Stevenson v. Silverman

• Citation: 208 A.2d 786,417 Pa. 187
• Parties: Harold A. STEVENSON and Elsie B. Stevenson as Tenants by the Entireties, and Gloria Wydrznyski and Richard J. Ferrell and Earle C. Stevenson and Ellen Stevenson, as Tenants by the Entireties, Appellants, v. Louis SILVERMAN, Elias H. Stein, Samuel R. Rosenbaum, Leonard A. Gottlieb, Leon J. Slonimsky, Ruth Marmon and the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia.
• Decision Date: 16 March 1965
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

208 A.2d 786

417 Pa. 187

Harold A. STEVENSON and Elsie B. Stevenson as Tenants by the Entireties, and Gloria Wydrznyski and Richard J. Ferrell and Earle C. Stevenson and Ellen Stevenson, as Tenants by the Entireties, Appellants, v. Louis SILVERMAN, Elias H. Stein, Samuel R. Rosenbaum, Leonard A. Gottlieb, Leon J. Slonimsky, Ruth Marmon and the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1965.

Rehearing Denied April 16, 1965.

Lawrence J. Richette, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Jerome J. Shestack, George P. Williams, III, Philadelphia, for appellees Louis silverman, Elias H. Stein and Samuel R Rosenbaum.

Sidney B. Gottlieb, Philadelphia, for appellees Leonard A. Gottlieb and Leon J. Slonimsky, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis Philadelphia, of counsel.

Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

EAGEN Justice.

This is an appeal from an order below dismissing a petition for a declaratory judgment.

This is the factual background.

On June 4, 1959, Harold Stevenson filed a petition for a declaratory judgment (to No. 199 June Term 1959) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, praying that he be declared the owner of 64 acres of land in the Eastwick section of Philadelphia. After answer filed, a trial, consuming twenty-four days, ensued. Subsequently, the action was dismissed and judgment entered for the defendants. On appeal, we affirmed, 412 Pa. 478, 195 A.2d 268 (1963).

In that action, the plaintiff, Stevenson, claimed title to the land involved because he or members of his immediate family had been in continuous, open, exclusive, and hostile possession thereof for more than twenty-one years, and, therefore, he was the owner by adverse possession. Stevenson did not maintain or attempt to establish that he personally was in possession for the entire twenty-one year period, but he did urge, and offer testimony to establish that he was in possession for a portion of the required period, and that members of his family were in successive possession for an additional period of time which, when added together, satisfied the twenty-one year requirement. In other words, the plaintiff's case depended 'upon the theory of 'tacking'; that is, that the plaintiff and members of his family together had accomplished that which the law required in adverse possession.' Brief for Appellant, p. 69, Stevenson v. Stein, 412 Pa. 478, 195 A.2d 268 (1963). This was the issue raised both by the pleadings and the proof.

At trial, plaintiff offered not only his own testimony to prove the claim, but also that of each and every member of his family who allegedly joined in the successive possession of the land. Many witnesses were offered in contradiction. The lower court decided the issue on the merits and found, inter alia, that neither 'the plaintiff or his privies' (members of his family) were in continuous possession 'of any part of the land' for the required twenty-one year period, and therefore concluded that one of the necessary elements of adverse possession had not been established.

Shortly after our affirmance of the lower court's findings and judgment, the present proceedings were instituted. The facts alleged herein are precisely identical with those Stevenson sought to establish in the prior action. These are the only differences in the two proceedings: 1) In the first, Stevenson claimed ownership for himself, and hence was the only party-plaintiff, whereas in the instant proceeding, joint ownership is claimed on behalf of all members of the family who allegedly joined in the successive possession, and all these individuals are now named plaintiffs; 2) Additional parties are named defendants; and 3) The land claimed has been reduced in area from a total of 64 acres to approximately 62.5 acres.

The lower court dismissed the present action on the principle of res judicata. This order was definitely correct.

For the doctrine of res judicata to prevail, there must be a concurrence of four conditions: 1) Identity in the thing sued upon; 2) Identity of the cause of action; 3) Identity of persons and parties to the action; and, 4) Identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued: Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595 (1953), and Fisher Building Permit Case, 355 Pa. 364, 49 A.2d 626 (1946). There can be no doubt but that the present action is an attempt to relitigate the same cause of action, and that all conditions, enumerated above, exist in the present situation, except No. 3, i.e., additional parties-plaintiff and defendants appear in the second action. However, under the facts, the principle still controls. The doctrine of res judicata applies to and is binding, not only on actual parties to the litigation, but also to those who are in privity with them. A final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of...