Sternberger v. Cape Fear & Y.V.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1888
• Citation: 7 S.E. 836,29 S.C. 510
• Parties: STERNBERGER v. CAPE FEAR & Y. V R. Co.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

7 S.E. 836

29 S.C. 510

STERNBERGER v. CAPE FEAR & Y. V R. Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 30, 1888

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Marlboro county; J. H HUDSON, Judge.

This was a complaint by E. Sternberger to the South Carolina railroad commission against the Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Railroad Company. The commission sustained the complaint, and the railroad company appealed to the circuit judge of the Fourth circuit, who dismissed the complaint. From this decision the plaintiff, Sternberger, appeals.

Jos. H Earle, Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Knox Livingston, for respondent.

SIMPSON C.J.

The plaintiff, (appellant,) who lives at Tatum, Marlboro county had consigned to him from Charleston, S. C., a ton of commercial fertilizers. The railroad route from Charles to Tatum over which this fertilizer was transported was first over the Northeastern Railroad and the Cheraw & Darlington Railroad to Cheraw, both roads being entirely in South Carolina; thence from Cheraw over the Cheraw & Salsbury Railroad to Wadesboro, in North Carolina, this road being partly in this state and terminating in North Carolina, at Wadesboro; thence over the Carolina Central Railroad, being entirely in North Carolina, to Shoe Heel, in North Carolina thence over the Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley Railroad, principally in North Carolina, to Tatum, in South Carolina, which point is about six miles from Bennettsville, S. C., where the railroad terminates. The freight charged to plaintiff on his ton of fertilizer to Tatum was $4.40, while the freight to Bennettsville, 6 miles further, on the same article, was only $4. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff complained to the railroad commission that the defendant was violating section 1443, Gen. St., which forbids common carriers to charge more freight on the same goods for transporting the same a shorter than a longer distance in one continuous carriage. This complaint was investigated by the railroad commission, the defendant resisting the complaint upon the grounds First, that Bennettsville was a competitive terminal point, and therefore exempt from the provisions of section 1443, Gen. St., by the terms of the proviso to said section; and, second, that the railroad state commission had no jurisdiction of the matter, inasmuch as it involved interstate commerce. These defenses were overruled by the railroad commission, and the defendant was required to correct its rates, and to refund the excessive charges. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the circuit judge of the Fourth circuit, who, after full testimony upon the question whether Bennettsville was a competitive terminal point, sustained defendant's appeal upon both the grounds taken; holding that Bennettsville, being a competitive terminal point, was exempt from the operation of section 1443, Gen. St., and also that the matter involved was interstate commerce, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the state railroad commission. He consequently decreed and adjudged that the judgment of the commission be reversed. From this decree and judgment the plaintiff has appealed to this court, assigning error to the circuit judge in overruling the two grounds upon which the judgment of the commission was based.

We will take up these grounds in the inverse order in which they were discussed by the circuit judge. And, first, did the railroad commission have jurisdiction? or did the matter involve and belong to interstate commerce, thereby depriving the state commission of jurisdiction? The word "commerce" is a term of broad signification. It embraces considerably more than the mere bargain and sale of goods and merchandise and other property between individuals. Yes, it includes all the instruments by which it may be conducted. It embraces...