Stephenson v. Stephenson
Decision Date | 21 October 1884 |
Citation | 21 N.W. 19,64 Iowa 534 |
Parties | STEPHENSON ET AL v. STEPHENSON |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Appanoose Circuit Court.
THE Northwestern Masonic Aid Association filed a petition in which both the plaintiffs and defendant were made defendants the object of the action being to determine which of the parties was entitled to certain life insurance, which the association was willing to pay to whichever party was entitled thereto. The court directed the parties to interplead, and issue was thereby joined between them, and the court held that the defendant was entitled to four-fifths of the insurance, and the plaintiff appeals.
AFFIRMED.
A. J Baker, for appellants.
Tannehill & Fee and Vermillion & Vermillion, for appellee.
The Northwestern Masonic Aid Association is a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Illinois. "The particular business for which it was formed was to cause pecuniary aid to the widows, orphans, heirs and devisees of the deceased members of the association." Robert Stephenson became a member of the association, and received a certificate of membership, which provided, in substance, that, if said Stephenson was a member of the association at his death, the association would pay four-fifths of twenty-five hundred dollars "to his wife Rachael," and to his daughter, Mary Ann Denoon, one-fifth of the sum above stated.
The by-laws of the association formed a part of the contract of insurance, the material portion of which is as follows:
Prior to his death, Robert Stephenson executed a will containing the following devise: "I bequeath to my sons, Thos. Stephenson, John F. Stephenson, and my daughter, Mary Ann Denoon, twenty-five hundred dollars, the proceeds of my life insurance, in equal shares;" and the plaintiffs insist that under the will they are entitled to all of the insurance, and the defendant to no part of it. Counsel for plaintiffs maintain that the interest of the defendant in the policy during the lifetime of her husband, because of the power reserved to change the beneficiary, was a mere expectancy, and that she had no vested interest therein. We do not deem it essential to determine this question, because, if no change was made in the manner provided in the by-laws, which formed a part of the contract of insurance, then it cannot be successfully denied, we think, that the defendant was entitled to four-fifths of the insurance.
The contract between the association and ...
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