Stevenson v. San Francisco Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 20 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. AO58170,AO58170
• Citation: 24 Cal.App.4th 269,29 Cal.Rptr.2d 398
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Candice J. STEVENSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 398

29 Cal.Rptr.2d 398

24 Cal.App.4th 269

Candice J. STEVENSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. AO58170.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 20, 1994.

Review Denied July 14, 1994.

[24 Cal.App.4th 272] Andrew French Loomis, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.

Jacob Burland, Sally A. Keane, McDonald, Cullom & Burland, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

DOSSEE, Associate Justice.

This case arises out of the death of Candice J. Stevenson's father in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco. Stevenson sued the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA) and the owners of the building in which her father lived at the time of the injury which led to his death, alleging various causes of action. Stevenson appeals from the trial court's dismissal of SFHA from the action following the sustaining of SFHA's demurrer without leave to amend. We hold that state law immunities shield SFHA and its employees from liability for negligent inspections and that federal housing laws do not preempt the state immunities.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

"In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. 'We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] ...' [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]" ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Bearing this standard in mind, we accept as true the following facts as alleged in appellant's sixth amended complaint.

Appellant's father, Joseph Stevenson, lived at 355 Fulton Street at the time of the October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Joseph's tenancy was pursuant to a lease agreement with defendants Fulton Street Association ("Landlord"), dated June 1, 1985. A portion of Joseph's rent was subsidized by the federal government pursuant to the Section 8 Existing Housing Program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). (42 U.S.C. § 1437f, hereafter referred to as "Section 8".) Landlord participated in the Section 8 program pursuant to a contract with SFHA. SFHA received federal funds from HUD pursuant to an Annual Contributions Contract.

Appellant's complaint alleged that the 355 Fulton Street building was constructed over a creek, which resulted in a defective foundation. Structural defects in the building, existing at the time of the 1989 earthquake, caused the building to shake so violently that the walls, ceiling, and objects attached thereto became loose and were flung, broken, and shattered throughout the apartment. One of these flying objects struck Joseph and knocked him to the ground, thereby causing serious head injuries. Joseph was unable to move from his apartment and was not discovered by the building manager until seven days after the earthquake. He died in February of 1990 as a result of his injuries and the dehydration which occurred in the On April 12, 1990, appellant filed a claim with the City of San Francisco pursuant to the provisions of Government Code section 910. On May 24, 1990, she filed a complaint in Superior Court against the owners of the building, SFHA, two employees of SFHA (Ashley Rhoades and D.E. Smith), and others. Following a series of amended complaints, the sixth amended complaint was filed on January 21, 1992, alleging five causes of action. The first cause of action alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The second cause of action was for negligent failure to disclose latent defects in the building. The third cause of action alleged breach of a duty established by federal statute to inspect the premises for structural soundness. The fourth cause of action alleged negligent failure to inspect the building. The fifth cause of action alleged breach of an oral contract between Joseph and SFHA's agent, Donald Smith, pursuant to which Smith agreed to routinely monitor Joseph's health and safety.

seven days between the earthquake and his rescue.

SFHA filed a demurrer arguing appellant was barred from raising theories that were not described in her written claim, that a tenant has no right of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against a housing authority, that SFHA was immune from tort liability for the negligence causes of action pursuant to Government Code sections 815 and 818.6, and that the cause of action for breach of contract violated the integration clause in Joseph's lease and failed to allege consideration. ¹ The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action as to SFHA. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The main issue raised by this appeal is whether SFHA's governmental immunity from liability for the tort causes of action alleged in appellant's complaint is preempted by federal regulation of low income housing. The parties assert preliminary arguments regarding the need for a statement of grounds supporting the ruling on SFHA's demurrer and the effect of a variance between appellant's claim and the allegations of her complaint. We address these preliminary matters prior to our discussion of the preemption issue.

Statement of Grounds For Sustaining Demurrer

Appellant argues that the trial court failed to state the grounds for its decision. Code of Civil Procedure section 472d provides: "[w]henever a demurrer in any action or proceeding is sustained, the court shall include in its decision or order a statement of the specific ground or grounds upon which the decision or order is based...." In the instant case, the March 20 minute order stated "the court adopted its tentative ruling as set forth below. (Failure to state a cause of action) ... Sustain without leave to amend." The formal written order did not include the grounds for the decision. At the time the demurrer was argued, the court stated: "The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend for failure to state a cause of action."

The court's direction, entered in writing in the minutes, constitutes an order. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1003.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 sets out the eight statutory grounds for a demurrer. Failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is one of those grounds and is the one properly specified by the trial court herein. (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) (Mautner v. Peralta (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 796, 801, 263 Cal.Rptr. 535 [complaint "does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action" held sufficient compliance with section 472d].) Appellant's claim that she is entitled to a more detailed recitation of the court's reasoning is incorrect. (Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 943, 143 Cal.Rptr. 255 [plaintiff

not entitled to notice of judge's reasoning or motive].) There was no error in stating the grounds for the court's decision.

Variance Between Claim and Complaint

SFHA argues that there is a material variance between appellant's written claim pursuant to Government Code section 910 and the facts and theories alleged in her complaint. If this is true, appellant may be barred from asserting a different factual basis in her complaint. (Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 253 Cal.Rptr. 587.) Government Code section 945.4 provides that "no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon...." Appellant filed a claim with SFHA which contained the elements such as date, place, time, and circumstances of the injury as specified by statute. (Gov.Code, § 910.) The claim also included an attachment which identified various theories of liability.

Appellant's claim, attached as an exhibit to her complaint, states that "Mr. Joseph Stevenson fell in his apartment during the earthquake and was not discovered until 7 days later. He suffered injuries which subsequently resulted in his death on February 9, 1990. (See attached.)" The attachment sets out appellant's theories of liability for negligence. ² Appellant's complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) negligent failure to disclose latent defects in the walls, ceilings, and foundation, and building code violations; (2) breach of a statutory duty to inspect the premises for safety and structural soundness; and (3) negligent failure to inspect the building to ensure that it was safe. The factual allegations were that the defective condition of the building and the failure to discover appellant's father caused the fatal injuries.

SFHA argues that appellant's written claim focused on events that took place after the earthquake, while her complaint focuses on a failure to inspect and warn of defects prior to the earthquake. This argument relies upon cases which have held that plaintiffs may not include causes of action in their complaints that have not been fairly reflected in the written claim submitted to public entities. (Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 253 Cal.Rptr. 587; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 224 Cal.Rptr. 57; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 673, 171 Cal.Rptr. 527; Turner v. State of California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 284 Cal.Rptr. 349.)

In Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 253 Cal.Rptr. 587, cited by SFHA, the court limited the plaintiff to the facts alleged in the written claim. In that case, the claim stated that plaintiff had been injured when a door closed with sufficient force to slam his head against the door frame. (Id., at p....