Sterman v. Brown Univ.
| Decision Date | 14 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | CA. No. 20-358-JJM-PAS |
| Citation | 513 F.Supp.3d 243 |
| Parties | Grant STERMAN, Ahmed Amin, Maximo Moyer, Andrew Wei, Raghav Pemmireddy, Declan McCarthy, John Paul Champa, Alexa Jacobs, Danielle Benstock, Lily Seckendorf, Abby Dichter, Rachel Mashek, Kate Dowling, and Isabella Kearns, Plaintiffs, v. BROWN UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Jared R. Sugerman, Stacey P. Nakasian, Duffy & Sweeney, Ltd., Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.
Yotam Barkai, Pro Hac Vice, Anne O'Toole, Pro Hac Vice, Gabrielle E. Tenzer, Pro Hac Vice, Mahrah Taufique, Pro Hac Vice, Matthew Craig, Pro Hac Vice, Roberta A. Kaplan, Pro Hac Vice, Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP, New York, NY, Christopher N. Dawson, Robert Clark Corrente, Whelan Corrente & Flanders LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendant.
This dispute arises from Defendant Brown University's ("Brown") decision to transition its men's and women's varsity squash teams to club status. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for breach of contract (Count I), promissory estoppel (Count II), fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation (Counts III and IV), and breach of fiduciary relationship (Count V). ECF No. 14. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction from the Court to enjoin Defendant's action, ECF No. 16, and Defendant moves to dismiss all five counts under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 32.
This Court finds that there is little likelihood of success on the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ causes of action and therefore denies the request for a preliminary injunction. The Court however, considering the liberal pleading requirements and accepting all well-pleaded plausible allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, finds that two counts survive Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs bring this suit under this Court's diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Brown has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 threshold required for diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 32 at 10-12.
"It is well-settled that in an action for injunctive or declaratory relief ‘the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.’ " Grotzke v. Kurz , 887 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D.R.I. 1995) (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 347, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) ). When the value is in dispute, "the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of alleging with sufficient particularity facts indicating that it is not a legal certainty that the claim involves less than the jurisdictional amount." Dep't of Recreation and Sports of Puerto Rico v. World Boxing Ass'n , 942 F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).
Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated "that the pecuniary consequences of [this] judgment might crest $75,000." Maine Cmty. Health Options v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. , No. CV 20-10-JJM, 2020 WL 1130057, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 9, 2020). As they point out, Brown's total expense for its men's and women's varsity squash teams in 2018 was $303,518. ECF No. 36 at 2. Brown is correct that this figure does not represent the amount in controversy, as the university would still incur expenses running club squash teams. ECF No. 37 at 4. However, it is far from legally certain that the expenses associated with four years of varsity squash, compared to club squash, are less than $75,000. Consequently, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and Brown's 12(b)(1) Motion is denied.
Brown's men's and women's squash teams have historically competed in Division I varsity athletics, playing in the Ivy League and the College Squash Association. ECF No. 14 at 1. Both teams consist of a mixture of students who joined after enrolling at Brown, as well as students who matriculated at Brown anticipating participation on the team. The latter students were in contact with Brown Athletics throughout their college application process – receiving either a recruitment offer ("Recruited Plaintiffs") or some form of support in their application ("Supported Plaintiffs"). Id. at 5.
Brown has a limited number of recruitment spots that its squash coach can offer to high school students. Beginning in their junior years of high school, high-achieving squash players correspond with Brown's squash coach – learning more about Brown and its squash program, and in turn updating the university on their academic and athletic achievements. Id. By the spring or summer of their junior years, recruited students will receive a recruitment offer from the Brown squash coach. If accepted, the understanding is that – pending review by Brown Admissions – the student will be accepted to Brown and will plan to matriculate and play on the squash team. Id. at 6.
It is common for recruited students to be considered by multiple universities. Per Ivy League rules and norms, upon accepting their offer they will generally remove themselves from consideration at other universities – informing other squash coaches of their recruitment and often applying Early Decision to Brown. Id. at 7-12. Students who did not receive a recruitment offer may still receive support in their application to Brown (e.g., a recommendation letter by the coach). Id. at 13. Following review by the Admission Office, recruited students receive a "Likely Letter" in the Fall of their senior years, indicating that they can expect to be admitted. Id. at 14.
The recruitment process involved ongoing conversations between Plaintiffs and Brown squash coach Stuart leGassick throughout Plaintiffs’ junior and senior years of high school. Id. at 7-14. During 2016-2019, Coach leGassick offered recruitment spots to each Recruited Plaintiff. The offers varied in language, but generally explicitly offered Plaintiffs a recruiting spot and asked them to respond by informing the coach whether they would be accepting. Id. at 7-12. Offers often included statements attesting to the student's potential to thrive as a student-athlete at Brown, and sometimes used terms such as "four years" and "varsity," but other times did not. Following the offers, Recruited Plaintiffs sent emails accepting, and, often at Coach leGassick's instruction, notified other universities with whom they were in contact of their decision. They then applied Early Decision to Brown, received "Likely Letters" from Brown's Admission Office, and ultimately matriculated at Brown. Id. at 7, 12.
Similar exchanges, while not offering recruitment spots, occurred between Coach leGassick and the Supported Plaintiffs. In conversations with Supported Plaintiffs, Coach leGassick offered to support their applications for admission to Brown and were told that if they were accepted, they would be able to play on the team. Id. at 13-14. Supported Plaintiffs subsequently matriculated at Brown. Id. at 15.
On May 28, 2020, Brown announced its intention to transition its men's and women's varsity squash teams, along with nine other varsity teams, to club status immediately.1 Id. at 19. Brown's Athletic Director Jack Hayes announced the decision during a Zoom call with student-athletes. Before the call, Plaintiffs did not know that Brown was considering transitioning varsity squash to club status. Id.
According to Brown, the decision to transition its squash teams to club status was part of a broader effort to improve the school's athletic competitiveness, called the Excellence Initiative to Reshape Athletics at Brown. The decision was the culmination of the work of the Committee on Excellence in Athletics, which President Christina Paxson formed in January 2020. In March 2020, she charged the Committee with making recommendations on how Brown might enhance the quality of the student-athletic experience at the school. ECF No. 35 at 6. Ultimately, the process produced a revised proposal that called for transitioning eleven varsity teams, including squash, to club. On May 21, 2020, the Corporation – Brown's highest governing body – approved the proposal. Id. Brown notified the coaches of the affected teams, including Coach Stuart leGassick, of the decision shortly before they announced it to student-athletes. Id. at 7.
Preceding the announcement, and certainly in the months since, the COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged the globe. Accordingly, most intercollegiate squash competitions have been cancelled for the foreseeable future. See NESCAC Presidents’ Statement on Winter Sports , NESCAC (Oct. 8, 2020), https://nescac.com/news/2020/10/8/nescac-news-nescac-presidents-staement-on-winter-sports.aspx; Ivy League Outlines Intercollegiate Athletics Plans; No Competition for Winter Sports , Ivy League (Nov. 12, 2020), https://ivyleague.com/news/2020/11/12/general-ivy-league-outlines-intercollegiate-athletics-plans-no-competition-for-winter-sports.aspx. While Brown allowed some in-person training for varsity teams earlier in the Fall 2020 semester, as of November 15th all university in-person practice activities have been halted indefinitely in response to rising COVID-19 case numbers. ECF No. 35 at 10.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must plead a "plausible entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The complaint must have sufficient factual allegations that plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This standard requires more than a recitation of elements and must allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that a defendant is liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court must accept a plaintiffs allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, Inc. , 572 F.3d 45,...
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