Stewart v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 18 February 2021
• Docket Number: 530344
• Citation: 193 A.D.3d 121,142 N.Y.S.3d 626
• Parties: In the Matter of Tricia STEWART, Individually and as the Parent of ZAS et al., and on Behalf of Similarly Situated Individuals, Respondent, v. Samuel D. ROBERTS, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Appellant, et al., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

193 A.D.3d 121

142 N.Y.S.3d 626

In the Matter of Tricia STEWART, Individually and as the Parent of ZAS et al., and on Behalf of Similarly Situated Individuals, Respondent,

v.Samuel D. ROBERTS, as Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Appellant, et al., Respondent.

530344

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 12, 2021

Decided and Entered: February 18, 2021

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), for appellant.

Empire Justice Center, Albany (Saima A. Akhtar of National Center for Law and Economic Justice, New York City, of counsel), for Tricia Stewart, respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ.

Lynch, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Collins, J.), entered September 27, 2019 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted petitioner's motion for class certification and awarded retroactive class relief.

In our prior decision regarding this matter, we affirmed so much of Supreme Court's judgment as annulled a determination of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (hereinafter OTDA) denying petitioner's application for public assistance ( 163 A.D.3d 89, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 [2018] ). We agreed with Supreme Court that the methodology that OTDA was using to calculate whether an applicant had available resources from an automobile – which focused on the fair market value (hereinafter FMV) of the applicant's vehicle in excess of the statutory exemption (see Social Services Law § 131–n [1] [e] ) regardless of whether the applicant had any equity interest therein – was "irrational and unreasonable" ( id. at 93, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ). However, we reversed so much of Supreme Court's judgment as denied petitioner's motion for class action certification, finding the denial of her motion to be premature in the absence of further discovery on the prerequisite of numerosity (see CPLR 901[a][1] ). In so doing, we rejected the argument by respondent Commissioner of OTDA (hereinafter respondent) that the governmental operations rule¹ rendered a class action inferior to other methods of adjudication "where, as here, a class action provide[d] the only mechanism available to secure retroactive benefits for potential class members" and "the members of [the] proposed class [were] indigent individuals who [sought] modest benefits and for whom commencement of individual actions would be burdensome" ( id. at 94, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ). Moreover, we were unpersuaded that the administrative burden involved in identifying class members would be too cumbersome, noting petitioner's assertion that "OTDA maintains a coding system that would permit a [tailored] search of its electronic database" ( id. at 96, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ). We therefore remitted the matter to Supreme Court for discovery on the issue of numerosity and a redetermination of the motion upon completion thereof.

On remittal, the parties exchanged discovery and petitioner renewed her motion for class certification. In support of her motion, petitioner submitted certain evidence that came to light during the discovery process, including respondent's response to her notice to admit. Respondent admitted therein that, between July 20, 2015 (four months prior to the commencement of the proceeding/action) and October 9, 2018 (when respondent answered petitioner's notice to admit), at least 50 households in New York were denied public assistance because of a vehicle with an FMV over the applicable automobile resource limit – which effectively satisfies the numerosity component for a class action (see Globe Surgical Supply v. GEICO Ins. Co., 59 A.D.3d 129, 138, 871 N.Y.S.2d 263 [2008] ). Respondent opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit from the director of OTDA's Temporary Assistance and Home Energy Assistance programs, who opined that managing a class action would be unduly burdensome because, contrary to petitioner's prior representation upon which this Court previously relied (163 A.D.3d at 96, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ), OTDA's computer database does not allow a tailored search to identify putative class members and OTDA would be required to manually review over 10,000 case files to do so. Finding that the requirements set forth in CPLR 901(a) had been demonstrated and that the manual review process would be "manageable," Supreme Court granted petitioner's motion and granted class certification. After permitting both parties to submit draft proposed judgments, Supreme Court issued a class action judgment that, among other things, defined the class and set forth detailed provisions for determining how putative class members would be identified and provided with class relief (see CPLR 905 ). Respondent appeals.²

We agree with Supreme Court that class certification is appropriate in this case. Respondent does not challenge Supreme Court's finding that the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation have been established ( 163 A.D.3d at 94, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ). Instead, respondent argues that a class action is not a superior method by which to adjudicate the matter (see CPLR 901[a][5] ). Although respondent continues to argue otherwise, we have already determined that the governmental operations rule does not bar this class action ( 163 A.D.3d at 94, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ), and respondent has proffered no new evidence that would change the analysis or compel a different result (see O'Buckley v. County of Chemung, 163 A.D.3d 1129, 1130, 76 N.Y.S.3d 428 [2018] ; Seittelman v. Sabol, 217 A.D.2d 523, 526, 630 N.Y.S.2d 296 [1995], mod 91 N.Y.2d 618, 674 N.Y.S.2d 253, 697 N.E.2d 154 [1998] ; Tindell v. Koch, 164 A.D.2d 689, 695, 565 N.Y.S.2d 789 [1991] ; Matter of Brown v. Wing, 170 Misc.2d 554, 560, 649 N.Y.S.2d 988 [Sup. Ct., Monroe County 1996], affd for reasons stated below 241 A.D.2d 956, 663 N.Y.S.2d 1025 [1997] ).

As recently reiterated by the Court of Appeals, "New York's statutory class certification provisions are to be liberally construed" ( Andryeyeva v. New York Health Care, Inc., 33 N.Y.3d 152, 183, 100 N.Y.S.3d 612, 124 N.E.3d 162 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]) and "[c]laims of uniform systemwide violations are particularly appropriate" for class relief ( id. at 184, 100 N.Y.S.3d 612, 124 N.E.3d 162 ; see Hurrell–Harring v. State of New York, 81 A.D.3d 69, 72, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367 [2011] ). Considerations of judicial economy, as well as the burden that would be placed upon these putative class members – consisting of "indigent individuals who seek modest benefits" ( 163 A.D.3d at 95, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ) – if they were required to litigate their rights on an individual basis, weigh heavily in favor of class certification (see CPLR 902[2] ; Tindell v. Koch, 164 A.D.2d at 695, 565 N.Y.S.2d 789 ; Pruitt v. Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc., 167 A.D.2d 14, 23–24, 574 N.Y.S.2d 672 [1991] ; Weinberg v. Hertz Corp., 116 A.D.2d 1, 4–5, 499 N.Y.S.2d 693 [1986], affd 69 N.Y.2d 979, 516 N.Y.S.2d 652, 509 N.E.2d 347 [1987] ). In these circumstances, we discern no compelling reason to depart from Supreme Court's finding that "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" ( CPLR 901[a][5] ; see CPLR 902 ).³

We are, however, persuaded by respondent's argument that the process set forth in the judgment to identify putative class members – which, as borne out during the discovery process, would require OTDA to engage in an up-front manual review of over 10,000 case files – places a significant burden on OTDA (see Matter of Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 75, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956, 346 N.E.2d 794 [1976] ). On remittal, respondent proposed incorporating into any issued class action judgment an "opt-in" procedure whereby putative class members would self-identify. The 10,000–plus case files include all cases denied during a defined period for having excess resources (see 163 A.D.3d at 96, 79 N.Y.S.3d 371 ). It is fair to say that, in many of these cases, the excess resource threshold was not based on the FMV of an automobile. In such cases, a manual review would come up empty, wasting valuable administrative resources. Respondent's opt-in methodology approaches the member identification process from a different angle. Respondent has confirmed that it can readily identify the 10,000–plus case files through its computer database. Under the proposed opt-in method, a notice would be sent to each member of this category advising that the recipient may be entitled to a corrective payment for a wrongful denial of benefits as defined in this case based on the agency's incorrect valuation of an automobile. The notice recipients could, in turn, request an interview to determine whether they qualified for a corrective payment.

Although petitioner maintains that this approach places an undue burden on the recipient to initiate a review, the record suggests otherwise. Case in point is the notice of decision issued to petitioner on...