Stevens v. State Mineral Bd.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 49894,49894
• Citation: 233 So.2d 542,255 La. 857
• Parties: Mrs. Lillian C. STEVENS, Testamentary Executrix of the Estate of Dr. Noah S. Cutrer, Nicholas D. Olivier, Arthur C. Reuter v. STATE MINERAL BOARD, Gulf Oil Corporation, Estate of William G. Helis, et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 542

233 So.2d 542 255 La. 857 Mrs. Lillian C. STEVENS, Testamentary Executrix of the
Estate of Dr. Noah S. Cutrer, Nicholas D. Olivier,
Arthur C. Reuter
v.
STATE MINERAL BOARD, Gulf Oil Corporation, Estate of William
G. Helis, et al. No. 49894. Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 30, 1970.

[255 La. 859]

Page 543

Reuter, Reuter & Schott, Arthur C. Reuter, New Orleans, for appellant.

Morris Wright, Booth Kellough, Melvin Evans, New Orleans, Tucker, Martin, Holder, Jeter & Jackson, H. M. Holder, Shreveport, Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Edward M. Carmouche, John L. Madden, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Doyle, Smith, Doyle, Gordon, Arata & Watters, Donald W. Doyle, Roger H. Doyle, F. Henri Lapeyre, Jr., Solomon S. Goldman, Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlmeyer, Matthews & Schumacher, Murphy Moss, William R. Forrester, Jr., Ogden & Ogden, William W. Ogden, Charlton B. Ogden, II, William R. Ary, New Orleans, amici curiae.

HAMITER, Justice.

Plaintiffs, Mrs. Lillian C. Stevens, testamentary executrix of the Succession of Dr. Noah S. Cutrer, Nicholas P. Olivier and Arthur C. Reuter, alleged themselves to be the owners of certain described property in Plaquemines Parish and instituted the instant proceedings to remove purported 'clouds' from its title.

The 'clouds' constituted Lease No. 195, which was granted initially on February [255 La. 860] 20, 1928 by the State of Louisiana to one M. Hession for the development of oil, gas and other minerals, as well as other instruments executed in connection therewith. The lease is presently owned by Gulf Oil Corporation, the Estate of William G. Helis, and five partners in that Estate who, along with the Mineral Board of the State of Louisiana, are the named defendants.

Prior to filing an answer the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the first four links of plaintiffs' title are fatally defective, and (2) that the property involved was adjudicated to the state in 1932 for nonpayment of 1931 taxes due the state, and that any purported redemption by plaintiffs' ancestor in title was invalid because it was in contravention of Article IV, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which prohibits the state from alienating the fee bed of any navigable waterway.

The motion was sustained by the district court, it declaring that plaintiffs owned no part of the property in dispute. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. 221 So.2d 645. We granted certiorari at the instance of the plaintiffs. 254 La. 452, 223 So.2d 866.

The plaintiffs' petition sets forth their chain of title (among other allegations), including the following links which are pertinent to this litigation; (1) a transfer dated April 2, 1895 by the State of Louisiana[255 La. 861] to the Lake Borgne Levee District (referred to hereinafter as Levee District) signed by the Register of the State Land Office; (2) a transfer in the nature of a correction deed, dated July 27, 1910, by the State of Louisiana to the same Levee District and executed by the State Auditor; (3) a sale of part of the property involved in 1911 from the Levee District to the Plaquemines Land Company; and (4) a similar sale on the same date as Number 3 of the remainder of the property, it being between the same parties. These last two links are called Patents Nos. 59 and 60.

The petition, together with a supplemental one filed by order of court on defendants' exception of vagueness, further sets forth that the property in dispute is

Page 544

land in the form of 'water bottoms'; that it has been of the same nature since time immemorial; and that it was 'water bottoms' on each of the dates set forth in the first four links of plaintiffs' title. Alternatively, it shows that if the property was not 'water bottoms' from time immemorial then it had become 'water bottoms' by 1895. Also, it asserts that any defect in the title as above set forth was cured by the prescription of six years as provided in Act 62 of 1912, and further that, consequently, such title in this respect is now unassailable. (Reliance is placed on our decisions in Humble Oil and Refining Company v. State Mineral Board et al., 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839; California Company v. Price et [255 La. 862] al., 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (and the cases cited therein) and State v. Cenac et al., La.App., 132 So.2d 897 in which certiorari was denied, 241 La. 1055, 132 So.2d 928).

As aforestated, without filing an answer, the defendants moved for a summary judgment in their favor. Therein they averred that they (the defendants), accepting the plaintiffs' admissions for the purposes of the motion, 'show that according to the maps and plats filed in support of this motion, that the property which plaintiffs refer to as land in the form of 'water bottoms', is and was, on the dates referred to by plaintiffs, actually the bed of navigable waters, known or referred to as Black Bay and/or Breton Sound, which are and were bays, sounds and/or inlets bordering on or connected with the Gulf of Mexico, within the Purview of Act 189 of 1910.'

Defendants further asserted in the motion that on November 26, 1932 the property was sold to the state for 1931 taxes which sale was recorded December 31, 1932, and by virtue of the sale the title became vested in the State of Louisiana; and that a subsequent purported redemption thereof by the tax debtor (plaintiffs' ancestor-in-title) on September 6, 1933 was null and void inasmuch as the property was no longer subject to redemption in view of the provisions of Article 4, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.

Finally, the motion averred that 'in light of the foregoing, based on the admissions [255 La. 863] and allegations of the petition as amended, the exhibits annexed thereto, the affidavit annexed thereto and filed herewith and documents annexed thereto, and interrogatories and answers thereto filed herein, there being no genuine issue as to material fact, defendants move, pursuant to the provisions of Article 966 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment herein in their favor since they are entitled to such judgment as a matter of law.'

Although plaintiffs did not file any written response to the motion for a summary judgment, it appears that when the hearing was held thereon they did object to submitting the matter on such motion. Subsequently, they filed a written objection to a decision being rendered on the motion.

As above mentioned, following the hearing, the trial judge rendered judgment on defendants' motion for a summary judgment, it decreeing that the plaintiffs and their authors in title had never had any valid or effective title in and to the property claimed. Further it overruled the plaintiffs' plea of prescription predicated on Act 62 of 1912. (However, the judgment does not specifically dismiss plaintiffs' suit.)

In his written reasons the trial judge observed that it was proper for him to entertain the motion for a summary judgment, he showing that defendants had presented 'documentary evidence directed, primarily,[255 La. 864] at establishing that the 'water bottoms' here involved, were in fact the beds and bottoms of navigable bodies of water, Back Bay and Breton Sound--being bays and sounds 'bordering on or connected with the Gulf of Mexico' within the purview of the so-called 'Oyster Statutes' hereafter discussed, and about which there can be no question.'

The judge further found (in connection with the merits of the motion) that 'The various maps and documents submitted in support of defendants' motion, establish the

Page 545

fact that the 'water bottoms' here involved, were and are, in fact, the beds and bottoms of Black Bay and Breton Sound, which were and are navigable bodies of water 'bordering on or connected with the Gulf of Mexico' within the purview of the so-called 'Oyster Statutes ". (The Oyster Statutes referred to are Act 189 of 1910, its predecessors, and those statutes which replaced it.)

He then ruled that each of the four links of plaintiffs' title (referred to above) were fatally defective for various reasons assigned, among which was that the property in question was owned by the state and was inalienable by virtue of Act 189 of 1910.

The Court of Appeal reversed the district court with respect to the latter's ruling as to the first two links of plaintiffs' title, it holding that the validity of those transfers by the state to the Levee District were controlled[255 La. 865] by our decision in Humble Oil and Refining Company v. State Mineral Board, supra, and that in view of such decision they were unassailable.

However, the Court of Appeal affirmed that part of the judgment which held that the transfers in 1911 were null for the reasons that Act 189 of 1910 operated as a 'retaking' of title by the state to itself (and out of the Levee Board) and that, therefore, the Levee Board in 1911, having...