Stevens v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 10981

• Citation: 615 A.2d 507,29 Conn.App. 378
• Decision Date: 03 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10981,10981
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: John D. STEVENS, v. The HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

Page 507

615 A.2d 507

29 Conn.App. 378

John D. STEVENS, v. The HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

No. 10981.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 24, 1992.

Decided Nov. 3, 1992.

Charles J. Goddard, for appellant (plaintiff).

Philip F. von Kuhn, for appellees (defendants).

Before LANDAU, HEIMAN and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, Judge.

This appeal arises out of a case that had not been concluded before the trial judge died. A successor judge then issued a decision. Because we conclude that the method by which the successor judge reached his decision was not proper, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

This case involves a request to compel arbitration. The plaintiff claimed that he was a resident in his father's household and therefore had standing to compel arbitration on the uninsured motorist portion of an insurance policy held by his father. ¹ The defendant insurance company disputed this issue. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge James D. O'Connor on October 3 and 4, 1990, and Judge O'Connor took the matter under advisement. Judge O'Connor died without having issued his decision in this case. Shortly after Judge O'Connor's death, Judge Arnold W. Aronson rendered judgment on November 22, 1991, based on an unsigned, handwritten document that was found among Judge O'Connor's papers. Judge Aronson issued the following memorandum of decision:

"The court finds that in the months preceding November 27, 1990 and particularly June 8, 1986, the plaintiff by his own testimony lived at the residence of friends, at the residence of a girlfriend, in tents when taking excursions on a motorcycle, and also on occasion, in the basement of his parents' home.

"It was also the testimony of the plaintiff that any living accommodations afforded the plaintiff by his father [were] temporary.

"The court takes particular note of defendant's exhibit 1 which reads as follows: 'I, John D. Stevens withdraw all claims against the following policy holders, and their insurance company: John and Dorothy Stevens, Mary and Ronald Stevens. I also acknowledge that I was not a member of my father's household at the time of my accident, and did not have a Connecticut driver's license at that time.'

"The court concludes that the plaintiff's residence was not at the home of his parents.

__________________________

James D. O'Connor, Judge

"The above written Memorandum of Decision was typed from the decision of Judge O'Connor made in script prior to his death but not reduced to the usual typewritten form.

"Based on the decision of Judge O'Connor that John D. Stevens was not a resident of his father's household, he therefore, does not have standing under the father's insurance policy to demand arbitration under that policy.

"The application for arbitration is denied.

/s/ __________________________

Arnold W. Aronson, Judge"

On November 27, 1991, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial. In that motion, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that Judge O'Connor's handwritten decision "is not a proper basis for the Court's ruling on the Application to Proceed With Arbitration ... [because] there is no way of determining that this was a final decision [of Judge O'Connor] in that [he] did not cause the decision to be typed, signed, and filed with the Clerk of the Court." On December 23, 1991, after hearing argument on the plaintiff's motion, Judge Aronson denied the motion from the bench, concluding that "[i]t did appear that this was a final decision by Judge O'Connor in his own handwriting and, for that reason, it was the decision of this court to consider that to be a final decision by Judge O'Connor and to have it reduced in a proper typewritten form." The plaintiff asserted that until the decision was filed it was possible that Judge O'Connor could have changed it. Judge Aronson responded that "that always is a possibility. Whether it was a reasonable probability, it does not appear to be the case in this situation." This appeal followed.

The plaintiff argues that Judge O'Connor's handwritten decision, which was neither signed nor filed, was not a proper basis for the rendition of judgment by Judge Aronson. We agree. ²

It is abundantly clear that Judge O'Connor never rendered judgment in this case. "A judgment is in fact rendered in a cause tried to the court when the trial judge officially announces his decision orally in open court, or, out of court, signifies orally or in a writing filed with the clerk in his official capacity the decision pronounced by him." Bogaert v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 532, 535, 294 A.2d 573 (1972). Where a memorandum of decision is the judgment of the court, "[t]he judgment ... is not rendered when the judge arrives at his decision in the privacy of his chambers" but when the paper is handed to the clerk. Id., at 536, 294 A.2d 573. Consequently, the handwritten decision by Judge O'Connor, which was neither signed by him nor filed with the clerk, could not be given the force or effect of a judgment of the court.

This conclusion does not give preference to form over substance. Here, form and substance are inextricably intertwined. While Judge O'Connor did draft a preliminary decision, he did not sign the document nor did he cause it to be typed or filed with the clerk. While Judge O'Connor may have intended to take those final steps toward the rendition of judgment, we cannot determine with certainty what his intention was at the time of his death. Cf. Kasarauskas v. McLaughlin, 25 Conn.Sup. 60, 61, 196 A.2d 118 (1963) ("[n]o one knows how the motion to set aside would have been decided or what was in Judge Healey's mind when he directed a verdict"). Judges, like all other human beings, sometimes change their minds after further reflection on the evidence or the legal precedents controlling the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. "[W]hile [a decision] is still in the judge's possession, irrespective of whether it has been signed, it is at best a proposed order subject to change along with the judge's thought process...." State v. Dowdell, 55 Md.App. 512, 515, 464 A.2d 1089 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 310, 469 A.2d 864 (1984). While Judge Aronson may have been correct in noting that there was no reasonable probability that the handwritten decision would not have been the final decision of Judge O'Connor, we do not believe that that is a conclusion that the successor judge can or should reach. Such a conclusion is necessarily based on a degree of speculation that, no matter how small, involves too great a risk of error to be the basis of the adjudication of substantive rights. ³ Without a signed decision filed with the clerk, a draft decision found among a deceased judge's papers is simply a draft decision, which unfortunately leaves the judicial proceedings incomplete. "[T]he paper upon which [the successor judge] acted was merely a tentative and potential finding. It was in the breast of the court and subject to change and modification until its public announcement in court or filing gave it force as a finding, and it therefore could not be considered as determining the cause." Wainwright v. P.H. & F.M. Roots Co., 176 Ind. 682, 698, 97 N.E. 8 (1912).

Judge Aronson, as the successor judge in this case, had the power to complete the proceedings commenced before Judge O'Connor. General Statutes § 51-183f provides in relevant part that "if any judge of the superior court is retired because of a disability, dies or resigns during the pendency of any proceeding before him, any other judge of that court, upon application, shall have power to proceed therewith as if the subject matter had been originally brought before him." Because § 51-183f authorizes the successor judge to proceed in the matter as if it had been originally brought before the successor judge, it is incumbent on the successor judge to exercise independent judgment in completing the proceedings. In this case, it was Judge Aronson's responsibility to find the facts and apply the law to those facts. Rather than finding the facts himself, Judge Aronson relied on the inchoate findings articulated in Judge O'Connor's draft decision. Nowhere is it indicated that Judge Aronson made his own findings of fact. Just as a successor judge, "if the case comes before him regularly and he becomes convinced that the view of the law previously applied by his coordinate predecessor was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if followed ... may apply his own judgment"; Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 100, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982); a successor judge must apply his own judgment to the evidence in order to determine the facts...