Stewart v. Public Emp. Retirement Ass'n
Decision Date | 05 July 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 79CA0017,79CA0017 |
Citation | 612 P.2d 1141,43 Colo.App. 25 |
Parties | Charles F. STEWART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee. . I |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Robert C. Floyd, Denver, for petitioner-appellant.
Frank Plaut, P. C., John D. Beckman, Lakewood, for respondent-appellee.
Petitioner, Charles F. Stewart, appeals from the judgment of the trial court affirming the action of the respondent, Public Employees Retirement Association of Colorado (PERA), in denying his application for increased retirement benefits and in dismissing his mandamus petition. We reverse.
The facts of this case are not disputed. Stewart was a district court judge in the ninth judicial district of this state. He served in that capacity from January 5, 1971, until his retirement on May 1, 1976.
Pursuant to § 24-51-607(3), C.R.S. 1973, since his retirement Stewart has been paid a monthly pension of 21/2% of the average of his highest monthly salary during the five years preceding retirement, multiplied by the number of years of service.
In 1977, following Stewart's retirement, the General Assembly amended § 24-51-607(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973. The amendatory legislation, effective July 1, 1977, modified the statute by increasing the pension benefit for those judges with more than five and less than ten years of service.
In November 1977, Stewart notified PERA that he was eligible for increased pension benefits under the amendment to § 24-51-607(2)(a). After a hearing, the PERA Board of Directors denied Stewart's application for increased retirement benefits.
The present action was then commenced in the district court, seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus and review of the PERA action pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106. The court held that the legislative intent of the amendment to § 24-51-607(2) (a) was not to include judges retired prior to its effective date. It therefore denied the mandamus petition and held that PERA had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or abused its discretion.
Stewart appeals, contending that he is entitled to the increased retirement benefits provided by the statutory amendments. We agree.
At the time of Stewart's retirement in 1976, § 24-51-607, C.R.S. 1973, dealing with retirement of judges, provided, in pertinent part:
The 1977 amendment made the following changes:
"(2)(a) For at least FIVE years of service, but less than sixteen years, a monthly annuity equal to FOUR PERCENT FOR EACH SUCH YEAR OF SERVICE, BUT NOT TO EXCEED A TOTAL OF forty percent, MULTIPLIED BY the average of the highest monthly salary received by such member during any period of five consecutive years of service contained within the ten years of service immediately preceding his retirement OR, IF LESS THAN TEN YEARS, THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF SERVICE;" See § 24-51-607, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.)
Stewart was a member of PERA and served as a judge of the district court after May 5, 1949; he served for more than five years; he is not participating in any other state retirement system; he attained the age of sixty-five years; he has ceased to be a judge; and he had at least five years of service.
Although the statute does not on its face limit payment of increased retirement benefits to those judges not retired on the effective date of the amendment, PERA contends that the legislative intent was to do so. In order to ascertain the legislative intent, the PERA Board and the trial court below relied upon statements made by the bill's sponsor to the Senate while the 1977 amendment was pending. This was error.
The language used by the General Assembly in the bill is the touchstone of the legislative intent. It is only when the words used are ambiguous or would involve absurdity that resort may be had to legislative history. See Lassner v. Civil Service Commission, 177 Colo. 257, 493 P.2d 1087 (1972); City of Montrose v. Niles, 124 Colo. 535, 238 P.2d 875 (1952).
Here, the statute as amended is unambiguous. It is not restricted in application to non-retired judges. Rather, it plainly applies to any judge meeting the stated requirements. Thus the trial court and the PERA Board erred in ignoring the unambiguous language of the statute and relying instead upon the legislative history.
PERA contends, however, that application of § 24-51-607(2)(a), as amended, to Stewart would be giving it retroactive effect in violation of § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 1973, and Colo.Const. Art. II, sec. 11. Section 2-4-202 provides that: "A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation." That statute merely codifies the common law. Curtis v. McCall, 79 Colo. 122, 244 P. 70 (1926).
Colo.Const. Art. II, sec. 11, prohibits a law that is retrospective in its application. However, a law is applied retrospectively only when it " 'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation . . ..' " People ex rel. Albright v. Board of Trustees, 103 Colo. 1, 82 P.2d 765 (1938). The amendatory legislation does not impair Stewart's vested pension rights. "(T)he fact that peti...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
City and County of Denver v. Industrial Com'n
...and we refuse to do so now. We must give effect to the meaning intended by the General Assembly. Stewart v. Public Employees' Retirement Association, 43 Colo.App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979). Section 2-4-101, 1B C.R.S. (1973), requires statutory words and phrases to be construed according to t......
-
City of Ouray v. Olin, 87SC214
...1482 (10th Cir.1986); Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973); Stewart v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 43 Colo.App. 25, 28, 612 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1979). See also § 2-4-203(1)(c), 1B C.R.S. 1. Prior Statute In determining legislative intent, it is appropri......
-
People v. Fagerholm, 86SA455
...to "substantive" or vested rights, Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310 (Colo.1982); Stewart v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n, 43 Colo.App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979). In Germany, we noted that there was nothing in section 16-5-402 as then adopted to indicate a legislati......
-
Isbill Associates, Inc. v. City and County of Denver
...to a claim for property damage, it is necessary to resort to extrinsic aids to construction. See Stewart v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 43 Colo.App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979). A review of the legislative history of § 5-12-102 makes it clear that a strict reading of this section is A ......
-
Chapter 10 - § 10.1 • GENERAL PRINCIPLES
...dogs, but not cats).[67] Colo. Const. art. II, § 11.[68] C.R.S. § 2-4-202. See also Stewart v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 612 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1979) (statute merely codifies common law).[69] Note that retroactive application of statutes is also generally disfavored by the comm......