Sterrett v. Bell, 14410
Decision Date | 25 May 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 14410,14410 |
Citation | 240 S.W.2d 516 |
Parties | STERRETT et al. v. BELL et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Julien C. Hyer, Asst. Dist. Atty., George W. Hutchison and J. Hart Willis, all of Dallas, for appellants.
Joe A. Worsham, Jos. Irion Worsham, and Worsham, Forsythe & Riley, all of Dallas, for appellees.
This proceeding was filed by Tyree L. Bell and 37 other property-owning taxpayers of Road District No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas, as plaintiffs, against the County Judge and four County Commissioners of Dallas County, who together compose the Commissioners' Court, and as such, the governing body of Road District No. 1, as defendants, seeking an injunction against defendants to prevent them from receiving and opening bids; from letting a contract, and spending (on repairs, etc., to Belt Line Road) $3,300,000 of a $22,500,000 bond issue authorized by the qualified voters of such Road District, based on the allegation that the defendants were proceeding in an illegal manner.
The facts are not seriously in dispute. In the order calling the election it is provided: 'It will be the policy of the Commissioners' Court to do all construction work by contract on a competitive bidding * * *.' (With one exception not material here.)
After the electorate authorized the issuance of the bonds the Commissioners' Court furnished information to bidders for clearing and grading, widening, drainage structure, permanent paving and bridges on Belt Line Road (approximately 90 Miles of road) by a three to two vote, and sought bids for such work on the following basis, to wit:
'(1) Reimbursement of all expenses necessary to performance of the work, but excluding any home office overhead expenses or interest on invested capital.
'(2) A fee of ___% of all costs reimbursed under subparagraph First, above, which fee shall cover all profit, home office overhead expense and interest on invested capital.'
In the information to bidders it was stated that the projects would require:
'(1) Removing and replacing culvert pipe.'
'(2) Asphalt stabilized base.'
'(3) Reconstruction, widening, and strengthening flexible base, and asphalt surfacing.'
'(4) Flexible base construction.'
The bids as shown by the above were not on the cost of the project, but only on a supervision fee. The information to bidders also provided, material here, that:
And,
'It is understood that the amount of money available for the work is approximately $3,300,000.00.'
It is also provided:
'(16) Audit: The Road District will audit the accounts of the contractor at all times, and the contractor will furnish the auditor with adequate facilities for his work.'
'(17) Defective Work: Any work not in accordance with the plans and specifications to be approved by the court, which is required to be replaced, shall be done at the sole expense of the contractor and the Road District will not reimburse contractor, or allow any fee on such rework.'
'(18) Payment: On the 10th of the following month the Road District will reimburse the contractor for all expenses incurred up to the end of the preceding month and a proportionate amount of the fee earned upon the presentation of original vouchers and payroll sheets.'
After hearing the evidence the trial court granted the temporary injunction prayed for by plaintiffs, fixed the amount of the bond which was made and filed, and thereafter the defendants duly perfected this appeal.
The parties will be designated as in the trial court. The defendants (appellants here) brief six points of error in substance as follows: (1) The trial court committed fundamental error in overruling their plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss for the reason (a) plaintiffs had not requested and the district attorney had not refused to file the suit, and (b) it was also not shown that the Commissioners' Court had engaged in an illegal act; (2) committed material error in overruling their motion to dismiss called to the court's attention (a) before any evidence was introduced, (b) and at the conclusion of appellants' evidence, and (c) at conclusion of all the evidence; (3) material error in finding there were...
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