Stetson v. French

• Decision Date: 05 April 1947
• Citation: 321 Mass. 195,72 N.E.2d 410
• Parties: STETSON v. FRENCH (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

321 Mass. 195

72 N.E.2d 410

STETSON

v.FRENCH (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

April 5, 1947.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; O'Connell, Judge.

Actions by Jabez Stetson and Charles E. Stetson, respectively, against Jonathan W. French, executor of the estate of Lincoln Stetson, deceased, for wages due plaintiffs as testator's employees, in which Benjie Stetson, as administrator of the estate of Jabez Stetson, deceased, was substituted for deceased as plaintiff. Verdicts for plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, RONAN, WILKINS, and SPALDING, JJ.

C. Sheldon Williams, of Quincy, and J. M. J. Hurley, of Stoughton, for plaintiffs.

S. T. Abele and G. W. Abele, both of Boston, for defendant.

QUA, Justice.

These actions were originally brought by Jabez Stetson and Charles E. Stetson, brothers, to recover from the estate of a third brother, Lincoln Stetson, balances alleged to be due for wages earned by them respectively over a long period of years during which they were employed by Lincoln as farm laborers and cattle drovers in connection with his farms in Randolph and Abington. ¹ The writs were dated April 7, 1943. Jabez died during the pendency of the actions, and his action is now prosecuted by his administrator. The defendant set up the general statute of limitations in each case. There were verdicts for the plaintiffs, and the defendant prosecutes exceptions.

The consolidated bill of exceptions states that the sole issue presented ‘is whether the allegations of fraud * * * and the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in support of these allegations was such as to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations.’ We address ourselves to the issue so defined.

From statements of facts in the bill of exceptions, findings of an auditor not contradicted at the trial, and evidence at the trial the following facts are established or could be found: For more than fifty years the defendant's testator, Lincoln Stetson, operated one or more farms and engaged in the business of trading cattle. He was a successful business man, employing during the greater part of the time ‘a large number of men.’ Jabez and Charles were respectively ten and fourteen years younger than Lincoln. Neither Jabez nor Charles could read or write, and Charles ‘was of limited mentality’ and was ‘a farm hand of mediocre value.’ Lincoln employed Jabez in 1901 and Charles in 1903. Both worked for Lincoln until his death in 1941. Jabez was to receive $12 a week ‘and found’ (changed to $20 a week in 1920), and $5 additional for each trip to Brighton with cattle. Charles was to receive $18 a month ‘and found.’ Early in the employment of each of his brothers Lincoln Stetson began withholding a portion of the wages of each upon an agreement with each to deposit the sums withheld for his benefit in a bank in Randolph. This practice could be found to have continued with the assent of Jabez and Charles during most of the time of their employment and until substantial sums had been withheld from the pay of each. Lincoln did not in fact make any such deposits, as Jabez and Charles learned for the first time after Lincoln's death. These actions are prosecuted to recover as unpaid wages the sums so withheld and not deposited as agreed.

There was evidence from which these additional facts could be found: On one occasion about 1907 or 1908 when Jabez asked Lincoln for money, Lincoln replied, ‘I'm putting that money away and taking it out each week and when the house is paid for you won it.’ The house referred to was one owned by Lincoln and occupied by Jabez, which Jabez contended was to be conveyed to him when paid for out of withheld wages. On another occasion Lincoln told Jabez that Lincoln had the deeds to the house and would take care of them until the house was paid for. On another occasion Lincoln said to Jabez, ‘You will never have to worry. I am taking care of you fellows.’ At one time when Lincoln gave Charles 50 cents Lincoln said to the witness, ‘I will take care of his money. You see he don't know how to take care of his own money and I will take care of it for him.’ The plaintiff Charles Stetson testified in his own behalf. His appearance ‘warranted the inference that while strong physically, he was of limited mentality.’ He testified that Lincoln paid him 50 cents or $1 a week of his wages and told him that he was putting the rest of his money in a Randolph bank. There was further testimony that Lincoln had said to different witnesses that he was keeping part of Jabez's wages to pay for the house; that he was putting part of Charles' pay away in the bank to take care of him when he got old; and that he was putting away in a bank money withheld from the wages of Jabez and Charles ‘for their old age when they could not work.’

With these facts and this evidence in mind, we turn to the application of the statute of limitations. Each time, weekly and monthly, when wages were withheld by Lincoln Stetson and not deposited as agreed, a cause of action arose in favor of Jabez or Charles. In each instance the general statute of limitations would interpose its bar at the end of six years (G.L. [Ter.Ed.] c. 260, § 2) unless the cause of action was fraudulently concealed by Lincoln within the provisions of § 12. That section reads, ‘If a person liable to a personal action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period prior to the discovery of his cause of action by the person so entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited for the commencement of the action.’ We need expend no effort on the question whether the allegations of fraudulent concealment in the declarations were sufficient, since the plaintiffs were not required to allege anything in their declarations in anticipation of the pleading of the statute of limitations by the defendant. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, §§ 28, 147, forms 28 and 46. Hodgdon v. City of Haverhill, 193 Mass. 327, 330, 79 N.E. 818;Aisenberg v. Royal Ins. Co. Ltd. 266 Mass. 543, 546, 165 N.E. 682;Gallo v. Foley, 299 Mass. 1, 4, 11 N.E.2d 803. The real question is whether the evidence would...