Stephenson v. Stephenson
| Decision Date | 12 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-404-Appeal.,99-404-Appeal. |
| Citation | 811 A.2d 1138 |
| Parties | Shari Ann STEPHENSON v. Lawrence P. STEPHENSON. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ., and SHEA, J. (Ret.).
Carolyn R. Barone, Allen M. Kirshenbaum, Warwick, for Plaintiff.
Lauren E. Jones, Providence, Paul J. Russo, Cranston, Caroline Cole Cornwell, Providence, for Defendant.
In this protracted divorce case, the parties cross-appeal to this Court. The defendant is Lawrence P. Stephenson (Lawrence) and the plaintiff is Shari Ann Stephenson (Shari Ann).1 For the reasons that follow, we deny and dismiss the appeal of Shari Ann, and sustain the appeal of Lawrence and remand the case to the Family Court.
At the time they were married, Lawrence was forty-seven years old and Shari Ann was thirty. He is a dentist in his own private practice in North Providence, and she worked as a junior high school teacher, also in North Providence. Lawrence's practice was incorporated as a Subchapter S corporation of which he was the sole stockholder. He drew an annual salary of $150,000 and also received all the profits from the corporation, which varied year to year from more than $100,000 to more than $325,000. Shari Ann received an annual income of approximately $48,000 from her teaching job. She deposited her salary into a personal account. Lawrence took responsibility for all the marital expenses.
The couple married on July 11, 1992. Lawrence paid all the wedding expenses and for their honeymoon to Monte Carlo. Shari Ann paid only for her wedding dress. Their harmonious relationship deteriorated even before they returned from their honeymoon. Much petty bickering occurred, and, just over a year after they were married, the couple separated, on July 28, 1993. No children were born of the marriage. On August 13, 1993, Shari Ann filed a petition for divorce, alleging that irreconcilable differences had caused a breakdown of the marriage.2 In October, 1993, Lawrence filed a cross-petition for divorce on the same grounds.
During the marriage, the couple had numerous arguments. The more serious ones revolved around money. Before they were married, Lawrence held numerous bank accounts and investments in several banking and financial institutions. He held some of these accounts in his name alone, some were in the name of his corporation, and he held some jointly with his brother. This appeal principally concerns the actions taken during the marriage with respect to some of those preexisting accounts. Lawrence testified that within a week after they returned from their honeymoon, Shari Ann badgered him almost every day to add her name to his individual accounts. Eventually, he agreed. He added her name to twelve of his accounts in which there was a combined total of approximately $483,000.3 No further action was taken on these accounts during the marriage. Shari Ann never had possession of the bankbooks. The only change in the accounts during the marriage was the posting of interest as it accrued.
During the trial,4 Lawrence described Shari Ann as avaricious, while she characterized him as selfish and uncaring. Most of the approximately twenty-four trial dates involved identification, division and distribution of Lawrence's assets and the marital estate. When this trial concluded, the trial justice issued a long, detailed and well-reasoned decision. All of his findings except one are unchallenged by the parties. He found the joint accounts to which Shari Ann's name had been added to be part of the marital estate. He concluded that the value of the marital estate was $1.3 million. He allowed each party to keep his or her own personal property and divided up tangible items belonging to the marital estate, such as vehicles and wedding gifts. The trial justice then awarded Lawrence all the accounts he owned, whether they were in his name individually or jointly held with Shari Ann and in consideration of the distribution to Lawrence, he ordered Lawrence to pay Shari Ann $250,000. This distribution is the subject of the appeal.
Neither party disputes the distribution of the real and personal property. Shari Ann argues that the $250,000 award was insufficient, and that she should have received at least 50 percent of the marital estate. We disagree. Lawrence asserts that the joint bank accounts should not have been included in the marital estate. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we agree with Lawrence.
Lawrence initially points out that the trial justice specifically found that Lawrence did not intend to give Shari Ann a present possessory interest in the joint accounts; rather, he added her name for convenience in the event that he should predecease her. Lawrence contends that in light of that finding, the trial justice erred in declaring that, regardless of his intent, the joint accounts with Shari Ann became marital property by operation of the law.
"This Court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial justice or magistrate in a divorce action unless he or she has `misconceived the relevant evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.'" DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747, 751 (R.I.2000) (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 714 A.2d 576, 580 (R.I.1998)). Moreover, "[u]nless it is shown that the trial justice either improperly exercised his or her discretion or that there was an abuse thereof, this Court will not disturb the trial justice's findings." Gormly v. Gormly, 760 A.2d 1241, 1243 (R.I.2000) (per curiam). "In reviewing the findings of a trial court, `it is not our function to arrive at de novo findings and conclusions of fact based on the evidence presented at trial.'" Schaffner v. Schaffner, 713 A.2d 1245, 1247 (R.I.1998) (quoting Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 33-34 (R.I. 1992)).
"In dividing property, a trial justice must decide which assets are marital property, consider the contribution of each party and then distribute the property." Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 345 (R.I.1989). "The trial justice is vested with wide discretion to divide the marital property justly and fairly between the parties." Gormly, 760 A.2d at 1243 (quoting Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 964 (R.I.1986)). "It is well-established that the equitable distribution of property is a three-step process." Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.2000) (per curiam). "The first step is to `determine which assets are "marital property" and which are "non-marital property."'" Id. (quoting Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481A.2d 7, 10 (R.I.1984)). "Next, the trial justice must take into account the factors set forth in [G.L.1956] § 15-5-16.1 and, finally, he or she must distribute the estate." Olivieri, 760 A.2d at 1248.
"That provision, Rhode Island's equitable distribution statute, requires that the court consider, among other things, the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the contribution of each of the parties during the marriage in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective estates, the amount and sources of income of each of the parties, the occupation and employability of each of the parties, the opportunity of each party for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and any factor that the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." Viti v. Viti, 773 A.2d 893, 895 (R.I.2001) (per curiam).
"If the trial [justice] did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, and if he [or she] considered all the requisite statutory elements, this [C]ourt will not disturb the trial court's findings." DiOrio, 751 A.2d at 750 (quoting Murphy, 714 A.2d at 579-80). Conversely, an order of distribution of marital assets will be vacated and the case remanded for a rehearing where the trial justice overlooks salient uncontradicted evidence in determining the amount of assets to be distributed. See Saback v. Saback, 593 A.2d 459, 461 (R.I.1991)
.
In his decision, the trial justice found that both parties bore the responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage. He said that "[i]f this court finds any fault at all, however, it is that they both could have tried harder[,]" and that "[o]n balance, the court finds that the factor of conduct weighs in favor of the plaintiff, but ever so slightly." (Emphasis added.) He carefully took account of the factors enumerated in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1 and concluded that the most significant factors to be weighed in this case were the length of the marriage and the contribution of the parties. He found that:
In later declaring the disputed joint accounts to be marital property, the trial justice found that:
That conclusion was error.
"When, during the course of a marriage, title to property for which one spouse has paid the purchase price is acquired in the names of both spouses, the transaction is presumed to be a gift or advancement for the benefit of the other spouse." Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 852 (R.I.1986). Thus, "property can be converted from nonmarital property into marital property if changed in form and put into joint names." Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1132 (R.I. 1989). This is known as the doctrine of transmutation. See Quinn, 512 A.2d at 852
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Barlett v. Fitts, C.A. No. PC 00-2002
...that he alone has been in possession of the stock certificates since the time of the transfer. He relies on Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2002), a case involving joint bank accounts, to support his proposition that the presumption of a gift may be rebutted by showing that a ......
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Barlett v. Fitts
...that he alone has been in possession of the stock certificates since the time of the transfer. He relies on Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2002), a case involving joint bank accounts, to support his proposition that the presumption of a gift may be rebutted by showing that a ......
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Barlett v. Fitts
...that he alone has been in possession of the stock certificates since the time of the transfer. He relies on Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2002), a case involving joint bank accounts, to support his proposition that the presumption of a gift may be rebutted by showing that a ......
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Barlett v. Fitts
...that he alone has been in possession of the stock certificates since the time of the transfer. He relies on Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 2002), a case involving joint bank accounts, to support his proposition that the presumption of a gift may be rebutted by showing that a ......