Stewart Wholesale Co. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District of State
| Decision Date | 24 October 1925 |
| Citation | 41 Idaho 572,240 P. 597 |
| Parties | STEWART WHOLESALE COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY, GEORGE W. EDGINGTON, as Judge of Said District Court, A. B. LUNDBERG, L. E. LUNDBERG, JOEL J. LUNDBERG and ALLIE LUNDBERG, His Wife, LEWIS E. LUNDBERG and ARDA LUNDBERG, His Wife, and JOHN W. R. LUNDBERG, Defendants |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
EQUITY-TRIAL-SUBMISSION OF PHASE OF CASE TO JURY-SPECIAL VERDICT-CLERK'S JUDGMENT ON-NULLITY-JUDGMENT BY COURT-STIPULATIONS-ENFORCEMENT.
1. In a case involving equitable issues, where a phase of the case is submitted to a jury for verdict, under stipulation that questions in equity will be later submitted to the court, the verdict is a special verdict, and the judgment rendered must be by the court, and the clerk is without authority to enter judgment unless rendered by the court.
2. A judgment entered by the clerk on a special verdict, in an action involving equitable issues stipulated to be tried by the court, where no judgment has been ordered or rendered thereon by the court, is a nullity.
3. Stipulations between attorneys relating to the conduct of cases should be kept in good faith, and enforced when fair reasonable and proper, unless good cause is shown to the contrary.
Original application for Writ of Mandate. Writ granted.
Peremptory writ issued. Costs to plaintiff.
Delana & Delana and Arthur W. Holden, for Plaintiffs.
A judgment is not final as to matters, even though covered in the pleadings, which were withdrawn by consent or stipulation of the parties. (Southern P. Ry. Co. v. Edmunds, 168 Cal. 415, 143 P. 597; Miller v. James, 180 Cal 38, 179 P. 174; Crossman v. Greggs, 188 Mass. 156, 74 N.E. 358; Allen v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.), 252 S.W. 347; Healey v. Bowman, 271 Pa. 293, 115 A. 184; Brennan v. American Sulphur Min. Co., 45 Colo. 248, 100 P. 412; Utah Oil Refining Co. v. District Court, 60 Utah 428, 209 P. 624; Davenport v. Davenport, 69 Mont. 405, 222 P. 422; Johnson v. Vance, 86 Cal. 128, 24 P. 863.)
A judgment is not a final judgment as to matters which were not actually litigated, even though covered by the pleadings. ( Major v. Owen, 126 Minn. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 589, 147 N.W. 662; Fox v. Fox, 154 Minn. 169, 191 N.W. 420; Parker v. Shannon, 137 Ill. 376, 27 N.E. 525; Crebbins v. Bryce, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 532, 60 S.W. 587; Allen v. Frank (Tex. Civ. App.), 252 S.W. 347; Hastings v. Swindle, 206 Mo.App. 74, 226 S.W. 71; McComb v. Frink, 149 U.S. 629, 13 S.Ct. 993, 37 L.Ed. 876; Black on Judgments, 2d ed., sec. 620.)
A judgment is not final where a part of the issues are withdrawn for any cause. (34 C. J. 825, sec. 1238; Palmer v. Sanger, 143 Ill. 34, 32 N.E. 390; Dean v. Cole, 103 Ore. 570, 204 P. 952; Farrell v. Steward, 134 Ark. 605, 135 Ark. 617, 204 S.W. 423; Lake v. Hancock, 38 Fla. 53, 56 Am. St. 159, 20 So. 811; Levy v. Solomon, 207 Pa. 478, 56 A. 1007; Young v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 131 S.W. 62; 34 C. J. 931, sec. 1337.)
It is not material that the equitable features of this case were not disposed of at the same term at which the law features were settled by a verdict of the jury. (Utah Oil Refining Co. v. District Court, 60 Utah 428, 209 P. 624.
"A stipulation between attorneys relating to the conduct of a suit should be enforced unless good cause is shown to the contrary." (Brennan v. American Sulphur & Min. Co., 45 Colo. 248, 100 P. 412.)
C. E. Crowley and E. M. Holden, for Defendants.
The complaint shows on its face that the final judgment on the verdict has been entered in the trial court at plaintiff's special instance and request; that no cause of action is now pending in said district court; that no order reserving judgment was made when said verdict was received and no reservation of judgment for further hearing was retained in said judgment; that plaintiff was evidently satisfied with the verdict and judgment rendered in the action and is bound by the record. (C. S., secs. 6864, 6895; Barry v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. 486, 27 P. 763; White v. White, 130 Cal. 597, 80 Am. St. 150, 62 P. 1062; Carpentier v. Hart, 5 Cal. 406; Hubbard v. Moss, 65 Mo. 647; 33 C. J. 1193; In re Barry, 94 Cal. 562, 29 P. 1109; United States F. & G. Co. v. Porter, 3 F.2d 57; 1 R. C. L. 341; Suydam v. Pitcher, 4 Cal. 280.)
The complaint in this proceeding shows on its face that the lower court has heretofore made and entered a judicial order, finding and judgment to the effect that the judgment on the verdict prepared and caused to be entered by the plaintiff in said case was a final judgment in said case and that the plaintiff is estopped by its own acts to further prosecute said case in said court; that said judgment and order is a judicial determination of fact and of such a nature that it will not be reviewed by this court on application for a writ of mandate. (Newman v. District Court, 32 Idaho 607, 186 P. 922; Cahill v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 42, 78 P. 467; see annotations, 4 A. L. R. 599.)
The complaint in this proceeding shows that the plaintiff has waived and abandoned its rights to be heard on any of the equitable issues, and it is estopped by its conduct and by its own record made by it in the lower court and pleaded in said complaint to claim any of the relief prayed for. ( Klokke v. Stanley, 109 Ill. 192; Ames v. Ames, 75 Neb. 473, 106 N.W. 584; 38 C. J. 574; 1 C. J. 1169, sec. 443, and cases cited.)
When at the trial of a cause of action containing legal and equitable issues it is stipulated that certain issues will be submitted to a jury and the remaining issues will "later be submitted to the court," the defendant, by entering into such stipulation, does not consent to a splitting of the cause of action so that more than one final judgment can be entered in such case. (Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 121, 99 Am. Dec. 256; Leavitt v. Judge, 52 Mich. 595, 18 N.W. 374; State v. Judge, 43 La. Ann. 826, 9 So. 640.)
The defendants against whom judgment was rendered thereafter appealed to this court, and other defendants made application to the lower court to have certain property released from attachment in said case, which motion was resisted by plaintiff. After hearing, the court released said property and held that such judgment was a final judgment. From said order the plaintiff took an appeal to this court and thereby waived any rights it might have had for further hearing under said stipulation, and abandoned the equitable issues in the case. The judgment is therefore binding on the plaintiff as a final judgment and it is estopped by its own act and record from procuring a writ of mandate to compel the district court to further try any of said issues not tried or presented at the trial in the district court.
The jurisdiction of the lower court is exhausted and further hearing and trial of the case will not be ordered by this court on application of plaintiff for a writ of mandate. (C. S., sec. 6864, 6895; Peck v. Booth, 42 Conn. 271; People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9; Bear Lake Co. v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 108 Am. St. 179, 75 P. 614; De Cordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex. 470.)
The defendants did not, by stipulating that certain legal issues be submitted to a jury and that the remaining issues should be later submitted to the court, agree that more than one judgment be made and entered in said case, or that the plaintiff should take and enter final judgment on the verdict and that the then remaining issues of the case should be tried by the court. The final judgment has in fact been entered in said case and the action on which said final judgment was based is no longer pending in said court. Such judgment will not be reviewed in mandamus and the same does not constitute a refusal on the part of the trial court to act.
This action was instituted against the Hon. George W. Edgington, Judge of the district court of the ninth judicial district, and others named defendants, to secure an alternative writ of mandate, requiring the judge to make and enter an order setting a cause for trial, wherein the plaintiff herein and all of the defendants except the said judge were parties, alleged to be pending in said court, or to show cause why said order should not be made and entered. The cause was heard herein upon the complaint, a demurrer of the defendants thereto for insufficiency, and the return and answer of the defendant judge. Both the complaint and the answer thereto set forth many matters which it will not be necessary for this court to consider. We will treat of the sufficiency of the complaint and the return thereto together.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff, by a complaint and an amended complaint, in an action wherein this plaintiff was plaintiff and all of the defendants except the Hon George W. Edgington, District Judge, were defendants, in the district court in and for Bonneville county, set forth facts and prayed a judgment upon two promissory notes against W. A. Bishop, Lewis Dunton, M. B. Poole, A. H. Beasley, Isadore...
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