Stevens Medical Arts Bldg. v. City of Mount Vernon
Decision Date | 21 January 1980 |
Citation | 72 A.D.2d 177,424 N.Y.S.2d 230 |
Parties | In the Matter of STEVENS MEDICAL ARTS BUILDING, Respondent, v. The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON et al., Appellants. In the Matter of LUCAS BUILDING COMPANY, Respondent, v. The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON et al., Appellants. In the Matter of KENLAW REALTY CORP., Respondent, v. The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON et al., Appellants. In the Matter of George S. KAUFMAN, Respondent, v. The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON et al., Appellants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Philip C. Scarpino, Corp. Counsel, Mount Vernon (Corinne Edelbaum, Mount Vernon, of counsel), for appellants.
Milton D. Jacobs, Mount Vernon, for respondents.
Before MOLLEN, P. J., and HOPKINS, TITONE and MANGANO, JJ.
The question before us is the timeliness of these proceedings. The appellant city and its officers claim that under the provisions of the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) the proceedings must be instituted within 30 days after August 2, 1978, when the city gave notice that the assessment roll had been filed. Since incontestably these proceedings were instituted on September 20, 1978, the city contends that they are time-barred.
Special Term denied appellants' motions to dismiss based on this ground, holding that under the provisions of the city charter, read in conjunction with the provisions of the RPTL, the proceedings were timely brought, since the last day for filing the assessment roll under the charter was August 31, and that date controlled for the measurement of the 30 days' limitation provided by the RPTL (§ 702, subd. 2).
We affirm. The provisions of the RPTL must be read in the light of the provisions of the city charter, and the proceedings were therefore timely instituted within the 30-day limitation.
Each of the petitioners is an owner of taxable real property in the City of Mount Vernon. On August 2, 1978 the Commissioner of Assessment and Taxation filed a certified copy of the 1978 assessment roll in the office of the City Clerk. Notice of the completion and filing of the assessment roll was given on August 2, 1978.
On September 20, 1978 each of the petitioners served a petition to review the assessments (see RPTL, § 700), alleging that the assessments were unequal, illegal and represented more than the full value of the properties.
Thereafter the appellants moved to dismiss each of the proceedings on the grounds that it had not been timely begun and did not comply with subdivision 3 of section 307 of the RPTL. Special Term denied the motions, holding that the proceedings had been commenced within the 30-day limitation prescribed by section 702 of the RPTL. Special Term reached that conclusion, although acknowledging that service of the petitions occurred more than 30 days after August 2, 1978. It reasoned that the proceedings were timely because section 235 of the city charter provides that the last day for filing the assessment roll is August 31, and subdivision 2 of section 702 of the RPTL provides that the assessment roll cannot be considered finally completed and filed until the last day set by law for the filing of the assessment roll or until notice thereof has been given as required by law, whichever is later. Hence, the service of the petitions was timely, since it occurred within 30 days of August 31, 1978.
The appellants then moved for leave to reargue. Special Term denied the motion.
On this appeal the appellants argue that Special Term mistakenly construed the statutes, contending that the City Charter should not be applied to alter the provisions of subdivision 1 of section 516 of the RPTL, calling for the filing of the assessment roll on August 1. The interpretation of the statutes by Special Term, say the appellants, defeats the intent of the Legislature to prescribe a readily ascertainable date for the commencement of proceedings to review assessments.
Our initial inquiry must be directed to the statutes. Article 5 of the RPTL deals generally with the procedure to be followed for the preparation and filing of assessments. Subdivision 1 of section 516 of the RPTL provides, in part, as follows:
Article 7 of the RPTL provides generally for the judicial review of assessments. Section 700 of the RPTL reads in part as follows:
Section 702 of the RPTL, as recently amended (L.1977, ch. 620), reads, in part, as follows:
Finally, section 2006 of the RPTL (added by L.1958, ch. 959) reads as follows:
We turn now to the provisions of the City Charter. Section 235 provides, in part, as follows:
In construing the force and effect of these statutory provisions, we must recognize that they cannot be wrenched from their historical setting and prior interpretations (Matter of Horchler, 37 A.D.2d 28, 31, 322 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92, affd. 30 N.Y.2d 725, 332 N.Y.S.2d 896, 283 N.E.2d 768). Moreover, we must respect the precepts that tax statutes should be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer (Bayview Tower Apts. v. State Tax Comm., 48 A.D.2d 86, 89, 367 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859, affd. 40 N.Y.2d 856, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 356 N.E.2d 474; Matter of Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Assessors of City of Binghamton, 12 A.D.2d 852, 891 N.Y.S.2d 720), and that the dates fixed for the...
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