Steuart v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 1863
• Citation: 20 Md. 97
• Parties: GEORGE H. STEUART v. STATE OF MARYLAND, USE OF CHARLES SHIPLEY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

20 Md. 97

GEORGE H. STEUART v. STATE OF MARYLAND, USE OF CHARLES SHIPLEY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 5, 1863

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore City:

The action in this case was instituted by the appellee on the injunction bond given by the appellant in the case of Steuart vs. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, reported in 7 Md. Rep., 500. To the declaration on the bond, the appellant pleaded general performance; the appellee replied that the injunction was to prevent the opening, paving and grading of Baltimore street west of Fulton street; that it was dissolved by the Court below, and afterwards, on appeal, the order dissolving it was affirmed and the bill dismissed by the Court of Appeals; that the writ was not prosecuted with effect, that he, the appellee, was interested in the bond; that he was the owner of a part of the land through which the said street would pass; that he was assessed for and paid benefits for the opening of said street; that his land was valuable for building lots, and that the injunction delayed, hindered and prevented him for a long time from the beneficial and profitable use, enjoyment and disposal of his said land whereby he sustained damage, & c. The appellant rejoined denying 1st, that the appellant was interested in the bond and, 2nd, that the injunction did delay, hinder and prevent him from the beneficial and profitable use, enjoyment and disposal of his property.

The bond sued upon, was made to the State of Maryland in the penalty of $10,000, and its condition referred to in the pleadings, is in the following words: " Now the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the said George H. Steuart shall prosecute the said writ of injunction with effect, and satisfy and pay all costs and charges that shall be occasioned by the granting of said injunction, and all the damages that may be occasioned by the granting thereof, and indemnify and save harmless the defendants from all damages that may be occasioned them, if said writ shall not be prosecuted with effect, and shall in all respects obey such order or decree as the Court may pass in the premises, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue." The injunction was issued on the 12th of July 1854, and on the 31st of July 1855, the order dissolving it was affirmed and the bill dismissed by this Court.

At the trial of the cause, two exceptions were taken to the ruling of the Court as to the admissibility of certain evidence offered, and a third to the rejection of the five prayers of the defendant and the granting of the instruction given by the Court. The conclusions of this Court resting upon the rejection of the defendant's first prayer, and the granting of the instruction given by the Court below, the other prayers together with the arguments of counsel in reference to the same are omitted.

Defendant's 1st Prayer. That if the jury shall find from the evidence in the cause, that Charles Shipley, for whose use this action is instituted, was not a party concerned in the proceeding by the defendant against the Mayor & City Council, nor interested therein, then the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action.

The following is the instruction given to the jury by the Court below:

" I instruct the jury that Charles Shipley, the plaintiff in this action, is entitled to recover for any damage which the jury may find he sustained by reason of his inability to sell or lease the property to which they may believe he has shown title, (exclusive of that which he acquired by purchase from Mr. Lurman,) in consequence of the writ of injunction referred to in these proceedings; and that the measure of damages to be considered by the jury, if they should find that any damage was sustained by the plaintiff, is the difference between the sum for which the said plaintiff could have sold or leased the said property during the period covered by the injunction, that is from the time of the issuing of the injunction to its final dissolution, and the dismissal of the defendant's bill of complaint by the Court of Appeals, and the sum for which the plaintiff could have sold or leased the said property after the dismissal of the said bill, provided the jury find from the evidence that there existed any such relative difference of price."

To said rulings of the Court the defendant excepted, and the verdict of the jury being for the plaintiff, appealed.

Neilson Poe and J. Prentiss Poe, for the appellants:

1st. The first prayer of the appellant should have been granted it presents the proposition that no one but a party, or one interested in the cause, is entitled to sue upon a bond of this character. This point goes to the root of the action. Ing vs. The State, 8 Md Rep., 294.

2nd. The instruction given by the Court, in effect told the jury, that in assessing the damages, the depreciation between July 1854, and August 1855, if found to have existed, was the true measure by which they were to be governed. This obviously withheld from them the consideration of the preliminary question upon which we insist, viz: Whether even had no injunction been issued, any disposition at all could have been made by the appellee of his property. It is no answer to say that the opinion accompanying the instruction excludes from the jury " everthing that can be considered in its legal sense as speculative damages," for the reason that it leaves the jury to determine what that " legal sense" is, which is manifestly erroneous, and also because the rule, as given, necessarily makes the damages remote and speculative.

No better instance of the inaccuracy of such a rule can be furnished than that supplied by this very case. It is impossible to conceive how the jury arrived at their verdict. They could only have reached it by speculating, first, as to how much of said Shipley's land, within and beyond the City limits, was eligible for building lots; second, as to whether he might have sold or leased it all, and if not all, how much, in the interval of twelve months, while the injunction was in force; thirdly, whether there was any real depreciation; and if so, how much?

In support of these views, we refer to-- Abbott vs. Gatch, 13 Md. Rep., 332. Middlekauff vs. Smith, 1 Md. Rep., 329. 2 Pars. on Cont., ch. 11, sec. 5. Sedgwick on Dam., 69, 79. Mayne on Dam., 95 Law Lib., ch. 4, 5, 11, 15, 24. Fletcher, et al., vs. Tayleur, 17 C. B., 21. Taylor vs. Maguire, 12 Mo. Rep., 313. Porter vs. Woods, et al., 3 Hump., 56. Watson vs. Railway Co., 3 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep., 497. Hadley vs. Baxendale, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep., 402. City of Cincinatti vs. Evans, 5 Ohio U. S., 594. Cooper vs. Young, 22 Ga. Rep., 269. Wood vs. Fulton, et al., 2 H. & J., 78. Archer vs. Williams, 2 Car. & Kir., 26, (61 Eng. C. L. Rep. ) Lisk vs. Sherman, 25 Barb, 433. Del. Col. vs. Arnold, 3 Dallas, 333. The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat., 327. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Id., 546. La Amistad de Rues, 5 Id., 385. Smith, et al., vs. Condry, 1 How., 28. Weld vs. Nichols, 17 Pick., 543. Fox vs. Harding, 7 Cush., 516, 522. Bridges, et al., vs. Stickney, 38 Me. Rep., 361. Rubon vs. Stephan, 25 Miss., 256. Walker, et al., vs. Ellis, et al., 1 Sneed., 515. Dyer vs. Dorsey, et al., 1 G. & J., 440. Hamlin vs. Railway Co., 1 Hurl. & Nor., 408. Thompson vs. Shattuck, 2 Met., 615. Bruce vs. Hilliwell, 5 Exchequer, 615. Carthouse vs. Owings, 6 H. & J., 134.

The jury were led astray by the rule laid down for their guidance, and as their verdict based upon it is glaringly unjust, the judgment should be reversed, and a procedendo awarded.

I. Nevitt Steele, for the appellee:

The instruction given by the Court below, covered the case, and was correct in point of law. It disposed first of the question, whether the appellee could recover on the bond, and next of the question, as to the measure of damages, to be considered by the jury, excluding entirely from the appellee's case, the property purchased by him from Mr. Lurman.

1st. The proposition embraced in the first clause of the instruction, was, that if the jury found that the appellee had sustained damage from inability to lease or sell his property, caused by the injunction, he was entitled to recover therefor. This proposition is founded on the Act of Assembly of 1835, which provides that bonds taken by Courts of Equity in the name of the State, " may be sued by any person interested, as public bonds may." Here the bond was taken in the name of the State; the defendants in the injunction cause were acting in a public capacity, and had no personal or beneficial interest in the matter, and the condition of the bond was, not merely to pay all damages sustained by the defendants, but also generally " to pay all damages occasioned by the granting of the injunction." The bond is, therefore, obviously one to which the Act of Assembly applies. By simply placing such a bond on the footing of " Public Bonds," the Act would have clearly indicated, that the right to sue on it, should not be limited to the parties to the proceeding in which it was given; but here the Act goes further, and in terms, gives that right to any person interested. The only inquiry on this point, then is, was the appellee a " " person interested" in the matter of the injunction, and if he was not, it is difficult to imagine who was. Upon the hypothesis of fact on which the instruction was founded, he was the owner of property, which he was disabled from selling or leasing, by reason of the injunction, and sustained damages thereby. He was thus directly and immediately interested in the matter of the injunction. Act of 1835, ch. 380, sec. 7. Ing vs. State, 8 Md. Rep., 294, 295. Kierstead vs. State, 1 G. & J., 248.

The first prayer of the...