Stevens v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:15-CV-257-D,5:15-CV-257-D |
| Parties | Daniel R. Stevens, Plaintiff, v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Daniel R. Stevens, Raleigh, NC, pro se.
Susan P. Dion, Meredith A. Pinson, McGuireWoods, LLP, Charlotte, NC, for Defendant.
JAMES C. DEVER III
Daniel R. Stevens (“Stevens” or “plaintiff”) is a former employee of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (“DuPont” or “defendant”). Stevens (who proceeds pro se) contends that DuPont committed fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation while negotiating his separation agreement. The alleged fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation concern the monthly cost of Steven's retirement health care under DuPont's Medical Care Assistance Program (“Plan”), an “employee welfare benefit plan” under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
.
On July 16, 2015, DuPont moved to dismiss Stevens's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Stevens's three state-law tort claims are preempted by ERISA or (if not preempted) barred by North Carolina's three-year statute of limitations. See [D.E. 18, 19]; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–52(5), (9). On August 7, 2015, Stevens responded in opposition. See [D.E. 28]. On August 21, 2015, DuPont replied. See [D.E. 30]. As explained below, the court grants DuPont's motion to dismiss.
Stevens is a former DuPont employee. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 12] 6, 8. From 2004 to 2006, Stevens complained internally concerning alleged violations of federal law arising from a DuPont stock program. See id. ¶¶ 9-16. Due to Stevens's complaints, DuPont altered the stock program. See id. ¶¶ 17-23. According to Stevens, DuPont executives were upset with his complaints, retaliated against him, and denied him a promotion. See id. ¶¶ 24-31. As a result, Stevens decided to leave DuPont and negotiated a “Departure Agreement.” See id. ¶¶ 30–34. In the Departure Agreement, which is dated July 24, 2007, DuPont agreed to provide Stevens special consideration “outside, and in addition to, the standard DuPont Pension and Health Care Retirement Plans ....” Id. ¶ 35; see [D.E. 12-1] 4 ). “The Special Consideration included specific compensation for: lost regular salary and bonus pay due to retaliation which impacted Stevens'[s] progression path, pension income loss due to very early retirement, unexpected and additional long term health care premium cost, and attorney fee cost.” Id. ¶ 36. Essentially, Stevens alleges that, while negotiating the Departure Agreement, DuPont told him that his monthly health care costs under DuPont's medical plan (“the Plan”) would be $412 per month, but the costs turned out to be much higher. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-77. Stevens learned of the discrepancy in 2008 when DuPont notified him that his healthcare costs for 2009 would be $567—not $412—per month. See Am. Compl. ¶ 54. On November 19, 2008, Stevens notified DuPont of this “healthcare cost discrepancy,” but he never resolved the issue with DuPont and his monthly health care costs under the Plan remained much higher than $412 per month. See id. ¶¶ 56-77. Relying upon DuPont's incorrect statement of his monthly health care costs, Stevens failed to negotiate a sufficient lump-sum payment from DuPont for his health care costs. See id. ¶ 40.
In May 2015, Stevens filed suit in North Carolina state court and asserted three tort claims under North Carolina law: (1) negligent misrepresentation concerning his monthly health care costs under DuPont's Plan; (2) constructive fraud concerning his monthly health care costs under DuPont's Plan; and (3) fraud concerning his monthly health care costs under DuPont's Plan. See [D.E. 1-1] (state court complaint); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78-107. Stevens seeks compensatory damages of at least $60,000 per claim, punitive damages on his fraud and constructive fraud claims, costs, and attorney's fees. See Am. Compl. 17 (Request for Relief). DuPont timely removed the action to this court based on federal question and diversity jurisdiction, see [D.E. 1, 25], and moved to dismiss Steven's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [D.E. 18, 19]; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests the legal and factual sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Com. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals , 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir.2010), aff'd , ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012) ; Giarratano v. Johnson , 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008). Although a court “assume[s] the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draw[s] all reasonable factual inferences in [plaintiff's] favor,” Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp. , 278 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir.2002), it need not accept a complaint's legal conclusions. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Similarly, a court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano , 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
DuPont argues that ERISA preempts Stevens's North Carolina fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dism. Am. Compl. [D.E. 19] 3-6. Preemption is based on Congress's power to “take unto itself all regulatory authority over [a given topic].” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218,230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)
; see M'Culloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. 316, 405–06, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, and renders a state provision impotent when Congress enacts a conflicting federal provision intending to displace state law. Maryland v. Louisiana , 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). A court, however, begins “with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Id. at 746–47, 101 S.Ct. 2114 ; see Rice , 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146. Evidence of Congress's intent to preempt may overcome this basic assumption. Maryland , 451 U.S. at 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114. Analyzing a statute's preemptive effect “is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the [federal statute and putatively-preempted state law] and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict.” Perez v. Campbell , 402 U.S. 637, 644, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971) ; see Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co. , 450 U.S. 311, 317–18, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981).
Preemption may be express or implied. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta , 458 U.S. 141, 152–53, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982)
; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co. , 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977) ; Cox v. Shalala, 112 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1997). Congress expressly preempts state law “by directly stating its intention to do so.” Cox , 112 F.3d at 154. Even when Congress includes an express preemption clause in a statute, a court still must carefully construe Congress's intended breadth of the preemption clause. See, e.g. , Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good , 555 U.S. 70, 77, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). When a preemption clause “is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Id. (quotation omitted).
ERISA contains an express preemption provision, which states, “the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(emphasis added). Congress defined ERISA's preemptive scope broadly: “any and all” state laws “relat[ing] to” its subject matter, “employee benefit plan[s].” See id. ERISA defines “employee benefit plan” to include “any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment ....” Id. § 1002(1).
“A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines. Inc. , 463 U.S. 85, 96–97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)
; see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200, 208–10, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) ; Rush Prudential HMO. Inc. v. Moran , 536 U.S. 355, 364, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (2002) ; Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner , 532 U.S. 141, 146–49, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) ; Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward , 526 U.S. 358, 363, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999) ; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41, 44–48, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987), abrogated in part on other grounds by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans. Inc. v. Miller , 538 U.S. 329, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003) ; Great–W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. , 523 F.3d 266, 270 (4th Cir.2008). Thus, ERISA preempts state laws “not specifically designed to affect such plans;” state laws that...
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