Stewart v. City of Balt., Civil Action No. RDB-14-03567
| Decision Date | 23 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. RDB-14-03567 |
| Parties | BUTCH STEWART, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF BALTIMORE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Butch Stewart ("Stewart" or "Plaintiff") brings this pro se action against Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the City"),1 Larry Greene ("Greene"), Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake ("Rawlings-Blake"), Marguerite Murray ("Murray"), and Baltimore City Councilman Robert Curran ("Curran"), and Antoine Banks ("Banks") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), as well as various state law claims.
Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, a pro se litigant's complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Yet, a plaintiff's status as pro se does not absolve him of the duty to plead adequately. See Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999) .
This action arises out of alleged discrimination and sexual harassment directed at Plaintiff Stewart, a gay African-American male, while he was an employee of the City. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1. In May 2012, Stewart began his employment as a Fiscal Policy Analyst and Fiscal Officer under the direct supervision of Defendant Larry Greene. Id. ¶ 13.
Near the end of July 2012, Plaintiff complained to Greene that he had received harassing phone calls to his office number, in which an individual would call his phone number and immediately hang up after Stewart answered the call. Id. ¶ 17. Stewart's phone number was subsequently changed as the calls could not be traced. Id.
In October 2012, Stewart claims that Defendant Marguerite Murray entered his office in the evening after the work day wearing only a bathing suit, flirted with him, and looked at his "gentile [sic] region." Id. ¶ 18. After this incident, Plaintiff alleges that Murray continued to flirt with Stewart in the following months while implying that Stewart was a homosexual. Id. Plaintiff did not report any harassment by Murray to a supervisor until June 2014, over one and a half years later. Id. ¶ 49.
In mid-March 2013, the Plaintiff alleges that Greene received a request from an unknown individual at the office of the President of Baltimore City Council asking that Stewart be removed as lead analyst of the City Council's Budget and Appropriations Committee. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff was not removed. Id. The following month, an unidentified co-worker allegedly entered his office and searched his briefcase, where he or she discovered Stewart's prescription medication and shared this information with other office members. Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Curran stood inappropriately near Stewart during a budget hearing in May 2013, specifically placing his "genital region in close proximity to Plaintiff's face." Id. ¶ 23. Shortly thereafter, Stewart claims that the City Council President harassed him when he was ordered to dispose of a dead cockroach. Id. ¶ 24. Additionally, Stewart alleges that his personal home computer had been "compromised" and that information collected identifying Stewart's homosexuality had been communicated to unnamed Councilmembers and staff. Id. ¶ 27.
In August 2013, Stewart alleges that Defendant Antoine Banks assaulted him when Banks made contract with him in the hall. Id. ¶ 30. Stewart claims an assault of a "similar nature" occurred two weeks later. Id. After Stewart reported these alleged incidents to Greene the next month, Banks apologized for the previous contact. Id. ¶ 31. Greene also directed Banks to apologize if similar events occurred in the future and instructed Stewart to contact the Employee's Assistance Program. Id. Stewart subsequently filed a report with the Baltimore City Department of Human Resources ("DHR") and a complaint with the Baltimore City Police Department ("BCPD") in September 2013. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34. The DHR found the report unsubstantiated, whereas the BCPD elected not to follow up on Stewart's allegations. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34. In March 2014, Stewart retained counsel regarding the assault, and that counsel also found the allegations unsubstantiated. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44. At the same time, Plaintiff contends that his job duties were reduced to clerical work, Id. ¶ 28, while Greene filed written warnings on Stewart's tardiness, and "yelled at Plaintiff" for not saying hello or acknowledging him. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29, 32.
In September 2013, Plaintiff filed for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). Compl. ¶ 36. He began his FMLA leave in November 2013. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at or around this time, his work-stress related medical conditions necessitated the services of a psychologist, his circulatory system became inflamed, he suffered from chest pain, and "he began cracking his fingers so frequently and vigorously because of the stress that he broke his left ring finger." Id. ¶¶ 33, 35, 38, 40.
After Stewart returned to work in February 2014, Greene and a DHR coordinator offered him severance pay, which he declined. Id. ¶ 45. He alleges that he was subsequently the victim of further harassment and retaliatory behavior. Id. Murray allegedly began to lie about Stewart's conduct towards her in April and May 2014. Id. ¶ 47. After Stewart reported to Greene that Murray had sexually harassed him, Greene suspended Stewart in June 2014. Id. ¶ 49. A pre-termination hearing was then held at which Stewart was again offered severance pay. Id. ¶ 50. Stewart claims that the compensation was to be in exchange for indemnification of the Defendants. Id. Stewart declined the offer. Id. He was ultimately terminated in June 2014. Id. ¶ 51. In May of 2014 Stewart filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The EEOC denied his claim and issued a right-to-sue letter dated August 14, 2014, although Plaintiff's filings with this Court claim he received the letter on August 20. See Compl. Attachs. 1, 2, ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3.
Plaintiff subsequently filed the present action in this Court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff asserts numerous violations of federal and state law. Specifically, he contends he suffered employment discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and national origin under Title VII (Counts I, IV, and V). Further, Plaintiff asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, due to his gender, race, and national origin (Count II). Stewart also alleges state law claims for wrongful termination and implied contract (Count III), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). Finally, he asserts a claim of assault and battery solely against Defendant Banks (Count VI). Defendants have moved to dismiss all Counts. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges a court's authority to hear the matter brought by a complaint. See Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005). This challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed either as a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true." Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff carries the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
With respect to a facial challenge, a court will grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "where a claim fails to allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction." Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 799. Where the challenge is factual, "the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns, 585 F3d at 192. "[T]he court may look beyond the pleadings and 'the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003) (citation omitted). The court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Sharafeldin v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 94 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684-85 (D. Md. 2000).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to...
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