Stevens v. Manson
| Decision Date | 16 April 1895 |
| Citation | 32 A. 1002,87 Me. 436 |
| Parties | STEVENS v. MANSON et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
(Official.)
Report from supreme judicial court, Somerset county.
Action for false imprisonment by Zoradus D. Stevens against John W. Manson and another. Heard on report. Judgment for defendants.
This Was an action for false Imprisonment, brought by the plaintiff, an execution debtor, against two defendants, one being the attorney of the creditors, and the other a disclosure commissioner.
Frank W. Hovey, for plaintiff.
J. W. Manson and Abel Davis, for defendants.
This is an action for an alleged unlawful arrest and false imprisonment.
March 11, 1893, the plaintiff was cited to disclose at Pittsfield, in the county of Somerset, on an execution against him for $25.61 damages, and $10.29 costs, before the defendant Davis, as disclosure commissioner, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 137 of the Laws of 1887, but failed to obtain the benefit of the oath provided for in section 8 of that act. Thereupon, May 2, 1893, the magistrate appears to have issued a capias, and annexed it to the execution in force at that time, in accordance with section 20, and on the same day rendered judgment and issued a separate execution against the debtor and in favor of the petitioner for his costs and fees, taxed at $15.12, pursuant to section 23 of the same act. June 19, 1893, the plaintiff was arrested by virtue of this execution for costs, and also of the original execution, and caused the creditor to be cited on the former to appear before two justices of the peace and quorum June 21, 1893, for the purpose of submitting himself to examination and obtaining the benefit of the oath authorized by Rev. St. c. 113, § 30. The creditor appeared by his attorney, J. W. Manson, one of the defendants in this suit, and selected a justice residing in another county. Under the erroneous impression that such a justice was ineligible (Blake v. Peck, 77 Me. 588, 1 Atl. 828), the debtor's attorney objecting to the creditor's choice, the debtor refused to be examined before him; and the officer chose another justice, certifying that he did so because the creditor had "unreasonably neglected and refused to procure the attendance of a justice residing in Somerset county." The creditor's attorney withdrew, and the tribunal thus organized heard the debtor's examination, and administered the oath. But the creditor, becoming satisfied that this proceeding was coram non judice and void, caused the debtor to be cited again to appear at his disclosure on the original execution before two justices on the 20th day of June. It appears from the record of the magistrates and the return of the officer that after a disagreement on the part of the justices then selected by the debtor and creditor, and a selection of a third justice by the officer, the oath was administered and a discharge granted to the debtor on the 28th day of June.
The plaintiff now claims that the defendants are liable for an unlawful arrest on the execution for costs, on the ground that it was issued by the disclosure commissioner before the expiration of 24 hours from the rendition of the judgment, and therefore irregular and void; and, secondly, that they are liable for an unlawful arrest on June 21st, for the alleged reason that the officer released the debtor after the attempted disclosure of that date, and subsequently rearrested him.
1. It is the opinion of the court that the first ground is indefensible as a matter of law. It was undoubtedly the rule of procedure at common law that execution might issue as soon as final judgment was signed, and before its entry of record, "provided there was no writ of error depending or agreement to the contrary." This is expressly laid down in the English books of practice. Tidd, Prac. 994; Sher. Prac. 299. Not even the docketing of a judgment was deemed essential to its existence or a condition precedent to the issue of execution. But the time when execution may issue has been the subject of regulation by statute in the different states, and, while considerable diversity exists.
It seems to be the policy of these statutes in a...
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State v. Haney
...Garvey v. Buckner, 308 Mo. 390, 272 S.W. 940; Pelz v. Bollinger, 180 Mo. 252, 79 S.W. 146; Sharp v. Lumley, 34 Cal. 611; Stevens v. Manson, 87 Me. 436, 32 A. 1002; Cinebar Coal & Coke Co. v. Robinson, 1 Wash.2d 620, 97 P.2d 128; People ex rel. Holbrook v. Petit, 266 Ill. 628, 107 N.E. 830; ......
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Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
...judgment was signed, before its entry of record, nor was the docketing of the judgment deemed essential to execution. Stevens v. Manson, 87 Me. 436, 32 Atl. 1002. Most of the early cases held that the execution, if issued after pronouncement or rendition of judgment, could not be voided by ......
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