Stevens v. Tillman

• Decision Date: 26 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 81 C 3588.,81 C 3588.
• Citation: 661 F. Supp. 702
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Dorothy A. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy TILLMAN, et al., Defendants.

661 F. Supp. 702

Dorothy A. STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy TILLMAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 81 C 3588.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

November 26, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald H. Balson, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Edward W. Feldman, Thomas E. Johnson, Janet F. Gerske, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

The plaintiff Dorothy A. Stevens ("plaintiff"), a white woman who formerly was an elementary-school principal in a primarily-black school, brought this action against certain black parents and alleged that the parents successfully sought to remove her from her position as principal solely because of her race.¹ After lengthy discovery, unsuccessful settlement attempts and many other delays, the case finally reached the trial stage before this court starting in September of 1986. After the plaintiff completed her case in chief, the defendants moved this court for a directed verdict on all three counts of the complaint pursuant to rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court grants the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on Count III, but denies the motion for a directed verdict on Counts I and II. The court will address each of the counts in order.

I

Count I — 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

Count I of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiff of her civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Judge Nordberg set forth the five required elements of a § 1985(3) claim in his Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. Stevens, 568 F.Supp. at 292. The plaintiff must establish the following five separate elements:

(1) a conspiracy

(2) motivated by racial or other class-based invidious discriminatory animus and

(3) established for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;

(4) that the conspirators committed some act in furtherance of the conspiracy;

(5) that the plaintiff was either injured in his person or property or was deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-3, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)).

In their motion for a directed verdict, the defendants make two distinct arguments for dismissal of this count.² When considering these arguments, the court must make its determination on the merits of the argument based on the standards for deciding a motion for a directed verdict. The court must view all the evidence, taken as a whole, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir.1984). If the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find in favor of the nonmoving party, a directed verdict is improper. United States v. An Article of Device, 731 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir.1984). The court will consider each of the defendants' arguments in turn.

A. The Defendants' First Amendment Right to Petition the Government for Redress

The defendants first assert that they cannot be held liable under § 1985(3) because their allegedly unlawful acts and words were part of their effort to petition the government for redress. They argue that they were exercising their First Amendment right to petition when they spoke before the Board of Education, leafletted, picketed and boycotted the school.

It is the law in this circuit that a defendant's exercise of the right to petition precludes an action under § 1985(1). See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1345-46 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977). Over the objection of the plaintiff, this court finds that the valid exercise of the right to petition also undermines an action under § 1985(3). When discussing § 1985(1), the Seventh Circuit expressed a general concern that it not interpret the statute so as to interfere with established constitutional rights.³ The Seventh Circuit did not base its holding purely on a concern derived from the language of § 1985(1). Instead, the court applied the basic principle this court must apply in construing § 1985(3), i.e., that it seek a reasonable construction consistent with its legislative purpose so as to avoid serious constitutional doubt. Id. at 1344. The fact that this case involves a discrimination claim against a state as opposed to a federal official is irrelevant to the court's determination. The public criticism of governmental policy, whether state or federal, and those responsible for government operations is at the very core of the constitutionally-protected area of free speech. Cf. Stern, 547 F.2d at 1342. Since the essence of both Stern and this case is that a public citizen complained to the supervisor of a government employee about that employee's performance in his/her job, the court finds no reason to distinguish the cases. See Stern, 547 F.2d at 1345 (a taxpayer lodged a complaint about an IRS agent through the proper channels).

The allegations that the defendants' made defamatory statements about the plaintiff do not change the court's holding in this regard. In Stern, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that the mere fact that the defendant's petition to the government involved false statements did not change its ruling regarding § 1985(1). Id. As in Stern, the potential chill of the right to petition engendered by a knowing-falsity rule moves this court not to adopt such a rule. Id.

In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), the Supreme Court defined the circumstances in which an individual's activities are protected by the right to petition. The Court determined that peaceful, "nonviolent" activities are protected, but that "violence" is not. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 915-16, 102 S.Ct. at 3426-27. Specifically, the court held that the speeches made and nonviolent picketing done during a boycott of local merchants in Mississippi were entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 907, 102 S.Ct. at 3422. In so holding, the Court recognized that the express purpose of the Mississippi boycott was to influence governmental action, and affirmed the importance of a nonviolent, politically-motivated boycott as a means to effectuate change in governmental policies and practices. Id. at 914, 102 S.Ct. at 3426.

In this case, the defendants' objective was to have the plaintiff removed as principal at the Mollison School by the Chicago Board of Education. Stated differently, the defendants were unhappy with the way a governmental employee was performing on the job and petitioned her supervisor through various means to change the status quo. This kind of activity is at the core of the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. As already stated, it matters not that the defendants allegedly defamed the plaintiff in petitioning their government for redress. See supra at 705. The sole question for the court's consideration at this juncture is whether the defendants' activities could be characterized as "violent" or "nonviolent" within the meaning of Claiborne Hardware Co.

For purposes of § 1985(3), the court finds that the First Amendment protects many of the activities alleged in the complaint under Count I. These protected activities include the following:

(1) the publication of defamatory statements both through leaflets and news media (Complaint at 3, ¶ 6(A));

(2) the appearance in groups at various locations, including the offices of the Chicago Board of Education, for purposes of demanding the removal of the plaintiff as principal (Complaint at 3, ¶ 6(B));

(3) holding meetings with various Board of Education officials (Complaint at 3, ¶ 6(D));

(4) causing a student boycott of the school for several days (Complaint at 4, ¶ 6(E)).

With respect to these activities, the court finds the cases cited by the plaintiff distinguishable from this one either because they are not § 1985 cases or because the defendants did not raise the right to petition as a defense to a § 1985 claim. See Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156 (10th Cir.1980) (right to petition not an issue); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S.Ct. 1331, 63 L.Ed.2d 772 (1980) (a § 1983 claim to which the right to petition was not raised as a defense); Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.1979) (right to petition not an issue). The court reemphasizes that the basis for its holding regarding the protection of these activities is that they involve the right to petition in conflict with an alleged § 1985 claim. See supra at 705.

However, the complaint also alleges that the defendants appeared at the elementary school and trespassed on school grounds and corridors. Complaint at 3, ¶ 6(C). The plaintiff has also introduced evidence at trial that some of the defendants at one point were in the principal's office and instructed the plaintiff to leave. In doing so, Dorothy Tillman ("Tillman"), one of the defendants present during the scene at the principal's office, testified that the plaintiff was "frightened" during the incident. The defendants claim that their activities surrounding this incident are also constitutionally protected. The court recognizes that it cannot merely pass on to the jury the question of whether the Constitution protects this activity. The court has a responsibility as the interpreter of the Constitution to resolve the question of whether these activities are "nonviolent" within the meaning of Claiborne Hardware Co. See, e.g., Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F.Supp. 1295, 1306 (D.Md.1975) (the judiciary's authority to enforce its...