Mungin v. Charleston Cnty.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:15-4931-RMG-BM
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Khiry Mungin, Plaintiff, v. Charleston County, J. Al Cannon, in his capacity as Sheriff of Charleston County, and Charleston County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

Khiry Mungin, Plaintiff, v. Charleston County, J. Al Cannon,in his capacity as Sheriff of Charleston County,and Charleston County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:15-4931-RMG-BM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

March 23, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action was originally filed by the Plaintiff in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Ninth Judicial Circuit (Charleston County). The Defendants subsequently removed the case to this United States District Court on December 11, 2015, asserting that Plaintiff alleges causes of action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States and that this Court therefore has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1343. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Shortly following removal, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Defendants' motion on January 4, 2016, to which Defendants filed a reply memorandum on January 14, 2016. Defendants'motion is now before the Court for disposition.¹

Discussion

When considering a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the Court is required to accept the allegations in the pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. The motion can be granted only if the Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient factual matters to state a plausible claim for relief "on its face". Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Here, Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed on several grounds, including that Plaintiff has failed to named proper party Defendants and has included claims that are not cognizable under state law. After a careful review of the filings of the parties and the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint, the undersigned finds for the reasons set forth hereinbelow that, to the extent Plaintiff has even asserted any federal claims (which is unclear from a plain reading of the Complaint itself),² those claims should be dismissed, with Plaintiff's remaining state law claims then being remanded back to state court for disposition.

According to the allegations of the Complaint, this action arises out of a traffic stop that occurred on November 8, 2012, when Plaintiff alleges he was "subject to an unreasonable search of his personal body and body cavity outside of a custodial setting in public view . . . ." SeeComplaint, ¶ ¶ 7-8.³ Plaintiff then asserts claims against the three (3) named Defendants for unreasonable search and seizure (First Cause of Action), negligence (Second Cause of Action), negligent hiring (Third Cause of Action), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Fourth Cause of Action).⁴ None of these claims appear to have been intended to be asserted under federal law. However, in his negligence cause of action, Plaintiff does allege that the Defendants' negligence "caused injury to the Plaintiff by violating his constitutional rights and making an unauthorized search of his personal body and body cavity causing the Plaintiff emotional and physical distress", which is what the Defendants cited in removing this case to federal court on the ground that Plaintiff had asserted claims under federal law. Court Docket No. 1; see Complaint, ¶ 13. See also ¶ 15.⁵ Even so, to the extent Plaintiff has intended to assert a federal constitutional claim or claims in his Complaint against these Defendants, any such claims are subject to dismissal.

First, the Charleston County Sheriff's Department is a separate and distinct entity from Charleston County. Sheriff's deputies work for the Sheriff, not Charleston County, and underSouth Carolina law, the Sheriff and Sheriff's deputies are state, not County, employees. See Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 524 (S.C. 1992); Heath v. Aiken County, 368 S.E.2d 904, 905 (S.C. 1988). Charleston County as a body politic does not supervise, and has no control over, Sheriff's deputies or the operation of the Sheriff's Department. See S.C. Code Ann. 4-9-650 [Providing that the County Administrator shall exercise no authority over any elected officials of the County whose offices were created either by the Constitution or by the general laws of the State]; S. C. Const. Art. V, § 24 [Creating the office of sheriff]; see also Henry v. Horry County, 514 S.E.2d 122, 123 (S.C. 1999) [Sheriff's are constitutional officers in South Carolina]. Therefore, Charleston County is not a proper party Defendant for any claim Plaintiff may be asserting that his constitutional rights were violated by employees of the Sheriff's Department or Sheriff Al Cannon. Allen v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 515 F.Supp. 1185, 1190-1191 (D.S.C. 1981) [a County cannot held liable or responsible for actions taken by employees who were hired, supervised, or terminated by the Sheriff of that county], aff'd. 697 F.2d 716 (4^th Cir. 1982); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) [In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the named defendant deprived him or her of a federal right].

With respect to the remaining two Defendants, although the Defendants in their brief address Plaintiff's constitutional claims against these Defendants under the theory of supervisory liability and/or "custom and practice" liability, both Plaintiff and the Defendants are clear in their briefs (as well as it being clearly stated in Plaintiff's Complaint) that Sheriff Cannon is only named as a Defendant in this case in his official capacity as Sheriff of Charleston County.⁶ As such, thereis no issue of supervisory liability or potential liability under a "policy or custom" argument presented, as neither Sheriff Cannon in his official capacity or the Charleston County Sheriff's Department are even subject to suit in this Court for a constitutional claim under § 1983.⁷

It is well established in South Carolina that a sheriff's office is an agency of the State, not a County. Stewart v. Beaufort County, et al., 481 F.Supp.2d 483, 492 (D.S.C. 2007). As such, as asserted against the Charleston County Sheriff's Department, or Cannon in his official capacity, any alleged constitutional claims constitute a suit against the State of South Carolina itself. Id.; see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd., 878 F.2d 379 (1989); Carroll v. Greenville County Sheriff's Dept., 871 F.Supp. 844, 845-846 (D.S.C. 1994); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, n. 55 (1978) ["Official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"]; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985) ["A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity"]. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina, its integral parts (such as a Sheriff's Department), or its officials in theirofficial capacities (such as Sheriff Cannon), by a citizen of South Carolina or a citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)(reaffirming Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) [holding that a citizen could not sue a state in federal court without the state's consent]; Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)[although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens]; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61-71 (1989); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)[stating that "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its [Eleventh Amendment] sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants"](quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C. 1989); Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 583-85 (D.S.C. 1983); Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corrs., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978).

While the United States Congress can override Eleventh Amendment immunity through legislation, Congress has not overridden the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979). Further, although a State may consent to a suit in a federal district court, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 & n.9, the State of South Carolina has not consented to such actions. Rather, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit onlyin a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).⁸ Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff has intended to assert any federal constitutional claims against these Defendants in this lawsuit, they must be dismissed.

Finally, If the recommendation set forth herein with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims (if, indeed, any were intended to be asserted) is accepted, the only claims remaining in this lawsuit will be Plaintiff's state law claims being asserted against the State pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Since Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) ['"[T]he Constitution does not...