitness who is also a retired deputy sheriff, testified that he saw a black male wearing dark clothing, who was at a minimum five-feet tall and definitely not six feet, shooting into the victims' car. Detective Michael Gibbons testified that of all the people arrested for the murders only Appellant matched...