Steptoe & Johnson PLLC v. Lycan
Docket Number | 2022-CA-1181-MR |
Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
Parties | STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC APPELLANT v. D. ERIC LYCAN APPELLEE |
Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey K. Phillips Lexington, Kentucky.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Stephanie Tew Campbell Christine Trout Van Tatenhove Lexington, Kentucky
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
This matter involves contractual disputes between the law firm of Steptoe &Johnson PLLC ("Steptoe") and a former employee, attorney D. Eric Lycan. The issue before us is whether the parties were properly before the circuit court when it entered an order that: 1) joined Steptoe as a party to ongoing litigation between the Commonwealth of Kentucky Justice and Public Safety Cabinet ("the Commonwealth") and numerous online gambling entities ("the Gambling Case") pursuant to CR[1] 20.01; 2) ruled the circuit court is the proper forum for Steptoe and Lycan to resolve any fee-splitting dispute related to the Gambling Case; and 3) stayed arbitration proceedings initiated by Steptoe. We hold the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties and, therefore, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court was void ab initio. We make no holdings related to the merits of the underlying contractual disputes and whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
In 2007, the Commonwealth entered into a service contract with Lycan's then-employer, Hurt, Deckard, and May, PLLC ("HDM"), to pursue civil action against various entities offering illegal online gambling in Kentucky (i.e., the Gambling Case). HDM was to receive a 25% contingency fee for any recovery by the Commonwealth. In 2009, Lycan left HDM and began employment at Steptoe. He continued to work on the Gambling Case, but his initial employment agreement provided Steptoe was not entitled to any portion of the fees Lycan received in the Gambling Case. About a year later, Steptoe and Lycan amended the employment agreement because Lycan's continued work on the Gambling Case was affecting his billable hours requirement with Steptoe. The amended agreement provides Steptoe would receive 10% of the fees earned by Lycan in the gambling case in 2010 and then increased 5% each year thereafter.
Lycan's employment with Steptoe terminated in November 2014. Upon his exit, Lycan tendered $533,335.40 to Steptoe for its share of fees received from the Gambling Case since the parties entered into the amended employment agreement. The parties also entered into a practice transition agreement upon Lycan's 2014 exit. The current underlying dispute between the parties is whether the 2014 practice transition agreement contains an arbitration provision that specifically addresses fee-splitting between Steptoe and Lycan in the Gambling Case.[2]
On June 3, 2021, the circuit court approved fees of $13,501,626.60 to Lycan from a settlement between the Commonwealth and one of the defendants in the Gambling Case, PokerStars. On July 25, 2022, Steptoe filed for arbitration in West Virginia, demanding approximately $4.7 million, or 35%, of the fees Lycan received. On August 10, 2022, Lycan filed a response objecting to arbitration, but also filed counterclaims against Steptoe. On the same date, he also filed a motion in the Gambling Case. Lycan moved the circuit court for a declaratory judgment that Steptoe was not entitled to any portion of the fees he received in the Gambling Case and for an order staying the arbitration proceedings. Steptoe filed a limited response as a non-party arguing the circuit court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
At this point, Lycan argued the circuit court has jurisdiction over all attorneys in the case, but also offered to file a separate complaint. He also argued the court could bring Steptoe in by permissive joinder. Steptoe continued to argue lack of jurisdiction. Despite the circuit court's initial misgivings, it entered an order joining Steptoe as a party pursuant to CR 20.01. However, the circuit court did not stop there. It went on to rule that an arbitration agreement did not exist between Steptoe and Lycan related to fee-splitting in the Gambling Case and also stayed the arbitration proceedings. This appeal followed.
(Emphasis added.)
It is unclear from the circuit court's order if Steptoe was to be brought into the Gambling Case as a plaintiff or a defendant. We assume, due to the nature of relief requested in Lycan's motion, Steptoe would be a defendant. However, this assumption is problematic because Lycan is not a plaintiff, or a party at all, in the Gambling Case. Even assuming, arguendo, that it was permissible to join Steptoe as a defendant pursuant to CR 20.01, the circuit court should have stopped there until Steptoe was served with process. This begs the question: What, exactly, would have been served upon Steptoe? The most recent amended complaint between the Commonwealth and the various defendants is wholly unrelated to the contractual disputes between Steptoe and Lycan.[3] Stated differently, the instant contractual disputes do not arise "out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" or a "question of law or fact common to all defendants" in the Gambling Case. Further, CR 3.01 provides, "[a] civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a summons or warning order thereon in good faith." Lycan's motion filed in the Gambling Case fails to meet this requirement.
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