Stevens v. Neligon
| Decision Date | 21 February 1933 |
| Citation | 116 Conn. 307,164 A. 661 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STEVENS v. NELIGON et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edwin C. Dickenson Judge.
Action by William J. Stevens, for whom was substituted Lucy M Stevens, administratrix, against Frank P. Neligon and another to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective sidewalk. Judgment for named defendant after the court sustained such defendant's demurrer, and plaintiff appeals.
No error.
Harry R. Cooper, of Meriden, for appellant.
Daniel J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellee Neligon.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.
The plaintiff brought suit against Neligon and the city of Meriden to recover damages for an injury caused by a fall upon a sidewalk in front of his property in the defendant city. The only question upon this appeal is that raised by the demurrer of the named defendant to the complaint.
The complaint alleges that the sidewalk at the point where the plaintiff fell was dangerous by reason of the fact that it was covered by a layer of ice; that it was the duty of the defendant Neligon, under the city ordinance, to remove the ice or cover it with sand or other suitable substance; that he had neglected to do so; and that by reason of such neglect the plaintiff had fallen and suffered the injuries complained of. The complaint further alleged that the sidewalk was defective and not reasonably safe for public travel, in that the flagstones were not even, one being raised above the other, and that it was so laid as to present a sloping surface, thereby creating a structural defect in the sidewalk, rendering it more dangerous by reason of the accumulation of snow and ice, that the defendants had neglected to make such structural changes in the sidewalk as to make it reasonably safe for public travel, and that by reason of such improper construction of the walk by the defendant city, or by its being allowed to remain in such defective condition by the city, the plaintiff fell and was injured.
The defendant Neligon demurred to the complaint upon the grounds, in substance, that it did not appear that the sidewalk was under his jurisdiction and control, and that it was the primary duty of the city to keep it reasonably safe for travel, which duty could not be delegated to, or imposed upon, this defendant by a city ordinance. Unless certain charter provisions of the city of Meriden, to be considered later, are controlling, the demurrer was rightly sustained. The state places upon the municipality the burden of keeping its highways in a reasonably safe condition for public travel, and this duty it cannot impose upon the property owner by contract or ordinance. Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 532, 40 Am.Rep. 189; Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 559, 143 A. 850. When the abutting property owner has not by his own act created a condition upon the highway dangerous to the traveler, he is not responsible where, by reason, of the failure of the city to perform its duty, it has become unsafe for public travel.
The plaintiff contends that the complaint sets up a good cause of action against the defendant Neligon under a special act of the Legislature enacted in 1915 amending the charter of the city of Meriden, 17 Special Laws, p. 72, which is set forth in the footnote.[1]
In 1921 the Legislature passed a special act revising the charter of the city of Meriden and consolidating the town and city government thereof. 18 Sp. Laws, p. 919. This act contained no provision analogous to those of the 1915 special act, but did contain a provision that " all charter provisions, laws, ordinances, resolutions, orders, rules and regulations in force in the city of Meriden, at the time when this act takes effect, not inconsistent with its provisions, shall continue in force until otherwise provided by law, ordinance, resolution, order or vote." (Section 5.) We assume, for the purpose of this case, that the special act of 1915 is still in force and controlling as to the rights of the parties hereto, if applicable thereto.
The complaint does not recite the special act, nor expressly aver that the action was brought upon it, but on the contrary recites and relies upon a charter provision authorizing the common council to enact ordinance compelling property owners to remove snow and ice from sidewalks in front of their property, and upon an ordinance of the city of Meriden requiring such removal. Nor does it appear that this special act was called to the attention of the trial judge. However, it is sufficient if the complaint states facts which, if true, give an action under the statute, and the statute is the law of the land which the parties and the court were conclusively presumed to know. Cunningham v Cunningham, 72 Conn. 157, 44 A. 41. The question, then, is whether the complaint alleges facts upon which, if true, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover under the special act. The...
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Machado v. City of Hartford
...duty specifically imposed by § 13a-99, however, towns lack the authority to shift that duty onto a third party. See Stevens v. Neligon, 116 Conn. 307, 309, 164 A. 661 (1933) ("[t]he [s]tate places upon the municipality the burden of keeping its highways in a reasonably safe condition for pu......
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Curley v. The Phx. Ins. Co.
...7 A.2d 446 (1939) (court, sua sponte, raised applicability of statute because "pertinent statute [was] overlooked"); Stevens v. Neligon, 116 Conn. 307, 311, 164 A. 661 (1933) (although applicable statute neither was brought to attention of trial court nor relied on by plaintiff, "it [was] s......
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Cahill v. Board of Ed. of City of Stamford
...§ 10-151 the complaint would have to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Special Act No. 310. Stevens v. Neligon, 116 Conn. 307, 311, 164 A. 661 (1933). There was no claim made that the plaintiff did not receive a hearing or notice of a hearing or that improper grounds ......
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Willoughby v. City of New Haven
...for failure, is insufficient to create such a liability. Stevens v. Neligon, supra, 116 Conn. 307, at page 313, 164 A. 661. In Stevens v. Neligon, supra, regarding a claim under a provision of the Meriden charter (quoted 116 Conn. 307, at page 310, 164 A. 661, 662) that, ‘ Any person who sh......