Stephenson v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.

Decision Date03 May 1996
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 93-11747.
Citation924 F. Supp. 1258
PartiesDawn STEPHENSON, Plaintiff, v. STATE STREET BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Winston Kendall, Boston, MA, for plaintiff.

Robert B. Gordon, Bonnie B. Edwards, Ropes & Gray, Boston, MA, for defendant.

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Report and Recommendation Accepted.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS' (sic) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY # 25)

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT AND PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56.1 STATEMENT SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET ENTRY # 58)

March 4, 1996

BOWLER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before this court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant State Street Bank & Trust Company ("State Street"). (Docket Entry # 25). After conducting a hearing (Docket Entry # 63), this court took the motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry # 25) under advisement.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dawn Stephenson ("Stephenson"), a former employee of State Street, filed this employment discrimination action claiming that State Street discriminated against her on the basis of her race (black) and her national origin (Jamaican). Stephenson's four count, verified amended complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages for State Street's breach of an alleged employment contract (Count III) and for its alleged violation of: (1) section four of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B ("chapter 151B") (Count I); (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") (Count II); and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("section 1981") (Count IV). (Docket Entry # 13).

Stephenson began work at State Street as an Account Controller in May 1987. After her July 1990 termination, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") based on race and national origin in October 1990. Stephenson described the discriminatory conduct in the MCAD charge as "unfair treatment" and being "treated different" since the beginning of her employment. Stephenson also stated in the MCAD charge that, "In a performance review, I was told that in order for me to obtain a raise I had to receive a course in pronunciation." In addition, Stephenson noted that she was given a written warning in January 1990 due to the loss of one or more bank documents and "excessive money movement" although State Street had no proof that it was Stephenson who misplaced the documents. As set forth in the MCAD charge, after two meetings to discuss the warning, State Street terminated Stephenson "with no cause." (DS Dep. III, Ex. 40).1

In March 1993 the MCAD issued a lack of probable cause finding. The case summary delineated Stephenson's allegations as being "subjected to unfair treatment, in that she was told that in order to receive a raise, she had to obtain a course in pronunciation." The MCAD Field Representative described Stephenson's complaint as follows:

Complainant alleges that she has been wrongfully accused of being responsible for losing bank documents and for large overdrafts ... Complainant alleges that Respondent harassed her while she was on short term disability by making her attend meetings regarding the warnings she received.

(DS Dep. III, Ex. 41). The MCAD Field Representative described State Street's response, in part, as being that Stephenson did not "adhere to the Bank's established policies."

In rebuttal, Stephenson alleged, in part, that State Street "manipulated performance evaluations of employees and that this manipulation does not exclude fabrication of documents." (DS Dep. III, Ex. 41). Noting that Stephenson presented a disparate treatment theory of discrimination, the MCAD Field Representative found that Stephenson failed to meet her burden of providing information "that she was treated differently because she is black and/or is from Jamaica." Accordingly, the MCAD issued a Notice of Final Disposition with the aforementioned lack of probable cause finding. (DS Dep. III, Ex. 41).

Thereafter, Stephenson filed suit. State Street moves for summary judgment on all four counts in the verified amended complaint. With respect to the discriminatory employment counts (counts I, II and IV), State Street contends that it met its burden of production by establishing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Stephenson's termination, i.e., poor job performance, tardiness, absenteeism and misrepresentation of cash book figures, which Stephenson failed to rebut. (Docket Entry # 27).

State Street also argues that Stephenson's assertions regarding discriminatory treatment during her employment, in contrast to her allegations of discriminatory termination, are procedurally barred because Stephenson did not assert these allegations before the MCAD. In particular, State Street submits that Stephenson never raised the alleged discriminatory denial of overtime, special projects and a promotion with the MCAD. Further, State Street contends that Stephenson failed to bring a discriminatory impact theory before the MCAD. (Docket Entry ## 27 & 56).

With reference to the section 1981 claim, State Street maintains that Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), and its progeny foreclose relief with respect to the performance of any employment contract, the conditions of employment at State Street and any discriminatory discharge from employment. Furthermore, Stephenson's denial of promotion claim is barred by the three year statute of limitations, according to State Street. Finally, State Street argues that its employee handbook does not give rise to an enforceable employment contract. Stephenson was therefore an employee at will and, hence, her breach of contract claim is without merit. (Docket Entry ## 27 & 56).

In light of these arguments, this court finds the following facts viewed in Stephenson's favor from the record solely for purposes of summary judgment.2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Stephenson, a black female born in Jamaica, West Indies, began her employment at State Street in May 1987 as an Account Controller in the mutual funds division of the bank. It is undisputed that State Street hired Stephenson as an employee at will. (Docket Entry # 13, ¶¶ 1, 3 & 5; DS Dep. I).

As an Account Controller, Stephenson priced various funds maintained by State Street for its clients. Such work included calculating shares and units of the funds, transferring the information into a computer, printing out the information and, at the end of each day, transmitting the information to State Street's clients. In the course of her duties, Stephenson verified capital stock sales, redemptions and adjustments, verified and entered cash debits and credits for securities settlements and calculated interest accrual rates. She also maintained a cash book, periodically reconciled the "DDA account," and maintained daily summaries and records on trial balance sheets. (DS Dep. I & Ex. 1).

State Street functioned as a custodian of these mutual funds. Its responsibilities included maintaining certain accounting standards. State Street was also responsible for mistakes made in the pricing of the funds. According to both State Street and Stephenson, accuracy in the pricing of the funds was important. Inaccurate pricing could result in significant losses of money in a fund. Stephenson's annual performance review in April 1988 set a performance standard of 100% accuracy for unit pricing. The review notes that Stephenson met this standard. (DS Dep. I & Ex. 2; Docket Entry # 29).

During Stephenson's employment, first line managers at State Street directly supervised account controllers. These managers, in turn, reported to the Assistant Vice President and Fund Manager, Stephen P. Wigmore ("Wigmore").3 A few months after being hired, Mark Manzoni ("Manzoni") became Stephenson's First Line Manager. (DS Dep. I; Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 2).

In August 1987 Manzoni issued a verbal warning to Stephenson as a result of three errors she had made. One of the three errors resulted in a loss to the bank of $5,873.09. Manzoni also cited Stephenson for working overtime due to her lack of speed.

Stephenson disputed Manzoni's criticisms by stating that she had to price an estimated 18 funds and that such pricing did not begin until 5:00 p.m. She also pointed out that a prior supervisor had already resolved one of the three errors. Stephenson also informed Manzoni that the bank had promoted another bank employee, Patrick Conley ("Conley"), who had made errors similar to the errors made by Stephenson. In addition, at or around the time of the warning, Stephenson told Manzoni about Caroline, a white employee, whose error affected one of Stephenson's funds.4

The verbal warning required Stephenson to demonstrate a substantial improvement within a certain period of time. Stephenson's August 1987 quarterly review similarly referenced a number of areas for improvement. (DS Dep. I & Ex. 6-8; Docket Entry # 30, Ex. B & C; DS Dep. III).

In April 1988 Stephenson received the aforementioned annual review prepared by Manzoni. Although Manzoni noted difficulties in the areas of absences from work, pricing errors and efficiency, he nevertheless determined that Stephenson successfully met State Street's overall performance standard. (Docket Entry # 30, Ex. A).

Manzoni also suggested therein that Stephenson attend a pronunciation training course offered at the bank. (Docket Entry # 30, Ex. A). Although State Street offers pronunciation courses to employees free of charge (Docket Entry # 30, ¶ 6, sentence two), Manzoni's suggestion offended Stephenson. (Docket Entry # 13, ¶ 15). She avers that, except for Manzoni, no one at State Street experienced any difficulty...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Civ. No. 95-CV-253-B.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • August 8, 1996
    ...a relevant contract related act, and both purposeful and racially motivated discrimination. Id.; Stephenson v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 924 F.Supp. 1258, 1279 (D.Mass.1996). "If any of these elements is missing, a section 1981 claim cannot flower." Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16. Dr......
  • Carmack v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., Civil Action No. 03-12488-PBS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • March 22, 2007
    ...Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1990)) (additional citation omitted). See also Stephenson v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 924 F.Supp. 1258, 1276 (D.Mass.1996) ("What controls is not what the [MCAD] did but what it was given the opportunity to do.") (quoting Borase v. M......
  • Boadi v. Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • March 6, 2017
    ...(Dkt. No. 65–26; Dkt. No. 69). See Cosme v. Salvation Army , 284 F.Supp.2d 229, 241 (D. Mass. 2003) ; Stephenson v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. , 924 F.Supp. 1258, 1277 (D. Mass. 1996). In addition to being procedurally barred, her claim is bereft of the requisite evidence showing that CHD's c......
  • Russell v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car Co. of Ri
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • September 11, 2001
    ...acts of discrimination that an administrative investigation would reasonably be expected to uncover. Stephenson v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 924 F.Supp. 1258, 1276 (D.Mass.1996). The underlying rationale for this rule is the same as the reason for specifically naming a defendant in the ad......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT