Stewart v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 91,91
• Citation: 287 Md. 524,413 A.2d 1337
• Parties: Gregory Bernard STEWART v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 524

287 Md. 524

413 A.2d 1337

Gregory Bernard STEWART v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 91.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 6, 1980.

Martha Weisheit, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

William H. Kenety, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE and RODOWSKY, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

In this criminal cause we address the issue whether the indictment as returned by the grand jury here was void ab initio, so as to require that the petitioner's conviction and sentence be set aside and that charging document dismissed.

The parties' agreed statement of facts is short, and thus, with minor editing, may be set out in full.

Gregory B. Stewart, at the time seventeen years of age, was alleged to be delinquent in the Circuit Court for Cecil County on grounds of an attempted robbery with a deadly weapon. On May 19, 1977, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction, and Stewart appealed. On January 25, 1978, the Court of Special Appeals filed an unreported opinion affirming the waiver order.

On February 16, 1978, prior to issuance of the mandate by the intermediate appellate court, the grand jury in Cecil County returned in the circuit court an indictment against Stewart charging him with attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon and related crimes. On February 24, 1978, the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals issued pursuant to Maryland Rule 1076.

On May 8, 1978, the petitioner was convicted of the attempted robbery as well as the assault charges and sentenced to serve concurrent ten year prison terms. On appeal, Stewart argued for the first time that these convictions were void because the indictment had been returned prior to issuance of the Court of Special Appeals' mandate in the appeal of the waiver determination.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed holding, again in an unreported opinion, that the circuit court action prior to issuance of the mandate rendered neither the indictment nor Stewart's subsequent conviction null and void. It held that although the grand jury may have acted improperly in returning the indictment prior to the issuance of the mandate, this charging document was not void, and since there was no objection made in the trial court and the grand jury action was not inconsistent with the Court of Special Appeals' mandate, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We granted certiorari to examine the propriety of this holding. Being in agreement with the Court of Special Appeals that the indictment returned by the grand jury against the petitioner in this cause was within the circuit court's jurisdiction to receive and not void, we shall affirm the judgment of that appellate court.

In explaining the rationale for the mandate we issue in this case, it may be well to recall for the reader that " '(j)uridically, jurisdiction refers to two quite distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court to render a valid (final judgment), and (ii) the propriety of granting the relief sought. 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941), Secs. 129-31.' " First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm'r, 272 Md. 329, 334, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974) (quoting Moore v. McAllister, 216 Md. 497, 507, 141 A.2d 176, 182 (1958)). Thus, it is only when a court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to render the judgment it did that there is an absence of authority in the court so as to render its judgment a nullity. First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm'r, supra, 272 Md. at 334, 322 A.2d at 543. Accord, Pulley v. State, 287 Md. ---, 412 A.2d 1244, 1248-51 (1980); Parks v. State, 287 Md. 11, 17-19, 410 A.2d 597, 601-02 (1980); Block v. State, 286 Md. 266, 270-73, 407 A.2d 320, 322-24 (1979). On the other hand, "the question of whether it was appropriate to grant the relief merges into the final (judgment) and cannot (therefore) be successfully assailed for that reason once enrolled." First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm'r, supra. The power possessed by a court to hear and determine disputes, including that which is inherent, is derived from applicable constitutional and statutory pronouncements. So if,

by that law which defines the authority of the court, a judicial body is given the power to render a judgment over the class of cases within which a particular one falls, then its action cannot be assailed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit courts of this State, such as the Circuit Court for (Cecil) County, are courts of original general jurisdiction, Maryland Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 19, 20, and, therefore, they may hear and decide all cases at law ((which include criminal causes)) and in equity ((which include juvenile causes)) other than those which fall within the class of controversies reserved by a particular law for the exclusive jurisdiction of some other forum. (First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm'r, supra, 272 Md. at 335, 322 A.2d at 543 (citations omitted). ¹)

To this we add the widely acknowledged principles that parties cannot confer jurisdiction, in its fundamental sense, upon a court by consent, and that the lack of such jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including initially on appeal. But when a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and also the parties, it ordinarily has power to decide the issue in dispute between those parties.

In the case now before us no one contests that the Circuit Court for Cecil County acquired jurisdiction of the parties; nor does either party dispute that the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over both juvenile causes, Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.), Courts Art., §§ 3-801 to 3-834, as well as over criminal causes of the type involved here. Md.Const., Art. IV, §§ 1, 19 and 20. However, as we perceive it, the petitioner does contend that when he noted an immediate appeal to the Court of Special Appeals (as was authorized by § 3-817(f) of the Courts Article) from the trial court's § 3-817 order waiving the exclusive juvenile jurisdiction over him, the Circuit Court for Cecil...