Stevenson v. State
| Decision Date | 24 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | 67,1997,No. 32,32 |
| Citation | 709 A.2d 619 |
| Parties | David STEVENSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Court Below--Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN95-11-1047 through 1049 and 95-12-0687 through 0689.
Leo John Ramunno, Wilmington, for appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr. (argued), William E. Molchen and Thomas E. Brown, Deputy Attorneys' General, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT, and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc)
This is an appeal after a capital murder trial and penalty hearing where the defendant-appellant, David D. Stevenson ("Stevenson"), was sentenced to death. On November 13, 1995, Stevenson and his co-defendant, Michael Manley ("Manley"), were arrested and charged with the murder of Kristopher Heath ("Heath"). Heath's death had occurred earlier that day. After a joint trial in the Superior Court, a jury found both Manley and Stevenson guilty of Murder in the First Degree and related offenses. 1 The State At the penalty phase of their joint trial, eight members of the jury voted to recommend the death penalty for Stevenson and four members voted against that recommendation. 2 By a vote of seven to five, the same jurors also recommended that Manley receive a death sentence. The Superior Court sentenced both Stevenson and Manley to death by lethal injection. 3 An automatic appeal of each death sentence was docketed with this Court pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4209(g) and Supreme Court Rule 35. 4
then sought the death penalty for both defendants.
In this Court, Stevenson's automatic appeal was consolidated with Stevenson's separately filed direct appeal. Stevenson has raised five contentions, which he submits require his convictions to be reversed. First, he argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion for severance. Stevenson argues that he was prejudiced because his defense and that of his co-defendant, Manley, were mutually antagonistic. Second, Stevenson contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance on the morning of jury selection, so that the private attorney his family had retained could represent him at trial. Third, Stevenson contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in finding that his pending felony theft charges were admissible under an exception to the prohibition on admission of "other crime" evidence. Fourth, Stevenson contends that the State made improper statements to the jury by expressing the prosecutor's personal opinions and beliefs during closing argument. Fifth, Stevenson contends that the Superior Court erred in its instruction to the jury on accomplice liability, by not requiring the jury to determine which co-defendant was the accomplice and which was the principal.
Stevenson also argues that his sentence of death must be reversed by this Court for three reasons: First, he asserts that the Superior Court erred in finding that the evidence established the existence of certain statutory aggravating circumstances. Second, Stevenson contends that the imposition of the death penalty in his case was arbitrary and capricious. Third, Stevenson submits that the imposition of his death sentence was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
This Court has reviewed each of Stevenson's contentions regarding the guilt phase of his trial. We have also reviewed his sentence of death, as required by the Delaware Death Penalty Statute. We have determined that the arguments raised by Stevenson, challenging the judgments entered after both the guilt and the penalty phases of his trial, are without merit. We have also concluded that the Superior Court's decision to sentence Stevenson to death by lethal injection should be affirmed.
The defendants' joint trial commenced on October 30, 1996, and concluded on November 12, 1996. The facts, as set forth in this opinion, are taken primarily from the findings in the Superior Court's written decision following the guilt phase of Stevenson's trial and the subsequent penalty hearing. See State v. Manley, Del.Super., No. 951107022, Barron, J., (Jan. 10, 1997)
(Findings After Penalty Hearing). Before announcing its sentences, the Superior Court determined that to put this case into a proper perspective, it had to begin with a recitation of the events that had occurred during September 1994, more than a year prior to the murder of Heath. This opinion also begins with those 1994 actions.
On September 30, 1994, Stevenson was arrested by Detective Thomas Ford of the Delaware State Police in connection with the fraudulent use of credit cards to purchase Macy's gift certificates. 5 Stevenson had been employed by Macy's and worked in the ladies shoe department when these purchases were made. In making the arrest, Detective Ford relied upon information supplied to him by, among others, Parminder Chona ("Chona") and Heath, who were both employed by Macy's as security officers. Their investigation of the Macy's internal theft culminated in Stevenson confessing to the thefts.
In February 1995, Stevenson was indicted on nine counts of felony Theft and nine counts of felony Unlawful Use of a Credit Card. Four of the thefts occurred on September 2, 1994; five of the thefts occurred on September 15, 1994. Each theft was in the amount of $500, for a total of $4,500.
On April 1, 1995, Stevenson's attorney filed with the Superior Court a Motion to Suppress. This motion sought to suppress all statements which Stevenson had given to agents of Macy's department store on September 30, 1994. Stevenson's attorney argued that his statement was not given voluntarily. The Superior Court held a suppression hearing on August 23, 1995. The presentation of the evidence included testimony from Chona and Heath. The Superior Court concluded that Stevenson's September 30, 1994 statement to the Macy's security personnel was voluntary. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress was denied.
The theft case against Stevenson was originally set for trial on April 12, 1995. After four continuances, the trial was rescheduled for November 13, 1995. Two of the witnesses subpoenaed to testify on November 13, 1995, were Chona and Heath.
The Superior Court concluded the credible evidence established that Stevenson and Manley left Stevenson's Wilmington residence on November 13, 1995, at approximately 6:45 a.m. 6 They were in a vehicle, jointly owned by Stevenson and his sister. That vehicle was distinctive in appearance because its dark blue paint had peeled off in many places, leaving silvery splotches in all such locations. A gold and red tassel hung from the rearview mirror. The vehicle was a 1989 Mercury Topaz with Delaware license number 727970.
At approximately 7 a.m., Michael Chandler ("Chandler") was leaving for work when he observed the "distinctive" vehicle in a parking lot at the Cavalier Country Club Apartments. The vehicle was occupied by two black males. Chandler noticed that the driver was wearing a dark winter wool hat. Chandler was suspicious because both men seemed to be slouching in their seats. Chandler testified that he recalled seeing the gold and red tassel hanging from the rearview mirror. Chandler lived in Building 10B, Capano Drive.
A number of the State's witnesses testified that they heard gunfire at approximately 7:40 a.m. These witnesses were all tenants of the buildings surrounding the parking lot at the Cavalier apartment complex. Their The witness called by the State who had the best vantage point at the time of the shooting was Lance Thompson ("Thompson"). He lived in a third floor apartment. When he heard four to six shots of gunfire, Thompson ran to his window which looked out over the parking lot. He saw a man get into the passenger side of the suspect vehicle. The vehicle, which had paint peeling off its top, backed up towards his apartment building and then exited the parking lot. Thompson had a clear look at the license number. He immediately wrote it down on a piece of paper so he would not forget the number.
descriptions of what they saw varied. Two witnesses, Susan Butler ("Butler") and Philip Hudson ("Hudson"), testified that they saw a stocky black man wearing a dark blue sweatshirt or jacket and dark pants or blue jeans running across the parking lot immediately after hearing the gunfire. 7 This description matched Manley, who was wearing a dark blue pullover shirt and blue jeans when he was apprehended
Thompson exited his building and told Patrolman Daniel Meadows of the New Castle County Police Department that he had written down the vehicle's license number. Patrolman Meadows, who had just arrived at the scene, took the piece of paper and immediately had the number broadcast by the police dispatcher. That automobile license number was Delaware 727970. Patrolman Meadows gave the piece of paper back to Thompson following the broadcast. 8 The tag number was checked in the motor vehicle records. Those records showed the registered owner's address as being 206 West 20th Street, Wilmington, Delaware. This information was also broadcast by the police dispatcher.
Shortly after 8 a.m., Officers Murray, Witte, Danese and Stark of the Wilmington Police were dispatched to the area of Stevenson's residence, at 206 West 20th Street in the City of Wilmington. Upon arrival, Officer Murray exited his police vehicle and approached on foot two black men who were exiting the suspect vehicle. When the two men turned in Officer Murray's direction and saw him, they immediately got back into the Mercury Topaz and sped off. The vehicle turned left on Washington Street and then right on West...
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