Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co.
| Decision Date | 03 October 1893 |
| Citation | 18 S.E. 981,93 Ga. 12 |
| Parties | STEWART, Tax Collector, v. ATLANTA BEEF CO. SAME v. ARMOUR PACKING CO. SAME v. NELSON et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In the general tax act, approved December 26, 1890, the twenty-second clause of the second section is in these words "Upon all packing houses doing a cold storage business in this state, whether carried on by the owners thereof, or by their agents, five hundred dollars in each county where said business is carried on." Held, that a packing house which uses cold storage for preserving its own commodities alone, and does not receive and store for the public, or any part thereof, is not "doing a cold storage business," within the meaning of this clause and therefore is not subject to the imposed tax.
2. Neither the evidence of a member of the legislature which passed the act, nor that of the comptroller general, touching the meaning and purpose of the same, was admissible to aid in construing the statute and arriving at the legislative intent. Other rulings complained of, as to the rejection and the admission of evidence, were immaterial to the substantial legal merits of the case, in view of the uncontested facts and of the correct construction of the law, as above announced.
3. A tax collector who, by issuing an execution for taxes against one not engaged in the business on which the tax in question has been imposed, coerces, through a levy by the sheriff, the payment of such tax, together with the cost of collection, is personally liable in an action brought against him for such wrongdoing by the party so coerced; and the recovery may extend to the whole amount paid to the sheriff, irrespective of whether it reached the collector's hands or not. In the verdict and judgment, the description of the defendant "as tax collector" will not vitiate; the words quoted being merely descriptive of the person, and having no legal effect otherwise.
Error from city court of Atlanta; Howard Van Epps, Judge.
Three actions--by the Atlanta Beef Company against A. P. Stewart tax collector, the Armour Packing Company against the same defendant, and Nelson, Morris & Co. against the same defendant--to recover certain taxes paid. There was a judgment for plaintiff in each case, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
In an action involving the meaning of a statute, evidence of a member of the legislature that passed the statute as to the legislative intent is inadmissible.
The following is the official report:
The Atlanta Beef Company, by its petition, alleged that it was a partnership composed of certain citizens of Illinois and Missouri, doing business in Atlanta, Ga., under the firm name of the Atlanta Beef Company, and elsewhere in Georgia under a name made from the location, and doing no other business in Georgia, except to sell dressed meats. As a necessary part of its business, and as a necessary means for carrying on its business, it has a place in Atlanta, Ga., where its fresh meats are put and temporarily held for sale. When shipments of fresh meats from other states to Georgia began, the meats came into Georgia, to the place of sale, in refrigerator cars, and were sold directly from such cars to local butchers and consumers. When the business increased, it became necessary to unload the cars into storehouses containing refrigerators, to keep the meats cool, to avoid spoiling. Petitioner leased a store in Atlanta, in which to keep its fresh meats shipped from Illinois for sale in Atlanta and contiguous territory, and since then has done the business of selling such meats at that store. It has not engaged in any other business in Georgia, and said products have been kept only for preservation temporarily, and for as short a time as possible, while its goods were for sale. It has never done any storage business in Georgia, of any character. There is not, nor has there ever been, any packing house doing a cold-storage business in this state. Among the specific taxes mentioned in the act of December 26, 1890, is one covered by the twenty-second subdivision of section 2: "Upon all packing houses doing a cold storage business in this state whether carried on by the owners thereof, or by their agents, five hundred dollars in each county where said business is carried on." The same act, in its fourth section, enacted that such specific taxes should be paid, for the fiscal years for which levied, to the tax collectors of the counties where such vocations are carried on at the time of commencing to do the business specified, and further, that, before any person so taxed should be authorized to carry on the business, they should go before the ordinary of the county, and register, and at the same time pay their taxes to the tax collector, etc., and failure to register, or, after registering, to pay the tax, should subject the offender to a punishment mentioned. Petitioner never was a packing house in Georgia, nor a packing house doing a cold-storage business in Georgia, but has ever been only a seller of fresh meats, and products thereof, sent from Illinois to Georgia in regular interstate commerce, of all which the tax collector of Fulton county, A. P. Stewart, had due notice. A storage business is storing the goods of others for compensation, and cold storage is storing such goods for compensation in receptacles or rooms kept cold to preserve them, and such was the meaning of the words when the tax act was passed. Notwithstanding the facts aforesaid, said Stewart, on January 28, 1891, issued a fi. fa. against petitioner, for $500, for said alleged special tax for 1891, and interest thereon from January 1, 1891, and costs, falsely alleging in the fi. fa. that petitioner had a packing house doing a cold storage business in Fulton county, and delivered the fi. fa. to the sheriff of the county, with orders to collect it. Whereupon, the sheriff, on January 29, 1891, seized certain property of petitioner, described, over its protest, to sell to pay the fi. fa. Petitioner needed all this property to carry on its business, but was compelled to give bond for its forthcoming at such sale. The property was advertised for sale, and petitioner did all it could to prevent the sale, but could not, because no judicial interference could be had with a tax sale. Under compulsion, it paid the sheriff $536.20 on May 27, 1891, in full of the fi. fa., principal, interest, and costs, of which $514.70 was paid to said Stewart, tax collector. The declaration then set forth a similar course pursued by Stewart as to tax for 1892, levy, attempt by petitioner to prevent the issuing of the fi. fa. and levy, and to prevent the sale thereunder, after advertisement of the sale, similar payment by petitioner of $507.32 to the sheriff, of which $503.32 was paid to Stewart. It was further alleged: No demand has been made of any one for such alleged tax of $500, except of petitioner, Nelson, Morris & Co., and the Armour Packing Company, which two companies, like petitioner, are engaged in the sale of beef sent to this market from other states, though there are many other persons in Atlanta and Georgia so selling fresh meats. Said tax collector claims that none are liable for the tax, except said three companies dealing in western beef. Efforts have been made to levy taxes from, or put burdens on, sellers of western beef, which would not be borne by citizens of Georgia selling beeves raised in Georgia, but such efforts have heretofore not been put in statutes. The section of the tax act of 1890 above quoted was intended solely to accomplish that purpose. In the issuing of the fi. fa., and levy thereof, the tax collector and sheriff, while claiming to act as officers of Georgia, in pursuance of law, were acting without authority of law, and in defiance of law, which protects petitioner's legal rights; and in his conduct said Stewart did not represent the state of Georgia, in discharging duties imposed upon him by its constitution, or the constitution of the United States, or laws in pursuance thereof. Under the facts aforesaid, petitioner owed no such taxes for 1891 and 1892 as in the fi. fas. described, nor under the alleged tax act. The claim of said sum from it for these years is a tax upon interstate commerce, and an unconstitutional interference with one of the necessary instruments of carrying on such commerce; and in so far as the statute of 1890, or any other statute of Georgia, would try to authorize or command the same, it would be contrary to the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and void, because no power but the congress of the United States can "regulate commerce above mentioned is such commerce. Said act is also unconstitutional because violating the provisions of the constitution of the United States, declaring that "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," (Const. art. 4, § 2,) and to "the equal protection of the laws," (Const. Amend. art. 14, § 1.) Under the facts aforesaid, there is by said act, and practice thereunder, a discrimination in favor of the citizens of Georgia vending fresh meats, against petitioners, citizens of other states engaged in the same business. Said section 22, so enforced, is unconstitutional, because contrary to the constitution of Georgia, requiring taxation to be ad valorem, and uniform upon every species of property taxed, and "on every class of subjects." Const. art. 1, § 27. As a license tax, such tax is not uniform, but varies, in order to catch some and relieve others of the same class in like business. The failure to register and pay the tax is made a crime for some, but not for all, classes of subjects or business licenses. The issuing of said fi. fas.,...
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