Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp.

Decision Date30 July 1971
Docket NumberNATION-WIDE,No. 47,47
Citation279 N.C. 278,182 S.E.2d 410
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesAdolphus Jackson STEWART v.CHECK CORPORATION, a corporation.

B. Kermit Caldwell, Charlotte, for plaintiff appellant.

Wardlow, Know, Caudle & Wade, Lloyd C. Caudle and Carpenter, Golding, Crews & Meekins, by John G. Golding, Charlotte, for defendant appellee.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

The question of law presented by defendant's motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), G.S. § 1A--1, is whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury. Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 157, 179 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1971).

'On a motion by a defendant for a directed verdict in a jury case, the court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may grant the motion only if, As a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff.' 5 Moore's Federal Practice, § 41.13(4) at 1155 (2d 1969). Accord: Kelly v. International Harvester, supra.

In a defamation action qualified privilege is an affirmative defense. Ordinarily, it must be specially pleaded. Bouligny, Inc., v. United Steelworkers, 270 N.C. 160, 173, 154 S.E.2d 344, 356 (1967); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 552, 567 Et seq. (1957). The burden is on defendant to establish facts sufficient to support this plea. Where qualified privilege exists, plaintiff cannot recover absent actual malice; and the burden of proving actual malice rests on plaintiff. Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962), and cases cited.

Defendant did not allege qualified privilege in its answer proper or in its further answer and defense. The trial judge denied defendant's motion for leave to amend. In the Court of Appeals, defendant again moved to file an amendment to its pleading and allege qualified privilege. Under authority of Rule 20(c) of its Rules of Practice, the Court of Appeals allowed defendant's motion. Although the record before us does not contain such amendment, the decision of the Court of Appeals assumes qualified privilege was properly pleaded pursuant to its allowance of defendant's motion.

In affirming the Judgment of the superior court, the Court of Appeals held: (1) The defamatory words attributed to Gormley were actionable Per se; (2) plaintiff's evidence established that these alleged defamatory statements were qualifiedly privileged; and (3) that plaintiff offered no evidence of actual malice.

According to plaintiff's evidence, Gormley, defendant's agent, in conversations with Daughety and with plaintiff's relatives, made false statements which, in effect, charged plaintiff with the crime of embezzlement. A false and unprivileged charge of the crime of embezzlement is actionable Per se. 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 44 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 68 (1948); Beck v. Bank, 161 N.C. 201, 206, 76 S.E. 722, 724 (1912). Defamatory charges which are actionable Per se raise a Prima facie presumption of malice and a conclusive presumption of legal injury and general damage, entitling plaintiff to recover nominal damages at least without specific allegations or proof of damages. Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955); Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d 660 (1954); Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 6 S.E.2d 882 (1940); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935).

Ordinarily, the court may not direct a verdict for the defendant when the evidence tends to show the publication by the defendant's agent of false statements of and concerning the plaintiff which are actionable Per se. See Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283, 150 A.L.R. 1330 (1943), where it was held that such evidence required the denial of the defendant's motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit under the (repealed) statute formerly codified as G.S. § 1--183.

'Whether the occasion is privileged is a question of law for the court, subject to review, and not for the jury, unless the circumstances of the publication are in dispute, when it is a mixed question of law and fact.' Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N.C. 270, 13 S.E. 775 (1891). Accord, 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 200; Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines, Co., 200 N.C. 356, 361, 157 S.E. 16, 19 (1931).

On this appeal, decision turns upon whether plaintiff's evidence discloses the defamatory statements, although actionable Per se, were qualifiedly privileged. The Court of Appeals answered, 'Yes.' We take a different view and reverse.

'Conditional or qualified privilege is based on public policy. It does not change the actionable quality of the words published, but merely rebuts the inference of malice that is imputed in the absence of privilege, and makes a showing of falsity and actual malice essential to the right of recovery.

'A qualified or conditionally privileged communication is one made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty on a privileged occasion and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion and duty, right, or interest. The essential elements thereof are good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only. The privilege arises from the necessity of full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty.' 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 195 (1970). Accord: 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 89 (1948); Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines, Co., supra at 361, 157 S.E. at 19.

Both Gormley and Daughety had an interest and duty with reference to the status of Daughety's indebtedness to defendant. Hence, statements by Gormley relating to an unreported payment of one hundred dollars by Daughety to plaintiff to apply on Daughety's debt to defendant were qualifiedly privileged. However, Daughety had no interest or duty with reference to what plaintiff did with funds other than those collected from him. Hence, the statement made by Gormley, according to Daughety's testimony, that 'this still doesn't get Mr. Stewart off the hook because he has misappropriated funds other than this amount,' was not qualifiedly privileged.

There remains for consideration the statements which, according to plaintiff's evidence, were made by Gormley to the McQueens, aunt and uncle of plaintiff, and to Claude M. Stewart, Jr., plaintiff's first cousin.

Generally, communications made by a third person to relatives of the person defamed on a subject in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, are qualifiedly...

To continue reading

Request your trial
43 cases
  • Smith v. McDonald
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • April 28, 1983
    ...to convey.3 Under the common law, privilege is a question of law to be determined by the courts. Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 182 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1971); Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N.C. 356, 157 S.E. 16, 19 (1931); Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106, 52 S.E. 249,......
  • In re Terry
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • March 14, 2017
    ...law,] qualified privilege is an affirmative defense" that generally "must be specially pleaded." Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 283, 182 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1971). The defendant bears the burden of "establish[ing] facts sufficient to support this plea." Id. According to the ......
  • Cannon v. Peck
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • June 8, 2022
    ...154 S.E.2d 344, 354 (1967) )), appeal dismissed, review denied , ––– N.C. ––––, 854 S.E.2d 800 (2021) ; Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp. , 279 N.C. 278, 182 S.E.2d 410, 415 (1971) (explaining that a qualified privilege applies where the communication is "made in good faith on any subject ......
  • Robinson v. E. Carolina Univ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • August 3, 2018
    ...produced," in contrast to where a person dictates communications to a stenographer) (citation omitted); Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 283, 182 S.E.2d 410 (1971) ("In a defamation action qualified privilege is an affirmative defense.... The burden is on defendant to estab......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT