Stevens v. City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 06 December 1889
• Citation: 43 N.W. 842,42 Minn. 136
• Parties: STEVENS v CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

42 Minn. 136

43 N.W. 842

STEVENSvCITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 6, 1889.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Whether a witness offered as an expert possesses the requisite qualification is a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge, and his ruling will not be reversed unless it clearly appears that it was not justified by the evidence as presented to him at the time, or that it was based upon some erroneous view of legal principles.

2. The opinions of experts as to the value of services, or anything not having a fixed and known market value, are not conclusive, but it is the province of the jury to weigh such testimony by reference to all the other facts and circumstances in evidence, and judge of the weight and force of such opinions by their own common sense and general knowledge of the subject of inquiry.

3. Where a motion for a new trial was made on two or more different grounds, an assignment of error, “that the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial,” is insufficient.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; YOUNG, Judge.

Wilson & Lawrence, for appellant.

Robert D. Russell, City Atty., for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This action was brought to recover the value of services rendered by plaintiff under a contract by which he was employed by defendant to compile, revise, annotate, index, and edit the city charter, together with all acts of the legislature relating to the city and its various public boards; also all ordinances and regulations of the city and its predecessors; and to prepare the same for press, and superintend the printing and publishing of the same in book form. This employment included the preparation, for presentation to the city council, of such new ordinances, and amendments to existing ordinances, as might be necessary to make them conform to existing laws, or to put into one ordinance the provisions of a multiplicity of ordinances on the same subject. It involved, first, the adoption of a plan or system of compilation, and then an examination of all general and special laws affecting the city since the adoption of the original charter; also of the proceedings of the councils of the two cities, St. Anthony and Minneapolis, down to date, to ascertain what ordinances had been passed; making a summary of these, and noting which were repealed, and which were inconsistent with each other; also a preparation of a complete index of the whole compilation; and, finally, the supervision of the printing and publishing it in book form. The work, therefore, was to be a very thorough one,-not a mere compilation; but also, at least so far as the ordinances were concerned, a revision. It also included what might be called the editing and publishing. Upon the trial the plaintiff explained to the jury at very great length, and in minute detail, the character and extent of the work; how he did it; the degree of skill and care it required; the difficulties in the way of its performance; and the length of time in hours it occupied him. He and another witness in his behalf were also allowed to testify as experts as to what, in their opinions, such services were worth by the hour. The evidence on part of the defendant consisted mainly of testimony tending to show that plaintiff was not occupied in the work as long or as steadily as he claimed; also testimony as to the salary or compensation usually paid to editors or others employed in making compilations and revisions of a somewhat similar character.

The most important question in the case is that raised by plaintiff's sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error, as to the rulings of the trial court in excluding the testimony of certain alleged experts, Merrick, Ripley, and Benton, as to what, in their opinions, plaintiff's services were reasonably worth by the hour. The rule determining the subjects upon which experts may testify, and the rule prescribing the qualifications of experts, are matters of law; but whether a witness offered as an expert has those qualifications is a question of fact to be decided by the court at the trial. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546. Whether a witness offered as an expert possesses the requisite qualifications involves so much of the element of fact that great consideration must necessarily be given to the decision of the trial judge; and his ruling will be sustained, unless it is made clearly to appear that it was based upon some erroneous view of legal principles, or that the ruling was not justified by the evidence as presented to the judge at the time. Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274;Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122;Perkins v. Stickney, 132 Mass. 217;Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645;Ft. Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75, 7 N. E. Rep. 743; Castner v. Sliker, 33 N. J. Law, 96; McEwen v. Bigelow, 40 Mich, 215; Lawson, Exp. Ev. 236. There is not, and, in the nature of things, cannot be, any exact legal standard by which to determine whether a proposed expert possesses the requisite qualifications. The trial judge has, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to pass upon it as a question of fact, and his decision should have the same weight given to it as upon any other question of fact, and ought not to be reversed except in a clear and strong case. Sorg v. Congregation, 63 Pa. St. 156; Towboat Co. v. Starrs, 69 Pa. St. 36. As was said by COOLEY, J., in McEwen v. Bigelow, supra: “The court is not obliged to receive the evidence of every person called who may appear to have some little knowledge of the business, but who has no personal knowledge of the matters in controversy. He must decide, within the limits of a fair discretion, whether the experience of the supposed expert had been such as to make his opinions of any value.”

Applying these rules to the present case we are unable to say that the court erred in excluding the evidence referred to. We take the case of the proposed expert Merrick, for it presents a stronger case for plaintiff than that of either Ripley or Benton. The proposed witness stated generally that he had knowledge of the nature and character of...