Stewart v. Marvin
| Decision Date | 09 March 1956 |
| Citation | 139 Cal.App.2d 769,294 P.2d 114 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Wayne T. STEWART, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, v. John MARVIN, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Respondent. Civ. 4958. |
Deadrich, Gill & Bates, John H. Stewart, Bakersfield, for appellant.
Woodruff & Williams, Bakersfield, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant to partition certain property in Kern County. Defendant answered and by way of cross-complaint sought a declaration that plaintiff held the property as constructive trustee for defendant because a former deed to the property was obtained by fraud and undue influence.
The facts show that defendant, in 1933, then aged 62, was married to Anastasia Marvin, then aged 42; that in 1948, they were divorced and a property settlement agreement was entered into whereby defendant, by deed, became the sole owner of their home as his separate property. Anastasia acquired certain other properties, and thereafter she apparently believed she should have had a better settlement. After the divorce was granted it appears that Anastasia moved to set aside the interlocutory decree. The motion was denied. One month later, after overtures made to John about a reconciliation and a different property settlement, Anastasia, unaided by counsel, on June 15, 1949, took John to the judge and they there consented to set aside the interlocutory decree, and they resumed matrimonial relationship. Apparently Anastasia then began to 'nag' John about transferring the home property to her. It appears that in the meantime John had transferred an interest in the property to his children by a former marriage. When Anastasia found this out she went to see her lawyer and endeavored to ascertain how the children could be made to return the property to their father. After some endeavor deeds were secured deeding the property back to defendant. It then appears that Anastasia set out to obtain an interest in it. She 'nagged' John, who was then 79 years old and somewhat senile, until he consented to go with her to a notary public, not her lawyer, and on June 27, 1951, had him sign a joint tenancy deed of the property to the two of them. John testified he did it because he had a deep love and regard for the woman, implicit confidence in her, and 'in order to make her happy'; that he did it because of her persistent nagging and threats that she was going to leave him again; that she was constantly after him to sign the deed, and he did so in order to have a little peace; that he wanted to provide in it that both could live in the house as long as they lived, and then the property was to go to his children; that he believed this was being accomplished by the making of the joint tenancy deed.
It appears that Anastasia was instrumental in having mutual wills drawn by them in November, 1950, whereby each left his or her property to the other in case one predeceased the other, and after their death the property was to go to the three children of John. It also appears that after obtaining the joint tenancy deed Anastasia, unbeknown to John, went to her attorney and executed another will leaving her property to strangers to John; that in February, 1952, while they were living in the house and just before her death, unbeknown to John, she made a gift deed of her joint tenancy interest in the home place to plaintiff, her nephew. It was not until after her death that John found she had made a different will and had deeded the one-half interest in the home property to plaintiff.
The trial court found generally in accordance with these facts; that at the time of the execution of the joint tenancy deed on June 27, 1951, the parties were husband and wife, and that a confidential relationship existed between them; that John did not have independant advice and did not apprehend the results of his acts; that he was 'affected to a substantial extent by senility and was not in complete control of his mental faculties'; that John intended that his wife should have and enjoy the property only in the event she should survive him; that prior to said deed she persistently and constantly nagged and demanded of him that he execute the deed in question to her; that he was so senile and his mental faculties sufficiently impaired as to make effective such nagging and demanding, and by reason thereof, and the trust and confidence reposed in her, she succeeded in procuring the execution of said deed with intent to defeat defendant's intent above stated; and that the deed was procured by undue influence exerted on John Marvin by Anastasia Marvin.
It then held that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint and that he be ordered to reconvey to defendant any claimed interest he might have therein.
The main contention on this appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of undue influence. In addition to what has been stated, the testimony of defendant is that he was 81 years of age on February 5, 1954, at the time of trial; that the joint tenancy deed had been prepared in advance and was awaiting his signature when his wife took him to the notary's office; that he did not know at that time that she could subsequently legally deed her joint tenancy interest in the property to another without his consent; that he always went to his lawyer about legal affairs but unfortunately he did not do so on this occasion because she took him to a notary public. He testified on cross-examination that he was in good health and there was nothing wrong with his mind on June 27, 1951, 'any more than there is today'. The general course of cross-examination, as reflected by the record, clearly indicates that the trial court's finding that defendant was affected to a substantial extent by senility and was not in complete control of his mental faculties, has some evidentiary support. The trial judge made an observation of defendant on the witness stand and had an opportunity to judge his mental condition at the time of trial. Payne v. Payne, 12 Cal.App. 251, 253, 107 P. 148. From an examination of the record of his testimony it must have been obvious to all the parties present at that hearing that there was considerable indication of senility of the defendant.
Mr. Woodruff, who had been defendant's attorney since 1941, testified defendant came to him which all his legal problems but did not consult him about the joint tenancy deed here indicated; that he represented him in the divorce action and property settlement agreement; that Anastasia left defendant in 1947, and withdrew a good portion of their joint bank account; that she went to Texas and defendant filed a suit to attach and impound the funds; that defendant was then recovering from a very serious heart attack and that in 1947 he suffered a stroke and was in the hospital and unconscious for about 1 1/2 months; that he then advised defendant to execute a deed of the home property which was in joint tenancy with Anastasia, to him, his...
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...lest the very definition itself furnish a finger-board pointing out the path by which it may be evaded. Stewart v. Marvin, 139 Cal.App.2d 769, 774-75, 294 P.2d 114, 118 (1956). "Undue influence" in determining fraud is a fraudulent influence over the mind and will of another to the extent t......
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...arises that the advantage obtained by the grantee was by reason of undue influence exerted on the grantor (Stewart v. Marvin (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 769, 775, 294 P.2d 114; Sparks v. Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 135, 225 P.2d 238). Such a presumption is evidence and is, by itself, suffic......
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...in independently recalling events. It is proper for the court to permit leading questions under such circumstances. Stewart v. Marvin, 139 Cal.App.2d 769, 294 P.2d 114. A number of other evidentiary questions are presented. However, rejection of the evidence cited by appellant could in no w......
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...1400, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, §17:140 Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, §4:150 Stewart v. Marvin (1956) 139 Cal. App. 2d 769, 294 P.2d 114, §7:120 Stewart, People v. (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 425, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, §§1:50, 2:110, 2:160, 20:30 Stewart, People v. (1983) 145 C......
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