Lake v. Hancock

• Decision Date: 16 June 1896
• Citation: 20 So. 811,38 Fla. 53
• Parties: LAKE v. HANCOCK.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

20 So. 811

38 Fla. 53

LAKE v. HANCOCK.

Florida Supreme Court

June 16, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Columbia county; John F. White, Judge.

Ejectment by Minerva J. Hancock, for the use of James W. Payne, against Asa Lake. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. In an action of ejectment, proof by defendant that third persons, other than the plaintiff, have executed to such defendant a deed of conveyance of the premises in dispute unaccompanied by any proof of possession or title in such grantors in said conveyance, is no evidence of title in such defendant. Especially is such a deed of no avail to a party defendant who has admitted to the plaintiff that he knew the grantors therein did not own the land conveyed thereby, and that the deed was of no validity.

2. A vendee, having acquired possession of land from his vendor under an executory contract to purchase the same, and having failed to pay for the same, and to surrender possession upon demand, after he had forfeited his right thereto, is estopped, when sued by his vendor for the possession of the land so wrongfully withheld, to dispute his vendor's title, or to set up as a defense any outstanding title acquired by him (the vendee) during the continuance of such possession.

3. An unrecorded deed is good and effectual against subsequent purchasers, unless such purchasers bought the premises without notice of the former conveyance, and for a valuable consideration.

4. The want of notice on the part of a purchaser of premises which his grantors had previously conveyed by an unrecorded deed need not be shown otherwise than by showing the absence of a record, which is prima facie sufficient.

5. The burden of proof is upon the party who claims by virtue of a priority of record, against a prior but unrecorded deed, to show affirmatively the payment of a valuable consideration which must be shown by some other evidence than the mere recital of it in a deed.

6. In an action of ejectment, where the evidence only tends to show that the land sued for was included with other lands in the declaration filed in an action of ejectment formerly pending between the same parties, but, for some reason not shown, was omitted from the verdict and judgment, the issue as to the land in controversy does not appear to have been determined for either party; and, there being no judgment as to the identical matter in controversy, the former proceedings are no bar to plaintiff's recovery.

7. In an action of ejectment, where the defendant had, as against the plaintiff, no title or right of possession whatever, and was estopped to dispute the plaintiff's title, and could not have defeated the plaintiff under any proper view of the law and facts of the case, and where the plaintiff was entitled to succeed, whatever might have been the charge of the court, it is idle to discuss the question whether or not the trial court made some technical error in its instructions to the jury. If there was such error, it is harmless error for which the judgment should not be reversed.

COUNSEL

B. B. Blackwell, for appellant.

B. H. Palmer, for appellee.

OPINION

The proceeding in the court below was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff against the defendant. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The parties are hereinafter designated according to their status in the circuit court. The plea was not guilty.

It appears from the evidence that the original possession of the defendant was as a tenant of George W. Hancock, deceased, who was the husband of the plaintiff. He was what was called a 'renter' or 'cropper.' After the death of Hancock, the plaintiff, his widow and heir at law, also rented the land to defendant for the year 1883. He did not pay the rent, but, in the fall of the same year, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to buy the land. She gave him bond for titles. He paid $200 cash upon the purchase money and executed two notes for the balance. Several years after, the defendant came to see the plaintiff, and told her that he was not able to pay for the land, and also told her that he had a deed from one George W. Watts to the same land. The plaintiff stated to him that he knew said Watts did not own the land. To this statement defendant replied, 'Yes; that he knew Watts did not own the land, and that his deed was no account.' After this conversation the plaintiff, with her attorney, went to the land in question, tendered the defendant a warranty deed and his purchase-money notes, and demanded a compliance with his bond for title. He said he was not able to pay, and would remove from the land in a week, if given time. Plaintiff gave him two weeks to get off, and then demanded, about June 1, 1890, that he get off. Afterwards he sent a message to plaintiff, stating that his attorneys advised him to hold the land. The defendant had remained upon the land continuously from the date of his contract of purchase to the trial of the case. The evidence shows various deeds and muniments of title of the plaintiff and her ancestor, George W. Hancock. The defendant relied upon what he claimed was a former adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and a deed from one George W. Watts and wife. The nature of this defense of res judicata is stated in the opinion. The deed from Watts and wife to defendant was executed September 1, 1886, and was duly recorded on the 2d day of the same month. It appears from the evidence that Florence Watts, wife of George W. Watts, was a daughter and heir at law of C. D. Parks, the original patentee of the land, and was also an heir at law of Minnie Parks and Mary Parks, deceased, daughters of said patentee. The said parties, on January 1, 1882, before the contract of purchase by the defendant, had made a deed of conveyance to said George W. Hancock, embracing the land in question, conveying all the right, title, and interest of Mrs. Watts as an heir at law of the parties above mentioned. This conveyance, however, was not recorded until September 1, 1890. The deed of same parties to the defendant is not a conveyance of any special interest in the land, but a conveyance of the premises generally, containing covenants of warranty that both parties were seised of an absolute fee-simple title to the land. There is no evidence showing any title or possession in Watts and wife at the time of the conveyance to the defendant. A motion for new trial was overruled. The defendant takes an appeal. The alleged errors consist in overruling the motion for a new trial, and in incorrect charges of the court to the jury upon the trial of the case.

LIDDON, J. (after stating the facts).

It is claimed by counsel for appellant (defendant below) that the motion for new trial was improperly overruled, for the reason that the evidence fails to show the entire estate in the appellee, and would not support a recovery of a fee-simple title. The defect in the evidence is not pointed out by counsel. He says it is a plain, palpable fact, to be ascertained by an inspection of the deeds in evidence. We have examined the deeds offered by plaintiff, and, in connection with the parol proof offered, we think, as against the defendant, they show a valid, fee-simple title in the plaintiff. It is entirely useless, when the propositions of law hereinafter stated shall be considered, to state the nature and character of the evidence impelling us to this conclusion. The defendant evidently means that the deed of George W. Watts and wife to him shows that at the time of his contract of purchase of the land there was an outstanding title to the land, or some interest therein, which was afterwards purchased by him, and constitutes a defect in appellee's title. There are many reasons why this deed does not show any title whatever in the appellant, and why it fails to show any defect in appellee's title. In the first place, there is no evidence whatever that George W. Watts and wife, the grantors, were ever in possession of the premises conveyed or that at the time of such conveyance he had any title to the same. A deed unaccompanied by such evidence is not sufficient evidence of a title of appellant to justify setting aside the verdict upon the grounds stated. Railway Co. v. Burt, 36 Fla. 497, 18 So. 581. Especially should this deed be held of no avail to the appellant, when, according to the undisputed evidence in the case, he admitted to the appellee, in the presence of her counsel, that he knew at the time of the execution of the deed that Watts did not own the land, and that the deed was of 'no account.' Another and the most important reason why the appellant cannot avail himself of the purchase of the supposed outstanding title is that at the time he acquired such title he was in possession of the land,--a possession acquired from the appellee under an executory contract with her for the purchase of the same. Having failed to pay for the land in accordance with his contract, and to surrender the possession, upon demand, after he had forfeited his right thereto, he is estopped to dispute his vendor's title, or to set up any outstanding title acquired by him while in such possession (as is stated above), when his vendor sues for the possession of the land thus wrongfully withheld from her. The following rule has been laid down by this court: 'A party having the right to enter into possession of land, and agreeing to so enter in a contract of purchase based upon an acknowledgment of title in another, and obtaining possession, so far as this party is concerned, under such agreement, is estopped from referring his possession to rights acquired under a conveyance by a third party to him. A party thus...