Stevens v. Sch. City of Hobart
| Decision Date | 06 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Cause No.: 2:13-CV-336-PRC |
| Parties | MARTIN STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL CITY OF HOBART, PEGGY BUFFINGTON, CHRISTOPHER N. KING, and BARBARA STOOKSBURY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 20] and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE 21], both filed on February 16, 2015. These motions became fully briefed on March 27, 2015, and March 25, 2015, respectively. Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit [DE 41], filed on May 22, 2015. This motion became fully briefed on June 2, 2015.
This case stems from Plaintiff's resignation from his job in the technology department of Defendant School City of Hobart ("the School") on April 18, 2012, following accusations of child molestation by a former student. Plaintiff filed an eleven-count Complaint in Lake County, Indiana, Superior Court on August 21, 2013, alleging both federal and state-law claims relating to his resignation, which he alleges was coerced, as well as a subsequent order from Defendant Peggy Buffington, the School's superintendent, that he was not allowed to come onto school property without permission.
Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana on September 23, 2013, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. On December 10, 2013, the undersigned Magistrate Judge was advised that all parties had filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. This Court thus has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Plaintiff was employed by the School from September 1998 through April 18, 2012. During that time he worked as a substitute teacher, a substitute custodian, a custodian, and in the School's technology department as a district technician.
Starting in 1998, while he was working as a substitute teacher, Plaintiff formed a close bond with a young male student, which continued for some time. In 2002, the child's mother made a complaint to Child Protective Services due to her concerns about Plaintiff's relationship with her son. The School suspended plaintiff for one day while an investigation was performed. The investigation concluded that the allegations of misconduct were unfounded, and Plaintiff returned to work. The mother then signed a document rescinding her accusations.
The mother, who apparently has some psychological issues and was in a difficult period of her life, then moved in with Plaintiff along with her two boys. (The eldest was the one whomshe had accused Plaintiff of molesting.) The relationship between Plaintiff and the Mother was platonic. After two years, she abruptly moved out.
In 2005, the allegations of child molestation resurfaced after the boy, who was still a student at the School, went to his assistant principal and reported sexual misconduct by Plaintiff. As before, the matter was investigated, and Plaintiff was temporarily suspended. The police officer who interviewed the child caught him in a discrepancy and came to the conclusion that the accusations were unfounded. Plaintiff then returned to work.
Starting on December 6, 2010, Plaintiff began working in the School's technology department. In that position he reported to Defendant Christopher King (his immediate supervisor), Russell Mellon (the Director of Technology), and, ultimately, Defendant Peggy Buffington (the School's Superintendent). Plaintiff had been advised to refrain from working overtime without authorization to do so. He never sought authorization, and he never turned in any records indicating that he had worked more than forty hours per week. But he did in fact work more than forty hours per week on numerous occasions.
Plaintiff had a few disciplinary issues in this job, and his coworkers complained about his behavior on a few occasions. Three of the four times he was disciplined occurred while he worked in the technology department under Defendant King. He felt hated by Defendant King, but had a good relationship with Defendant Buffington.
In the spring of 2012, Plaintiff met in a public place with the now-adult boy who had accused him of sexual abuse. During the conversation, the boy told Plaintiff that there was a pregnancy scare and that he needed money. Shortly thereafter, on Easter Sunday, 2012, the boy left phone messages with some administrators at the School, telling them that they had apedophile in their ranks, namely, Plaintiff. The same day, the mother called Plaintiff and let him know about the phone calls, claiming that the boy had been "messed up for life."
There was no school the next Monday, but Plaintiff met with school resource officer Joe Clemmons as well as Mellon and Defendant King. Plaintiff asked them to tell Buffington about the messages so that no one would be "blindsided" by them.
On April 10, 2012, Plaintiff met with Buffington and King at the School's administrative building. Buffington commended Plaintiff for coming forward and told him that it was her job to prove him innocent. Plaintiff responded that it would be easier to prove innocence to murder than to child molesting because the dispute came down to his word against the boy's and the boy's mother's. Buffington put School Safety Officer Larry Juzwicki in charge of investigating the allegations and placed Plaintiff on administrative leave. Juzwicki interviewed the boy twice, but he never spoke with Plaintiff.
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