Stewart v. Mack

• Decision Date: 28 July 1953
• Citation: 66 So.2d 811
• Parties: STEWART et al. v. MACK et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 811

66 So.2d 811

1 P.U.R.3d 249

STEWART et al. v. MACK et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

July 28, 1953.

Thomas H. Wakefield and Graham C. Miller, Miami, for petitioners.

Milam, McIlvaine, Carroll & Wattles, Jacksonville, for Great Southern Trucking Co., respondent-intervenor.

Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for Central Truck Lines, Inc., respondent-intervenor.

Lewis W. Petteway and R. Y. Patterson, Jr., Tallahassee, for respondents.

HOLT, Associate Justice.

The constitutionality of section 323.01, Revised Florida Statutes of 1941, F.S.A., and particularly section 323.04 thereof and rule 3 of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has been brought into question by the petition for certiorari in this case on the ground that said statute and said rule violate Article II and Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A., and that the provisions thereof contravene the due process and equal protection clause of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

This act which we are called upon to construe in the light of the assault made upon it, is the fundamental statute under which the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission now operates and has been doing so since it was enacted into law in the year 1931. Under it the Commission certificates or registers more than 12,000 motor vehicles operating within the State of Florida. This figure does not include common carriers or other vehicles operating entirely within municipalities of the state and their adjacent territory, nor does it include certain other exempted vehicles which need not be described here.

Certain phases of the so-called Transportation Act of Florida, enacted prior to the one under attack (1929), were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous case of Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264, and the present act was passed to cure the irregularities pointed out by that court in the opinion mentioned.

The bedrock case defining the powers, duties and responsibilities of the respondent Commission is that of Central Truck Lines v. Railroad Commission, 118 Fla. 526, 160 So. 22, 23, and we deem it significant that its pertinent language should be quoted here:

'The Railroad Commission has been made the repository of a general grant of regulatory powers as to both rail and motor carrier services performed in the state of Florida. It supervises and regulates railroads (and to some extent water carrier service) by virtue of the long-standing statutes of this state on that subject. See sections 6692-6751, C.G.L., sections 4607-4665, R.G.S. [F.S.A. §§ 350.01 to 350.66]. It supervises and regulates auto transportation companies and their peculiar services by virtue of chapter 13700, Acts 1929, and chapter 14764, Acts 1931, which reenacted and superseded the 1929 act on the same subject. All of these statutes are in contemplation of law statutes in pari materia, and have for their object the appropriate regulation of both rail and motor transportation services in their relation to each other and in relation to the carrying on of commerce in the state in so far as the subject of transportation is concerned.

'As evidence of the legislative purpose to be served by chapter 14764, supra, that act contains an express requirement to the effect and in exercising its functions under the auto transportation law the Railroad Commission shall (not may) take into consideration the effect that the exercise of its powers of regulation and supervision of motor carriers may have upon transportation as a whole within any particular territory as to which the licensing of motor vehicle facilities may be sought. Another object to be achieved by that act (perhaps its most important one) is to foreclose the inordinate use of the public highways as a means of conducting carrier service for profit in cases where there is no showing of public convenience or necessity therefor under the facts of a particular case wherein permission is sought for a certificate approving such use by a particular applicant.'

It is the contention of the petitioners that the 1931 act, supra, did not cure the purported defects pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Cahoon, supra, and upon this basis contend that the law is unconstitutional.

These are three cases filed by the respondents in the court below wherein respondent Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of Florida seek injunctions against the petitioners, permanently enjoining them in transporting freight, commodities and property for compensation upon the highways of the state of Florida without proper authority therefor and in violation of Chapter 323, F.S.A., and the laws and regulations of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, supra. The three bills of injunction are identical except for the various individual charges applicable only to one of the petitioners. The respondents claim that the petitioners entered into an 'arrangement' termed 'truck rental agreement' which is an unconstitutional subterfuge to contravene the provisions of chapter 323, F.S.A., and rules 2 and 3 of the respondents whereby the petitioners (defendants below) furnish a driver and vehicle in which the vehicle is leased only for the estimated duration of the one way or single trip to deliver the consignor's products to the consignee, and the driver of such vehicle is put on the payroll by the consignee only for the period and duration of the so-called 'arrangement.' In all of these instances (there are many of which the respondents complain) provision is made for transportation service over and beyond the leasing rental of a naked vehicle to a shipper for his own private use and operation. The drivers under these purported one way trip leases are under the supervision and control of petitioners rather than the consignee-lessee. Under the terms of the 'arrangement' the rate of compensation is stated in various ways, either by freight rate or by rate and cents per mile with a provision for additional mileage. Fuel, oil, and maintenance are furnished by petitioners in all instances, public liability and property damage insurance is furnished by petitioners. In some agreements the name of the leased driver is indicated, but this is usually omitted. The termination of the lease 'arrangement' is optional by either party and the equipment is in the possession of the lessee for the one way trip only. With exception of loading or unloading lessee-consignee has no direction nor control of vehicle or driver during the course of the one way transportation. The driver has not been previously or subsequently employed by the lessee and the driver is generally selected or furnished by the petitioners. Under the 'arrangement' the lessee is not responsible to anyone for observance of safety regulations required by the Interstate Commerce Commission or the...