Stewart v. Beaufort County
| Decision Date | 06 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 9:06-0624-PMD. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Robert STEWART, Plaintiff, v. BEAUFORT COUNTY, Beaufort County Sheriff's Department, and Todd Calhoun, Defendants. |
Jared Sullivan Newman, Newman and McDougall, Beaufort, SC, for Plaintiff.
Marshall H. Waldron, Jr., Keely M. McCoy, Carolina Litigation Associates, Bluffton, SC, for Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Robert Stewart ("Stewart") has filed a timely response to this Motion. For the following reasons, the court denies Defendants' Motion. However, because a federal court has no jurisdiction to hear a state law cause of action against the State of South Carolina, the court remands to state court the tort cause of action asserted against the Beaufort County Sheriff's Department. The court further orders that this matter is stayed until Stewart's pending criminal charges have been adjudicated.
On September 26, 2004, Stewart was lawfully arrested on outstanding bench warrants by deputies of the Beaufort County Sheriffs Department at the Smokers' Express in Beaufort, South Carolina. Prior to placing him in the patrol car for transportation to the detention center for booking, arresting officer Defendant Deputy Todd Calhoun ("Deputy Calhoun") and his partner handcuffed Stewart's hands behind his back and searched him for weapons.
Once in the sally port of the Beaufort County Detention Center, Deputy Calhoun and Stewart offer different versions of what transpired:
According to Deputy Calhoun, Stewart became "very agitated" and kicked the door of the patrol car as he got out of the vehicle in the sally port. Deputy Calhoun allowed Stewart to exit the vehicle unassisted, but then put his hand underneath Stewart's arm, as he had been trained to do, and attempted to escort Stewart into the Detention Center. As they approached the intake door, Stewart attempted to pull free, and "once [they] got to the door, [Stewart] panicked." Deputy Calhoun claims that when he attempted to get control of Stewart by pushing him against the intake door area, Stewart struck him in the chest with either his shoulder or elbow. When that occurred, Deputy Calhoun pushed Stewart into the door jamb again and then put Stewart on the floor and put his knee in Stewart's back. Deputy Calhoun then called for assistance, and the deputies took Stewart to the hospital. Deputy Calhoun asserts that he used force in this case in the manner in which he had been trained in order to gain control over a resisting detainee.
Stewart's version of events is markedly different: Stewart asserts that he did not resist or struggle against Deputy Calhoun on the way into the Detention Center. Stewart claims Deputy Calhoun had his arm "jacked up real high" which was hurting him, and that after Stewart asked him to "quit," Deputy Calhoun intentionally and maliciously slammed him against the door of the sally port. Then, when his head pulled back in response to having been struck so violently, Deputy Calhoun again slammed Stewart's face into the door jamb, then threw him onto the ground and ground his knee into his back.1 Stewart asserts that this use of force was unprovoked and excessive.
Throughout the entire use of force, it is uncontested that Stewart's hands were handcuffed behind his back. It is also uncontested that, as a result of the use of force, Stewart suffered lacerations and contusions to his face, nose, eyes, lips, shoulder and back that required immediate medical attention. Stewart claims to have received about eight stitches for a laceration on his cheek.
Stewart was subsequently charged criminally with assault and battery for allegedly striking Deputy Calhoun in the sally port. Stewart has entered a plea of not guilty and has requested a jury trial. At this time, these charges are still pending in South Carolina court.
On January 17, 2006, Stewart filed this lawsuit in the. Court of Common Pleas for Beaufort County, South Carolina. Stewart asserted causes of action for assault and battery against Defendant Deputy Todd Calhoun and for gross negligence against the Beaufort County Sheriffs Department, pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.2 Stewart also asserted that his constitutionally protected civil rights have been violated and brought an action for damages against Deputy Calhoun pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants removed the matter to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on March 2, 2006.
To grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must find that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The judge is not to weigh the evidence but rather must determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir.1990). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir.1991). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The "obligation of the nonmoving party is `particularly strong when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.'" Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir.1990)). Summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut," but an important mechanism for weeding out "claims and defenses [that] have no factual bases." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Stewart's federal claim is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits lawsuits against persons acting under color of state law for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." To state an action under § 1983, a plaintiffs claim "must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law." Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.1994)). Defendants assert that Stewart's § 1983 claim is subject to summary judgment because (1) Deputy Calhoun is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) Deputy Calhoun is entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants argue that Deputy Calhoun, is a "state official" and is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Obviously, state officials literally are persons, "[b]ut a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985)). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself, and is therefore barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct., at 2312; see, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Defendants assert that, because the Complaint does not explicitly state that the claims against Deputy Calhoun are, asserted against him "in his individual capacity," it states a claim against him in his official capacity. As such, Defendants argue that the claims against Deputy Calhoun are not asserted against a "person" as required for recovery under § 1983.
The court disagrees. The Complaint clearly requests "actual and punitive damages against the defendant Calhoun." [Complaint at 4.] Although the Complaint does not use the magic words "in his individual capacity," it clearly seeks recovery from Todd Calhoun, and not from the State of South Carolina. Accordingly, the court finds that the Complaint asserts a cause of action against a person, Todd Calhoun.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, law enforcement officers performing their discretionary duties "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In excessive force cases, an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity must be analyzed in two steps, which are to be "considered in proper sequence." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The "threshold question" requires a court to resolve whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show [that] the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272. "If no constitutional right would have been violated," even when the facts are...
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