Stewart v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC
Decision Date | 30 April 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 4:13-CV-539-VEH |
Parties | DANIEL STEWART, JR., Plaintiff, v. SANOFI AVENTIS U.S., LLC, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Daniel Stewart, Jr. ("Mr. Stewart") initiated this products liability action in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, on July 26, 2012. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). Defendant Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC ("Sanofi") removed the lawsuit to federal court on March 21, 2013. (Doc. 1 at 1). The case was reassigned to the undersigned on March 26, 2013. (Doc. 9). Sanofi filed an amended removal petition on April 5, 2013. (Doc. 14).
Pending before the court is Sanofi's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 12) (the "Motion") filed on March 28, 2013. (Doc. 12). Mr. Stewart has filed no opposition to the Motion, which under Appendix III to the court's uniform initial order was due on April 11, 2013. (See Doc. 2 at 23 ¶ B.2 ()). Accordingly, the Motion is now ready for disposition, and, for the reasons explained below, is GRANTED IN PART and is otherwise DENIED.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8 does not mandate the inclusion of "detailed factual allegations" within a complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). However at the same time, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
"[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifyingpleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (emphasis added). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Mr. Stewart's failure to file any opposition does not automatically mean that the Motion is due to be granted. As explained by Judge Steele in Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Howard, No. 12-0175-WS-N, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2013):
As noted, Churchill and Howard elected not to be heard inresponse to BB & T's Amended Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding that omission, BB & T (as Rule 12(b)(6) movant) bears the initial burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to dismissal of the counterclaims. Churchill's and Howard's lack of response to the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion does not trigger the kneejerk granting of such Motion on an abandonment theory. See Gailes v. Marengo County Sheriff's Dep't, 2013 WL 81227, *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2013) (). Rather, it remains BB & T's burden as movant to establish its entitlement to relief under Rule 12(b)(6). In light of these circumstances, the Court scrutinizes BB & T's Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the following legal standard: Id.
Branch Banking, 2013 WL 172903, *1 (footnotes omitted).
Mr. Stewart's second amended complaint indicates that he is suing Sanofi in its capacity as a designer, manufacturer, and seller of the prescription drug named Ambien. (Doc. 12-1 at 1 ¶ 1).1 Mr. Stewart claims that his use of zolpidem, the generic form of Ambien, as a sleeping aid on the night of October 3, 2011, caused him to engage in bizarre and erratic acts of misconduct while he was out of town in Indiana on a business trip, which culminated in his arrest and the loss of his job. (Id.at 3 ¶ 5; id. at 4 ¶¶ 7, 10).
Mr. Stewart does not allege Sanofi is a designer, manufacturer, or seller of zolpidem. (Doc. 12-1 at 3 ¶ 5). Instead, he contends that other former defendants (that were dismissed during the course of the state court proceedings)2 are responsible for the production and supply of zolpidem as a generic drug on the market. (Id.). Mr. Stewart's alleged damages include "much humiliation, embarrassment and chagrin . . . psychological and mental pain and suffering . . . ." (Doc. 12-1 at 11 ¶ 13).
Mr. Stewart asserts three separate counts against Sanofi: count one for negligently, wantonly, and/or willfully failing to adequately warn; count two for fraudulent concealment; and count three for breach of implied warranty for a particular purpose. (Doc. 12-1 at 11-12).
As a threshold matter, Sanofi asserts in its Motion that this court should apply Indiana law when evaluating the ability of Mr. Stewart to state a claim against it. More specifically, following Alabama's choice of law principles as this is a diversitycase,3 Sanofi maintains that because Mr. Stewart "was injured in Indiana . . . Indiana law applies to his claims against [it]." (Doc. 12 at 3). The court agrees.
As the Supreme Court of Alabama has articulated:
Fitts v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 823 (Ala. 1991) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, consistent with Fitts, the court will address Mr. Stewart's claims under Indiana law.
Sanofi suggests that all of Mr. Stewart's claims are governed by the Indiana Product Liability Act (the "IPLA"). The IPLA provides in relevant part that:
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