Stevens v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 04 January 1890
• Parties: STEVENS v. STEVENS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

150 Mass. 557

23 N.E. 378

STEVENS v. STEVENS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 4, 1890

COUNSEL

Chas.

S. Lincoln, for demandant.

Frank L. Washburn, for tenant.

OPINION

DEVENS J.

The demandant offered evidence that the deed of the land demanded had been made by the tenant to one Knapp, and thereafter another deed of the same premises had been made by Knapp to her husband, who had brought them to the house occupied by both. The tenant testified "that, after the execution of the deeds, they were brought to her by her husband, and that she took them, and placed them in a drawer in her bureau, under other articles belonging to her; that she allowed the instrument or deed from her to said Knapp to be taken and used only for the purpose of making the deed from Knapp to her said husband, and that after both instruments had been returned to her, and placed by her as above stated, they remained in her place, under her control undisturbed, for sometime; that without her knowledge they were at some time removed by some person, and concealed from her, and that after long search she found and destroyed them as already stated; and that said deeds were made under the understanding that they should remain in her possession, and only take effect in case of her death." When the tenant was permitted as a witness to testify, in answer to an inquiry from her counsel, that she had never parted with the possession of the deeds with the intent that they should take effect as deeds, she added nothing to the statement that she had already made in writing, that the deeds had been taken from her without her consent, and thus that she had been wrongfully deprived of their possession. It would perhaps be enough to say that this evidence admitted was immaterial, and can have done the demandant no harm. Independently of this consideration, as something more is necessary to the efficacy of a conveyance than a mere manual transfer of the instrument, it was competent to show, if the deeds were found in the manual possession of the demandant, that they were so without any delivery by the tenant with any purpose or intent that they should be operative as deeds. It must appear that the grantor parts with the control of the instrument with the intention that it shall operate immediately as a conveyance of title, and that it passes into the hands or is placed at the disposal of the grantee or of some other person in his behalf. Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560. "To constitute a delivery to the...