Stewart v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.

Decision Date15 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 08-89-00198-CV,08-89-00198-CV
Citation780 S.W.2d 910
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,414 Dennis Lee STEWART, Appellant, v. JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, INC., Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Richard T. Marshall, Alan J. Winters, Marshall & Winters, El Paso, for appellant.

James L. Gallagher, Scott, Hulse, Marshall, Feuille, Finger & Thurmond, El Paso, Jim Curtis, Kemp, Smith, Duncan & Hammond, El Paso, George Gore, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Irene C. Keyse-Walker, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellee.

Before FULLER and WOODARD, JJ., and PRESLAR C.J. (Retired), sitting by assignment.

OPINION

FULLER, Justice.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer of a drug that was administered during a hernia operation. We affirm.

Appellant, Dennis Lee Stewart, filed this lawsuit as a result of a hernia operation in which he suffered respiratory arrest.

He sued his anesthesiologist, Dr. Thomas R. Navar, Jr., for damages alleging that he was negligent:

(1) In that his use of the drug SUFENTA was inappropriate; and

(2) That the manner, dosage and length of time that Stewart was anesthetized with SUFENTA was inappropriate; and

(3) Dr. Navar failed to continually monitor Stewart's heartbeat for a sufficient length of time in the recovery room; and

(4) Dr. Navar failed to have sufficient personnel and resuscitation equipment on hand.

Appellant also sued Appellee Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., as manufacturer of the drug SUFENTA on a negligent theory, alleging:

(1) That the drug SUFENTA had been marketed without having been fully tested, and

(2) That Appellee had failed to adequately warn and instruct dispensing professionals that the drug was a long-acting narcotic rather than a short-term anesthetic.

Appellant also sued Appellee on a strict liability theory alleging that SUFENTA was unreasonably dangerous due to the inadequate warning.

Only the Appellee, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted by the trial court.

Points of Error Nos. One and Two assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of adequacy of the warning in the use of the drug SUFENTA and on the issue of strict liability.

Since the Appellee was a defendant in the trial court and, as such, was also the movant for summary judgment, the burden was on Appellee to show that, as a matter of law, no material issue of fact existed as to the Appellant's cause of action. Griffin v. Rowden, 654 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex.1983); Williams v. Chaney, 620 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It was Appellant's burden to establish each element of his cause of action and, therefore, if Appellee, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., submitted competent summary judgment evidence disproving at least one element of Appellant, Dennis Lee Stewart's case, then summary judgment for Appellee was properly granted. Bradley v. Quality Service Tank Lines, 659 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex.1983); Rayos v. Chrysler Credit Corporation, 683 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1985, no writ).

FACTS

While undergoing surgery for the repair of a hernia, the Appellee was administered the drug SUFENTA. After the surgery, he was awakened in the operating room and taken to the recovery room. Here his respiratory support was removed. Appellant then stopped breathing and turned blue. Secondary respiratory depression and respiratory arrest took place. Appellant contends this was because of the use of the drug SUFENTA resulting in renarcotization which means the narcotic drug reentered from the fat reservoirs into the bloodstream. Appellant contends that the Appellee failed to warn of the tendency of the drug to effect secondary respiratory depression or respiratory arrest in any of its advertising material in 1984. It is Appellant's assertion that the respiratory arrest that occurred from the use of SUFENTA resulted in permanent damage to Appellant.

Appellee, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., had a duty to warn the physician of the dangers of SUFENTA, and once the physician is warned, the choice of which drugs to use and the duty to explain the risks become that of the physician. Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Technical Chemical Company v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.1972), our Supreme Court stated that in a failure to warn case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:

(1) The warning was defective, and

(2) The failure to warn was a producing cause of the plaintiff's condition or injury.

ADEQUACY OF THE WARNING

The SUFENTA drug package contained an insert giving information under various headings as "Description, Clinical Pharmacology, Indications and Usage, Contradictions."

Under "Warnings" it is stated:

SUFENTA should be administered only by persons specifically trained in the use of intravenous anesthetics and management of the respiratory effects of potent opioids.

An opioid antagonist, resuscitative and intubation equipment and oxygen should be readily available.

Under "Precautions" it is stated:

Vital signs should be monitored routinely.

. . . . .

Respiratory depression caused by opioid analgesics can be reversed by opioid antagonists such as naloxone. Because the duration of respiratory depression produced by SUFENTA may last longer than the duration of the opioid antagonist action, appropriate surveillance should be maintained. As with all potent opioids, profound analgesia is accompanied by respiratory depression and diminished sensitivity to CO2 stimulation which may persist into or recur in the postoperative period. Appropriate postoperative monitoring should be employed to ensure that adequate spontaneous breathing is established and maintained prior to discharging the patient from the recovery area.

Testimony was to the effect that "renarcotization" means "the process in which a narcotic has an effect initially, appears to lose its effect, and the narcotic effect then reappears as if it were occurring again, a second time after the initial effect."

Appellant's expert, Dr. J. Stirt,...

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