Kristiansen v. City of Danbury
| Decision Date | 18 December 1928 |
| Citation | 143 A. 850,108 Conn. 553 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | KRISTIANSEN v. CITY OF DANBURY. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Carl Foster, Judge.
Action by Jennie Kristiansen against the City of Danbury for injuries alleged to have been caused by a fall on an icy sidewalk, brought to the superior court and tried to the jury. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Error and a new trial granted.
J. Moss Ives, of Danbury, and Clifford B. Wilson, of Bridgeport, for appellant.
William H. Comley, of Bridgeport, and Leonard McMahon, of Danbury, for appellee.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, BANKS, and YEOMANS, JJ.
The jury could reasonably have found from the evidence offered by the plaintiff that that portion of the sidewalk on West street, in the city of Danbury, which lies in front of the parish house of St. James Episcopal Church, was in a defective and dangerous condition for public travel, and had been for about two weeks before the plaintiff fell; that West Street was one of the principal thoroughfares of the defendant city, and the parish house in question was within a few hundred feet of the city hall and of the center of business and travel in that city; that for at least ten days before January 8, 1927, when the plaintiff fell, it was covered with snow and ice, and was uneven and slippery, and by reason thereof defective, dangerous, and unsafe for travel; that about 7:25 o'clock in the morning of that day the plaintiff, in the exercise of due care, attempted to pass along this sidewalk in front of the parish house, and slipped and fell because of its icy, defective, and dangerous condition, causing serious personal injuries, and resulting expense and loss of income.
The defendant's evidence was that the ice on this portion of the sidewalk had not been there more than two or three days otherwise the foregoing facts claimed by the plaintiff are essentially undisputed. The balance of the defendant's evidence was in effect that immediately adjoining this sidewalk on the north there was a terrace on which snow and ice accumulated, and under recurring conditions of thawing the water ran down onto the sidewalk, where it afterward froze; that the sexton of the parish had spread several pailfuls of fine sand all over the walk in front of the parish property the afternoon of the day before the plaintiff fell; that it was still well sanded on the morning of the plaintiff's fall, and that the sexton had thus made the walk reasonably safe for travel under all the existing conditions; and that, in any event, the city could not have done more than the sexton did to render the sidewalk reasonably safe. The defendant, on what appears from the foregoing statement of the evidence, says that
This being the controlling issue it was important that the jury be fully instructed as to the liability imposed by the law of this state upon the city for defects in its walks caused by snow and ice; the notice required to be established, either actual or constructive; and the legal effect upon the city's liability, if any, of the act of the adjoining owner in putting ashes upon the walk in question.
The court charged the jury that it was the duty of the city to use reasonable care to keep the sidewalk reasonably safe for use by pedestrians; that the city was not an insurer of the safety of travelers whatever the season or whatever the cause that renders the walk dangerous; that the defendant city in this case had 65 miles of streets, and the Herculean task of making such ways safe at all times and under all circumstances was not imposed upon the city, especially so in our climate in respect to accumulations of snow and ice; that some duty is imposed, but it is a limited one, taking into account a variety of conditions and circumstances, including the difficulties attending situations as they are created by the rigors of our winters.
This was a correct general statement of our Connecticut law as to the liability of a city for its sidewalks as respects snow and ice accumulations thereon, but it gave the jury but little information as to what conditions and circumstances they were entitled in this case to take into consideration to determine whether the city's liability had been met. We have heretofore, in a number of cases, carefully defined the limits of this liability, in the following opinions among others: Ritter v. Shelton, 105 Conn. 447, 135 A. 535; Keating v. New London, 104 Conn. 528, 133 A. 586; Schroeder v. Hartford, 104 Conn. 334, 132 A. 901; Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414.
" That rule is one which recognizes, on the one hand, the demands of public...
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Machado v. City of Hartford
...public travel, and this duty [the municipality] cannot impose upon the property owner by contract or ordinance"); Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 559, 143 A. 850 (1928) (city's duty to maintain its roads "was a primary duty which the city could not delegate to or impose upon a third ......
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Wade v. City of Bridgeport
...instead of the property owner, would have been sufficient to constitute reasonable care on the part of the city. Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 143 A. 850. Neither the request nor the charge covered the first aspect of this twofold proposition—the actual rendering of the walk reason......
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Woodward v. City of Waterbury
...reasonable care to keep its sidewalks reasonably safe, the failure to do which was the basis of our conclusion in Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 143 A. 850, relied upon by the defendant, that the trial court erred not giving certain requests to charge made in that case. The request ......
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Wade v. City of Bridgeport
... ... city instead of the property owner, would have been ... sufficient to constitute reasonable care on the part of the ... city. Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 143 A ... 850. Neither the request nor the charge covered the first ... aspect of this twofold proposition--the actual ... ...