Stevenson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corrs. & Cmty. Supervision

• Decision Date: 19 January 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-355
• Parties: DAVID STEVENSON and LESLIE STEVENSON, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, THOMAS STICHT, CRAIG BALCER, MICHAEL HERSPERGER, and CHRISTOPHER YEHL, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

DAVID STEVENSON and LESLIE STEVENSON, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, THOMAS STICHT, CRAIG BALCER, MICHAEL HERSPERGER, and CHRISTOPHER YEHL, Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-355

United States District Court, W.D. New York

January 19, 2022

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT (DOCS. 19, 29, 36)

Geoffrey W. Crawford, Judge United States District Court.

In their original six-count complaint, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") employees Leslie Stevenson and her husband David Stevenson sue their employer and DOCCS Superintendent Thomas Sticht Captain Craig Balcer, Lieutenant Michael Hersperger, and Deputy Director of Security Christopher Yehl.^[1] Plaintiffs claim that they experienced harassment and retaliation at their workplace-the Wyoming Correctional Facility ("Wyoming")-in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and in violation of 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985. They also bring a defamation claim. (See Doc. 2.) Plaintiffs seek $16 million in compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief reassigning all individual defendants to a different correctional facility. (Id. at 29.)

Represented by the New York Attorney General's office, DOCCS and three of the individual defendants-Sticht, Balcer, and Yehl-have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 19.) Represented by private counsel, Hersperger has filed his own motion joining his co-defendants' motion and asserting arguments for dismissal of the claims against him. (Doc. 29.) Plaintiffs oppose both motions (Docs. 32, 33) and Hersperger and the remaining defendants filed replies in August 2021. (Docs. 34 35).

Plaintiffs filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) to amend the complaint on October 20, 2021. (Doc. 36.) Based on the same factual allegations as those asserted in the / original complaint, Plaintiffs now seek to bring a total of 12 counts. (See Doc. 36-4.)^[2] Many of the proposed 12 counts mirror the Title VII, Section 1983, and defamation counts in the original complaint, but with some clarifications. The proposed Amended Complaint would also add three new counts under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"). At a hearing on October 21, 2021 previously scheduled for argument on the pending motions to dismiss, the court set deadlines for the opposition and reply memos in connection with the motion to amend. The parties have filed their memos (Docs. 38, 40, 41, 42) and the court rules on all pending motions here.

Background

It is unnecessary to recite here all of the allegations in Plaintiffs' 198-paragraph Complaint.^[3] Plaintiffs allege that "[i]n or around August or September 2017, Lieutenant Michael Hersperger referred to Leslie Stevenson as a 'hot, sexy, female CO.' when he answered a phone call Leslie had placed to her co-worker, CO. Andrew Lamb." (Doc. 2 ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that Leslie complained about that remark and her husband David, a Lieutenant at the same facility, "helped her bring forth her complaints." (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that "[a]fter that, Leslie and David had targets on their back. From excessive scrutiny and nitpicking to isolating them from their co-workers, defendants are putting their employees' livelihoods and lives at risk by undermining them at every turn." (Id.) More detailed factual allegations are set forth as necessary below.

Analysis

I. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The Rule 12(b)(6) standard applies to most of Defendants' requests for dismissal.^[4] On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's task is "to determine whether, accepting the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, plaintiffs have stated a facially valid claim." Ocasio v. City of Canandaigua, 513 F.Supp.3d 310, 319 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up). "In order to be found sufficient, a pleading must set forth sufficient facts to suggest that a cause of action is legally plausible." Id. (citing Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Ultimately, where a plaintiff has not nudged their claim across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id., (cleaned up).^[5]

B. Rule 15(a)(2) Standard

The federal rules instruct courts to give leave to amend "freely . . . when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Despite this permissive standard leave to amend may be denied "upon a showing of 'undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] futility.'" Sacerdote v. N.Y.Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec, LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 190 (2d Cir. 2015)). "The party opposing a motion for leave to amend bears the burden of establishing that the amendment should be denied." Gonzalez v. City of Rochester, No. 16-CV-6652L, 2020 WL 5032026, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.Aug. 26, 2020); Joinnides v. Floral Park-Bellerose Union Sch. Dist, No. CV 12-5682(JS)(AKT), 2015 WL 1476422, at *9 (E.DN.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) ("The party opposing the motion for leave to amend has the burden of establishing that an amendment would be prejudicial or futile.") (cleaned up).

1. Delay or Prejudice

Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend five months after the motions to dismiss and on the night before oral argument on those motions. Defendants argue that leave to amend should be denied on grounds of delay and prejudice. (See Doc. 39 at 16.)^[6]They contend that it is Plaintiffs' burden to explain the delay and that Plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden. Plaintiffs maintain that delay is not a basis for denial of leave to amend without a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, and that Defendants have not met their burden to show either. (Doc. 41 at 5-6; Doc. 42 at 6-7.)

Defendants seek to shift the burden to Plaintiffs to explain the delay in this case. It is true that district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend "where the motion is made after an inordinate delay, no satisfactory explanation is made for the delay, and the amendment would prejudice the defendant." MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 157 F.3d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also 3 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 15.15[2] (3d ed. 2021) ("If the delay is particularly egregious, some decisions shift the burden to the moving party to show that its delay was due to oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. .. ."). But the delay in this case does not qualify as "inordinate" or "particularly egregious." Cf. MacDraw, 157 F.3d at 962 (five-year delay). And even in cases of unexplained delay, the nonmoving party still has some burden to show prejudice. See Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Evans v. Syracuse City Sch. Dist, 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983)) ("[T]he longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of a showing of prejudice."). The court therefore focuses on that issue.

The Second Circuit has advised that courts evaluating "prejudice" should consider "whether the assertion of the new claim would: (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction." Block, 988 F.2d at 350. Defendants do not raise any argument under the third factor. Instead, they maintain that "[a]t a minimum, the filing of an amended complaint has required further briefing and delay." (Doc. 39 at 17.)

That is insufficient to satisfy Defendants' burden in opposing amendment. The proposed amendment does require some additional time and expense to analyze. But this case is still in its early stages and Defendants themselves recognize that the NYSHRL claims are "largely duplicative" of the Title VII claims. (Id.) Indeed, claims brought under Title VII and NYSHRL follow identical analytical frameworks, so Defendants would not be prejudiced by significant additional briefing. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[A] plaintiffs discrimination claims under . . . NYSHRL . . . are subject to the burden-shifting analysis applied to discrimination claims under Title VII."). Several of the other proposed amendments simplify the analysis by clarifying which plaintiff(s) are suing which defendant(s). Allowing the proposed amendments would not require Defendants to expend significant additional resources or significantly delay the resolution of the dispute.

Defendants also rely on Frenkel v. N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 611 F.Supp.2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), opinion adopted, 701 F.Supp.2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court in that case remarked that leave to amend may be denied "when the movant knew or should have known of the facts upon which the amendment is based when the original pleading was filed, particularly when the movant offers no excuse for the delay." Id. at 394 (quoting Berman v. Parco, 986 F.Supp. 195, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). But Frenkel does not stand for the proposition that failure to amend a pleading based on previously known facts "is itself dispositive for denying the motion." Phoenix Light SF ltd. v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n, No. 14-CV-10101 (LGS) (SN), 2021 WL 568080, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021). Since discovery has not yet begun in this case, the prejudice to Defendants is minimal and allowing amendment is consistent with resolving the dispute on the merits. See Id. ("[T]he relevant...