Stevens v. Stevens (In re Cseto)
| Decision Date | 20 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | B266179 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of ILDIKO CSETO and ANDREW E. STEVENS. ILDIKO CSETO STEVENS, Appellant, v. ANDREW E. STEVENS, Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD487938)
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Patrick Cathcart, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The Law Office of Herb Fox, Herb Fox; Kaplan Wanger and Darlene S. Wanger for Appellant Ildiko Cseto Stevens.
Trope and Trope and Thomas Paine Dunlap for Appellant Andrew E. Stevens.
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The marriage of Andrew E. Stevens and Ildiko Cseto Stevens was dissolved pursuant to a 2009 stipulated judgment.1 At the time of dissolution, Andrew and Ildiko had a 10-year-old child, Armand. In the stipulated judgment, Ildiko represented and warranted that she would not seek child support and agreed to "non-modifiable" spousal support. As partial consideration for the child support and spousal support provisions, the stipulated judgment awarded Ildiko rental properties that Andrew had claimed were his separate property.
Several years later, Ildiko filed a motion for modification of Andrew's child support obligation. She also requested that the court impose a lien on Andrew's estate as security for that obligation, and order Andrew to pay for Armand's medical expenses for an unspecified period of time, deposit into an escrow or trust account the proceeds of a judgment Andrew obtained in litigation with a third party, and periodically confirm that he is paying the premium on life insurance for the benefit of Ildiko that the stipulated judgment required him to purchase as security for spousal support. Except for the confirmation of the life insurance premium payment, which the court did not adjudicate, the court granted Ildiko all the relief that she sought,as well as some relief that she did not ask for. Andrew appealed; Ildiko cross-appealed on the life insurance question.
As to Andrew's appeal, we affirm the requirement that Andrew pay monthly child support for Armand, notwithstanding Ildiko's representation and warranty in the stipulated judgment that she would not seek child support. We reject Andrew's claim that, as a matter of law, the stipulated judgment required the court to order Ildiko to return the rental properties she received. The court had discretion to modify child support without requiring the return of the rental properties; it did not abuse that discretion in leaving the properties in Ildiko's possession while at the same time imposing child support obligations on Andrew. We reverse the order, however, as to all the other relief that Ildiko obtained. As to the cross-appeal, Ildiko's request for an order directing Andrew to confirm periodically that he is paying life insurance policy premiums is not ripe because the parties dispute whether the obligation the stipulated judgment imposed on Andrew to purchase life insurance for Ildiko's benefit as security for spousal support remains in force (Andrew says it is not, and Ildiko says it is), and that issue was not adjudicated below. Ildiko is free to seek its adjudication in the trial court through a noticed motion.
Andrew and Ildiko married in 1993. Andrew was 71 years old at the time of their marriage. Their son Armand was born in 1999. Armand was diagnosed with severe autism spectrum disorder at an early age. Through intensive therapy and medicaltreatment Armand has shown some improvement, but he remains seriously impaired. He is under the care of a therapist specializing in autism disorders and attends a private school for children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder.
Andrew is a retired businessman. Ildiko is an immigration attorney with her own law practice, but she is unable to work full-time because of the time she devotes to caring for Armand.
In June 2008, Andrew and Ildiko separated, and Ildiko filed a petition for dissolution. In January 2009, the trial court entered a stipulated judgment, which dissolved the parties' marriage. The stipulated judgment contains provisions regarding spousal support, division of property, and child custody and child support.
The stipulated judgment awarded Ildiko the family residence in Beverly Hills as separate property without any reimbursement to Andrew. It directs Andrew to pay "non-modifiable spousal support" in the amount of the monthly loan payments due on the Beverly Hills property, which was $7,351.11. To secure the spousal support obligation, the stipulated judgment required Andrew to "provide a life insurance policy on his own life of $1,000,000," with Ildiko as the named beneficiary, and to provide Ildiko with an "annual[] confirmation of the . . . status of the policy." The stipulated judgment states that Andrew will make monthly loan payments related to the promissory note on the Beverly Hills residence until either hedies or the loan is paid off. Upon Andrew's death, any remaining balance on the loan is to be paid from the life insurance proceeds.
The stipulated judgment also awarded Ildiko three rental properties: one in Louisiana occupied by a bowling alley, and two in Wisconsin occupied by pizza restaurant franchises. It noted that Andrew claimed that these properties were his sole and separate property, but that Ildiko "contends that there may be a community interest in [them]." Notwithstanding his ownership claim, Andrew agreed to transfer ownership of the properties and to assign to Ildiko all rights under the lease agreements for the three rental properties, including the right to receive a total of $41,385 in monthly rent. The stipulated judgment states that the rental properties would provide income sufficient for Ildiko's support (other than spousal support in the form of Andrew's payment of the loan related to the note on the Beverly Hills residence). It recites that the parties waived any other right to spousal support and no court would have jurisdiction to order any other spousal support at any time. It also recites that Andrew's transfer of the three rental properties to Ildiko was "in part consideration for the . . . spousal support provisions [in the judgment]."
The stipulated judgment awarded the parties joint physical custody of Armand, but stated that that Ildiko would have "primary physical custody" and Andrew would have "secondary physical custody."
The stipulated judgment imposed no child support obligation on Andrew. In pertinent part, it stated that the property division and spousal support provisions ensured that In the stipulated judgment, Ildiko "warrant[ed] and represent[ed] that she [would] not seek to obtain child support from [Andrew]." The stipulated judgment states that Andrew "rel[ied] on that representation in his agreement to the terms relating to the division of property, including the transfer of his separate property income producing assets to [Ildiko]." It recites that Andrew's agreement to transfer the properties was "in part consideration" for the judgment's child support provisions. Notwithstanding Ildiko's representation and warranty that she would not seek child support, she acknowledged that "it is the policy of this state that child support cannot be non-modifiable."
In the stipulated judgment, the parties expressly waived any rights to reimbursement under Family Code section 26402 for separate property contributions to the acquisition of community property. They also agreed to pay their own attorney fees, apart from $9,395.53 that Andrew had already paid to Ildiko's counsel.
In January 2010, a year after the stipulated judgment was entered, Ildiko filed a motion to have it set aside. In her motion,Ildiko argued that Andrew had failed to disclose all of his assets before the parties entered into the stipulated judgment and that she had mistakenly believed that the stated income from the rental properties was net rather than gross income. In April 2010, Ildiko withdrew the motion. Ildiko later claimed that she withdrew the motion in reliance on Andrew's oral representation that he would voluntarily pay monthly support for Armand, voluntarily contribute to Armand's medical, therapeutic, and educational expenses, and establish a trust to care for Armand after Andrew's death. Andrew denied making such a representation, but he did voluntarily pay one-half of Armand's medical, therapeutic, and educational expenses from 2010 until April 2013.
On November 4, 2014, Ildiko filed a request for an order modifying child support and other relief.
In her moving papers, Ildiko sought guideline child support (§ 4055) from Andrew. To support this request, Ildiko noted that the stipulated judgment contemplated that she and Andrew would pay for Armand's expenses during their respective periods of custody. Ildiko presented evidence showing, however, that Andrew no longer had any contact with Armand; she had custody of Armand 100 percent of the time and thus was paying for all of Armand's expenses. Ildiko asserted that the rental...
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