Stevenson v. Timme

• Decision Date: 11 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12-cv-02175-WJM
• Parties: WILLIAM R. STEVENSON, Applicant, v. WARDEN RAE TIMME, and JOHN SUTHERS, The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

WILLIAM R. STEVENSON, Applicant,

v.WARDEN RAE TIMME, and JOHN SUTHERS,The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 12-cv-02175-WJM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Dated: March 11, 2013

Judge William J. Martínez

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner William R. Stevenson's pro se Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his conviction and sentence imposed in Case No. 07CR508 in the Adams County District Court. Remaining for disposition are Petitioner's first and second claims asserted in the Application. Respondents have filed an Answer to those claims and Petitioner has filed a Reply. Having considered the Application and the Respondent's Answer, along with the state court record, the Court concludes that the Application should be denied.

I. Background

In On July 24, 2008, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery in Adams County District Court Case No. 07CR508. (ECF No. 1, at 2 of 88). He was sentenced to a twenty-four year term of imprisonment. (Id.).

The following summary of relevant facts is taken from the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Stevenson, No. 08CA2057 (Colo. App. June 23, 2011) (unpublished decision):

A man came into a Super Subs shop, pulled out a butcher knife, and demanded money from an employee. The employee complied, and the man fled. The employee immediately reported the robbery to the police.

Through subsequent investigation, the police identified [Petitioner] as their prime suspect. The police ultimately arrested [Petitioner] and, during the ensuing interrogation, [Petitioner] confessed to robbing the Super Subs shop.

The People charged [Petitioner] with aggravated robbery in violation of section 18-4-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2010, a class 3 felony. After the jury found [Petitioner] guilty, the district court sentenced him to a term of twenty-four years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

(ECF No. 13-3, at 4).

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. (ECF No. 13-3). The Colorado Supreme Court denied his request for certiorari review on March 5, 2012. (ECF No. 13-5).

Petitioner did not file any motions for post-conviction review in the state trial court.

Petitioner initiated this action on August 16, 2012. He asserts the following three claims in the Application: (1) his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated because his arrest was not supported by probable cause, and, therefore, any evidence gathered subsequent to his arrest was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree; (2) his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because his Miranda advisement was inadequate, and, therefore, his subsequentconfession and any evidence obtained therefrom were inadmissible; and, (3) his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was violated when the trial court improperly continued the trial to allow him to obtain replacement counsel. (ECF No. 1, at 10-33).

Upon preliminary review of the Application, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland ordered the Respondents to file a pre-answer response addressing the affirmative defenses of timeliness and exhaustion of state remedies. Respondents conceded that the Application was timely under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (ECF No. 13, at 2). Respondents further conceded that Applicant exhausted state court remedies for claims one and two asserted in the Application. Respondents argued, however, and the Court agreed, that claim three is procedurally barred. (ECF No. 13, at 7-8; ECF No. 23, at 11). The Court further found that claim three presented, in part, a challenge to the state trial court's jurisdiction that is not cognizable on federal habeas review. (ECF No. 23, at 11). The Court therefore dismissed claim three. (Id.). Claims one and two of the Application were drawn to a District Judge and to a Magistrate Judge. The Court reviews the merits of claims one and two below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The applicant bears the burden of proof under § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).

The court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question the court must answer under § 2254(d)(1) is whether the applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme court at the time his conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. Furthermore,

clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of the court's inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018. If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the court must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases"; or (b) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent."

Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [(10th Cir.2006)] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.' " Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply.

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

The court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective inquiry. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. In addition,

evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. [I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision" and then "ask whether it is possible fairmindedjurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. Moreover, "review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671; see also Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable").

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. 786-87.

The court reviews claims asserting factual errors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2) allows the federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the relevant state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination...